Child Law

Parent was found unfit as to two of her minor children. Court's finding of unfitness was not against manifest weight of evidence, as evidence showed that despite several years of therapy, assistance and coaching, parent was incapable of safely and effectively parenting the minors. Parenty failed to show she was treated differently from a similarly situated individual, or that Section 1(D)(g) of Adoption Act contains a presumption of unfitness or that she was unable to rebut or present evidence; thus she failed to show finding of unfitness violated her right to equal protection. (TOOMIN and LAVIN, concurring.)

At a dispositional hearing in a juvenile neglect case, trial court found Respondent grandmother, a party to the case because of her status as the legal guardian for two of the three children, unable to care for them, and that best interest of the children would be jeopardized if they remained in her custody, because she allowed their mother, who was a known substance abuser, to care for the children from the end of their school day until she returned home from work. Court improperly dismissed Respondent grandmother as a party from the case, as this dismissal denied services for her to become able to exercise guardianship over the children. The legislature intended for a minor's legal guardian to remain a party throughout the proceedings, regardless of whether the court names DCFS as guardian. (TURNER and MYERSCOUGH, concurring.)

Court terminated the parental rights of mother as to her minor son, finding that she is unfit and that termination is in minor's best interest. Respondent mother received ineffective assistance of counsel from per se conflict of interest when, during proceedings, the same Assistant PD appeared on her behalf at one hearing and subsequently appeared on minor's behalf at another hearing. Regardless of the source of a client's right to representation, including when under Juvenile Court Act, the right includes the right to undivided loyalty from attorney who does not undertake conflicting interests or inconsistent duties. Length and nature of representation are irrelevant, and conflict rule includes situations where prejudice may be difficult to establish. (McLAREN, concurring; HUTCHINSON, dissenting.)

Delinquency petition was filed in 2007, when Respondent had reached age 21, for events alleged to have occurred in 2000, when Respondent was under age 17. Circuit court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction. The issue raised by Respondent, that because he had reached age 21 he was no longer subject to petition brought under the Juvenile Court Act, addressed a potentially fatal pleading defect rather than a jurisdictional question. (KILBRIDE, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring; FREEMAN and BURKE, dissenting.)

Court terminated parental rights of both natural parents of nine-year-old boy, finding that termination was in minor's best interests. Court was not required to hear evidence or to make explicit finding regarding every statutory best interest factor. Even though minor was not in a pre-adoptive home but in residential facility at time of termination, evidence showed numerous bases for termination being in best interests, including mother's substantial drug addiction, and failure of both parents to show any concern or responsibility for minor's welfare. (NEVILLE and STEELE, concurring.)

Court found that it was in best interest of minor that mother's parental rights be terminated, found that she was unfit, and found that she failed to make reasonable progress toward return home in first nine months following adjudication of neglect. Respondent repeatedly relapsed and was discharged from alcohol treatment programs for drinking during programs, and arrived intoxicated for visits with minor, during initial nine-month period. That Respondent remained sober for 14 months after a relapse after initial nine-month period is irrelevant to finding of failure to make reasonable progress. Court's finding that at time of best interests hearing Respondent was not in a position to have minor returned to her was not unfounded, as Respondent had three recent relapses. Foster mother's testimony that she wanted the minor's family to remain involved in his life does not preclude best interests finding of termination. (NEVILLE and STEELE, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed third amended complaint for wrongful death/medical malpractice in post-operative care after bariatric surgery. Even though reviewing physician's report did not state the manner in which he had been practicing within the last six years, the circumstances, including his prior depositions, sufficiently establish that he had practiced within the last six years in the same area of health care at issue in the case, and his report stated that he was familiar with patients of the type involved. Physician's prior depositions do not materially conflict with his report, so that Section 2-622(e) deposition of physician is not justified. Court should have granted request for contempt finding, rather than dismiss complaint with prejudice, as Plaintiff had good-faith basis to refuse to produce physician for deposition in that confusion existed, at time of filing, as to whether disclosure of reviewing physician's identity was required. (ZENOFF and BURKE, concurring.)

Court's factual findings, that Respondent father/step-father did not torture or abuse his children or step-child, and that even if he had erred in his child-rearing in the past, such errors were not likely to recur, were not against manifest weight of evidence. Although testimony of sons and step-child of Respondent was disturbing, Respondent denied allegations, and trial court was in best position to judge witness credibility. Petitioners (grandmother and step-grandfather of one minor) thus lacked standing to petition for guardianship of minor, as evidence did not rebut the presumption that the father was willing and able to make and carry out day-to-day child-care decisions as to minor. (KNECHT and POPE, concurring.)

Minors were adjudicated as neglected, based on finding that their mother had failed to follow safety plan to keep minors from contact with her live-in boyfriend who was alleged to have committed sexual abuse on mother's four-year-old daughter. Mother appealed court's finding at temporary custody hearing, arguing that the State failed to establish probable cause for the implementation of a safety plan, arguing that the safety plan was based solely on daughter's statements which were neither corroborated nor subject to cross-examination. A finding of probable cause is not equivalent to a "finding" on the merits of abuse, neglect, or dependency. Section 2-18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act, which requires corroboration and cross-examination of a minor's previous statements as to allegations of abuse or neglect, does not apply to temporary custody hearings (also known as "shelter care hearings"), as such hearings are intended to be preliminary in nature with a focus on the necessity of removal for the immediate protection of the minor. (FITZGERALD, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and KARMEIER, concurring; FREEMAN, dissenting.)

Minor was adjudicated neglected, and at dispositional hearing court minor was made a ward of the court, the mother was found unfit, and custody was granted to father. Father filed a petition for custody in family court, and in juvenile court filed motions to consolidate juvenile and family court cases and to dismiss mother's motion to restore custody. Proceedings which were held before a juvenile court judge who then prepared to transfer matter to family court for proceedings before a different judge were in violation of the plain language of Rule 903, which requires that consolidated custody proceedings must be conducted by a single judge. (HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, concurring.)