Child Law

Respondent, age 15 at time of State's petition for adjudication, was adjudicated a delinquent minor for robbery and sentenced as a habitual juvenile offender and committed to Department of Juvenile Justice until age 21. Sentence is not equivalent to being sentenced as adult to death or to life without parole; and Respondent had committed two offenses that were felonies if prosecuted as adult, and violent third offense. Habitual juvenile offender provision of Juvenile Court Act does not violate due process or equal protection. (GORDON and PALMER, concurring.)

The State has standing to raise parentage issues in a neglect proceeding in the best interests of a minor, under the Juvenile Court Act, but the State's challenge must comply with the Parentage Act. Signatories of a Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity (VAP), but not the State, may challenge a VAP under Section 6(d) of the Parentage Act, on the limited grounds of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. State does not have standing to initiate a subsection (b) disestablishment of parentage action under Section 7 of the Parentage Act. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring; THEIS and GARMAN, specially concurring.)

Respondent, age 13, was adjudicated delinquent of charges arising out of altercation with her 14-year-old brother, and she was ordered to register for minimum of 10 years under Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act. Act requires that juveniles automatically register as adults when they turn 17, and contains no provision to petition for relief from registration requirement. Registration provisions of Act are unconstitutional as a violation of procedural due process and equal protection. Legislature's disparate treatment of juvenile offenders required to register, by allowing juvenile sex offenders to petition for relief from registration as an adult but not allowing such petitions for juvenile offenders against youth, violates equal protection. Denial of due process, as upon registration as an adult information will be publicly available, and Act fails to provide procedural due process protections. (HYMAN, concurring; PUCINSKI, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Respondent minor, age 14 at time of incident, was charged by petition for adjudication of wardship alleging sexual conduct against his then 3-year-old cousin. Improperly admitted testimony of detective about statement made by victim was harmless error, as it was cumulative of properly admitted evidence, and did not contributed to Respondent minor's adjudication of guilt. Properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supported Respondent's adjudication.(GARMAN, FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Off-duty sheriff's deputy saw live-feed webcam showing a young boy performing oral sex on adult male in bed with him and with an adult woman, child's mother. Court properly admitted deputy's testimony, and Respondent mother presented no evidence of tampering. Evidence established that technology allowed deputy to truly and accurately observe what was happening at source end of webcast. Court's finding that child was neglected and abused was not against manifest weight of evidence.(APPLETON and KNECHT, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 5/13/14.) Respondent, then age 15, was adjudicated delinquent for a forcible felony, for attack by group of girls on another girl on CTA el train. Court violated one-act, one-crime doctrine by finding Respondent delinquent of both aggravated battery and simple battery for striking and biting victim. As both adjudications resulted from same physical act, court should not have found her delinquent of both, but should have vacated less serious offense of battery. Mandatory minimum probation term of five years for robbery does not violate equal protection clause, as Respondent cannot establish she is similarly situated to juveniles who commit nonforcible felonies or that a criminal conviction of adult offender equates to a finding of delinquency. (NEVILLE and MASON, concurring.)

Ample evidence was presented to support court's finding that termination of mother's parental rights was in minor's best interest. Mother's long-term heroin addiction and multiple relapses have severely interfered with her ability to parent, and minor, age 12, is in need of permanency. Only if court had first determined that it was not in minor's best interest to terminate mother's parental rights would court have been able to then consider option of a custodial alternative, such as alternative guardianship arrangement. (HOWSE and LAVIN, concurring.)

Court found that evidence produced by State against minor, age 13 at time of incident, sufficient to prove minor guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of arson, aggravated arson, residential arson, theft, and burglary, for participating with another minor in setting fire to a residence. Minor, who was mildly mentally retarded and read at a first-grade level, could not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. Thus, court erred in denying minor's motion to suppress his statement to police. (CHAPMAN and SCHWARM, concurring.)