Child Law

After adjudication hearing, court found minor to be a neglected minor, due to lack of care, and minor was made ward of court after dispositional hearing. FInding was not against manifest weight of evidence, as record showed that Respondent-mother affirmatively locked minor out of her home, refused to take him home when he was placed in temporary shelter, refused request of DCFS to inquire about minor living with his father, and failed to make care plan for minor's emotional and behavioral disturbances at school. (FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Minor in delinquency proceeding was denied due process by his appointed attorney operating under per se conflict of interest, as attorney functioned more as GAL than as defense counsel. A per se conflict exists when minor's counsel in delinquency proceeding simultaneously functions as both defense counsel and GAL, as risk that minor's constitutional and statutory right to counsel will be diluted or denied is too great. (KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and THEIS, concurring; FREEMAN and KARMEIER, concurring in part and dissenting in part; THOMAS, dissenting.)

State filed petition for wardship of minor, then age 14, admitted to unlawful consumption of alcohol; upon revocation of her probation, court sentenced minor to 364 days’ confinement in Department of Juvenile Justice. Court was not authorized to incarcerate minor, as Section 5-710 of Juvenile Court Act does not authorize commitment to Department for unlawful consumption, a crime that is legally impossible for an adult to commit. (TURNER and POPE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 8/30/12.) Per oral agreement with mother, then age 16, petitioners had cared for child in the home from birth until age 7, when child began living with mother. Petitioners filed for guardianship, arguing that mother had voluntarily relinquished custody of child to them. Prior version of Guardianship Act, Section 11-5(b), which is applicable, granted standing to petitioners only in limited situations where parent consented to guardianship or child had no living parent able to care for child. Parent cannot, outside of court, orally consent to appointment of guardian over her child, and "constructive guardianship" is not recognized. Mother had refused Petitioners' repeated requests for written agreement to custody, and mother showed evidence that arrangement was inherently temporary in nature. (EPSTEIN and HOWSE, concurring.)

Petitioner filed Parentage Action to determine existence of father-child relationship shortly after seeing picture of child, then age 5, on mother's social media website, as child resembled him, and contacted mother and asked if he could be the father, which DNA test then confirmed. There is a presumption that Petitioner is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless visitation would endanger seriously child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health. Petitioner bore no initial burden of proof, and GAL's concerns that child did not know that Petitioner was her biological father and that starting visitation would place child at risk of harm academically, socially, and emotionally does not constitute evidence showing that visitation would seriously endanger child's health. Court could have taken steps to reduce risk of harm by gradually introducing child to Petitioner under guidance of experienced professional. (TURNER and APPLETON, concurring.)