Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-bank’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-County’s action under Fair Housing Act (Act), alleging that defendant improperly targeted potential minority borrowers for home loans knowing that said borrowers could not repay loans, which in turn caused plaintiff to incur expenses associated with vacant properties after said loans were foreclosed, as well as lost tax income and transfer fees. Under Miami, 581 U.S. 189, Act provides relief only for injuries proximately caused by statutory violations. Moreover, plaintiff failed to allege any direct injury caused by defendant, where: (1) only borrowers incurred direct injuries from defendant’s alleged conduct in form of lost housing and money; and (2) plaintiff’s injuries were not directly related to alleged violations of Act, since plaintiff’s alleged injuries derived from injuries incurred by borrowers and other banks.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-credit reporting agency’s motion for summary judgment with respect to portion of plaintiff-debtor’s claim under Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), alleging that defendant’s credit report on plaintiff was inaccurate because it had indicated that plaintiff’s mortgage was delinquent for three months in 2017. Under terms of revised payment plan, lender indicated that plaintiff’s account would be reported as delinquent for said months, where plaintiff would be paying established, but reduced mortgage payments. Thus lender could properly report to defendant than plaintiff was delinquent during said time period. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s summary judgment motion in portion of FRCA claim, that alleged that defendant failed to include existence of revised payment plan in credit report, after plaintiff had brought existence of said plan to defendant’s attention, since: (1) said omission of revised repayment plan was material, and thus rendered credit report inaccurate; (2) existence of said plan was factual matter within defendant’s competency to identify and correct; and (3) plaintiff gave defendant enough information about said plan to alert defendant of its existence. Also, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s summary judgment on portion of plaintiff’s FCRA claim alleging that defendant was unreasonable in its reinvestigation of status of plaintiff’s mortgage regarding disparities that lender was telling plaintiff and defendant about status of mortgage, i.e. lender telling plaintiff that he was current under revised payment plan and telling defendant that plaintiff was delinquent on mortgage. As such, defendant had cost effective way that could have confirmed existence of revised payment plan so as to include it in credit report. Too, plaintiff had viable claim under FCRA that defendant ignored his request to add statement to credit report that reflected his understanding of repayment plan.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting judgment on pleadings in plaintiff’s favor in action seeking declaration that contract between parties, which hired plaintiff as defendant’s exclusive agent in its shipping and logistics company, allowed plaintiff to terminate contract. Original contract had 3-year term, continuous one-year renewal option, and mutual non-renewal provision. Said contract was amended three years later to provide that agreement would renew perpetually for one-year terms, unless defendant, in its sole discretion, notified plaintiff of its intention to terminate contract with 30 days notice prior to end of annual expiration date. Amended contract, though, left intact provision in original contract that contract could be terminated under certain circumstances, where defendant had caused material breach that went uncorrected after certain period of time. Under Illinois law, as contract of indefinite duration, instant contract was terminable at will. Moreover, because contract did not clearly state that agreement can only be terminated based on occurrence of certain conditions or events, defendant did not rebut presumption that instant contract was terminable at will.
(Halpin, D-Rock Island; Williams, D-Chicago) amends the Code of Civil Procedure to do two things. (1) If a defendant seeks a physical or mental examination of the plaintiff during discovery, it allows the plaintiff to have an additional person to be present and video record the examination. (2) Amends the statute giving a preference for a trial setting by lowering the age of a party from 70 to 67 and includes the surviving spouse or next of kin in a wrongful death action. It requires the case to commence within one year of the motion granting the preference unless the court finds that the moving party does not have a substantial interest in the case as a whole. If any new party is added to a lawsuit after the trial setting, any party may move the court to reschedule the trial to commence up to one year after the date a new defendant appeared and answered the complaint or up to one year after the date a plaintiff was added to the lawsuit. The court shall (now, may) grant a motion for preference in setting for trial if a party or, in the case of a wrongful death action, the surviving spouse or next of kin, shows substantial physical or financial hardship or alternatively shows good cause that the interests of justice will be served by granting a preference in setting for trial within one year of the hearing on the motion. Allows any party to move for a trial continuance of up to six months for good cause shown. Effective July 28, 2023.
(Williams, D-Chicago; Ellman, D-Naperville) amends the Illinois Radon Awareness Act. It provides that the lessor shall provide the prospective tenant or tenant of a dwelling unit with the Illinois Emergency Management Agency’s “Radon Guide for Tenants” pamphlet, copies of any records or reports pertaining to radon concentrations within the dwelling unit that indicate a radon hazard to the tenant, and the new statutory Disclosure of Information on Radon Hazards to Tenants form. These must be provided at the time of a prospective tenant’s application to lease a dwelling unit, before a lease is entered into, or at any time during the leasing period upon request. Provides that at the commencement of the agreed leasing period, a tenant shall have 90 days to conduct his or her own radon test of the dwelling unit. Requires a tenant who decides to have radon mitigation performed to have the express consent of the lessor before doing so. Makes other changes. Effective Jan. 1, 2024.
(Croke, D-Chicago; Ellman, D-Naperville) creates a new article in the Probate Code authorizing the use of electronic nontestamentary estate planning documents. “Nontestamentary estate planning document” means a record relating to estate planning that is readable as text at the time of signing and is not a will or contained in a will. It applies to records that create, exercise, modify, release, or revoke estate planning documents with the exception of deeds to real estate and car titles. Effective Jan. 1, 2024.
(Guzzardi, D-Chicago; Halpin, D-Rock Island) creates the Consumer Contract Reciprocal Attorney’s Fees Act. If a consumer contract allows for the recovery of attorney’s fees in an action brought by a “commercial party,” the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the defendant if he or she prevails in the action. This bill applies to any action filed on or after Jan. 1, 2024. Exemptions include if the commercial party doesn’t request attorney’s fees in its complaint or each party to the consumer contract was represented by counsel in the negotiation of the consumer contract. Effective Jan. 1, 2024.
(Stava-Murray, D-Downers Grove; Villivalam, D-Chicago) amends the Landlord and Tenant Act to prohibit a landlord from requiring a tenant or prospective tenant to pay by electronic fund transfer to a landlord under a residential lease, renewal, or extension agreement. On or after March 1, 2024, a violation is an unlawful practice under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. This Act applies to leases or agreements executed after January 1, 2024.
(Murphy, D-Des Plaines; Collins, D-Chicago) deletes Section 15-1503(b) that requires, among other things, a copy of the notice of foreclosure to be sent by first class mail to the municipality or county within the boundary of which the residential real estate is located. Provides that the court may seal a file, upon motion of a mortgagor, of any foreclosure action filed during the “COVID-19 emergency and economic recovery period.” (From March 9, 2020, to December 31, 2021.) This Section applies to any action to foreclose a mortgage relating to: (1) residential real estate as defined in Section 15-1219; and (2) real estate improved with a dwelling structure containing dwelling units for six or fewer families living independently of each other in which the mortgagor is a natural person landlord renting the dwelling units, even if the mortgagor does not occupy any of the dwelling units as the mortgagor’s personal residence. This section doesn’t apply to mortgages enacted by the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, the Federal Housing Administration, or the Department of Veterans Affairs. If a residential eviction action filed during the COVID-19 emergency and economic recovery period is still pending after June 9, 2023, the court shall order the sealing of the court file. Effective June 9, 2023, but this section is repealed on June 1, 2025.
(Croke, D-Chicago; Ellman, D-Naperville) creates a new article in the Probate Code authorizing the use of electronic nontestamentary estate planning documents. “Nontestamentary estate planning document” means a record relating to estate planning that is readable as text at the time of signing and is not a will or contained in a will. It applies to electronic records readable as text at the time of signing that creates, exercises, modifies, releases, or revokes estate planning documents with the exception of deeds to real estate and car titles. Passed both chambers.
