(Yednock, D-Ottawa) requires that the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation work with the Illinois Real Estate Lawyers Association and other interested parties to develop a standardized residential real estate contract. Scheduled for hearing this Wednesday in House Judiciary Committee.
Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s lawsuit, alleging that defendants-employees of corporation insurance company had violated section 155 of Illinois Insurance Code and had tortiously interfered with insurance contract between plaintiff-insured and insurance company, where, according to plaintiff, defendants had vexatiously and unreasonably delayed payment on plaintiff’s claim for benefits under insurance policy. Defendants as employees/agents of corporation were shielded from liability by corporation, where, as here, instant denial of coverage by defendants was undertaken on behalf of corporation. Moreover, Illinois law provides corporation’s agents with conditional privilege from tortious interference lawsuits, and plaintiff otherwise failed to adequately plead that defendants acted against corporation’s interests and acted in their own interests when denying plaintiff’s claim for benefits under policy.
(Johnson, D-Waukegan) amends the Probate Act of 1975. It provides that a person who has been convicted of a felony is qualified to act as an executor if: (a) the testator names that person as an executor and expressly acknowledges in the will that the testator is aware that the person has been convicted of a felony; and (b) the person is otherwise qualified to act as an executor.
(Villa, West Chicago) Amends the Code of Civil Procedure. Provides that every individual is entitled to an estate of homestead to the extent in value of $30,000 of his or her interest in a farm or lot of land and buildings thereon, a condominium, or personal property, owned or rightly possessed by lease or otherwise and occupied by him or her as a residence, or in a cooperative that owns property that the individual uses as a residence, or $60,000 if the homestead is owned by 2 or more individuals. Scheduled for hearing Tuesday in Senate Judiciary Committee.
(Walker, D-Arlington Heights) amends the Illinois Banking Act and other lender statutes affecting provisions concerning customer financial records and confidentiality. It provides that the language does not prohibit the furnishing of financial information to the executor, executrix, administrator, or other lawful representative of the estate of a customer. Amends the Illinois Trust and Payable on Death Accounts Act. Provides that any holder of an account may elect a per stirpes distribution option to the descendants of a natural person beneficiary if the beneficiary predeceases the last surviving holder of the account. Amends the Financial Institutions Electronic Documents and Digital Signature Act. In provisions concerning electronic notices, provides that consent to electronic transactions given by the customer pursuant to the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act shall satisfy applicable consent requirements. Amends the Probate Act of 1975. Provides that any person doing business or performing transactions on behalf of or at the direction of an executor or administrator with a will annexed shall be entitled to the presumption that the executor or administrator with the will annexed is lawfully authorized to conduct the business or perform the transaction without such person investigating the source of the authority and without verifying that the actions of the executor or administrator with the will annexed comply with a will or any order of the probate court, unless such person has actual knowledge to the contrary. It was just introduced.
(Moeller, D-Elgin) amends the Eviction Article of the Code of Civil Procedure. It requires the court to appoint an attorney for an indigent tenant in an eviction action. Provides that the Supreme Court Access to Justice Commission is responsible for the implementation of such appointments, and the State shall pay the costs of legal services provided by an appointed attorney. Requires the Supreme Court Access to Justice Commission to enter into contracts with attorneys and agencies for the provision of legal services. Requires the Supreme Court Access to Justice Commission to submit to the General Assembly a plan to fully implement the indigent tenant representation requirements within 12 months of the effective date of the amendatory Act. Just introduced.
In action under 11 USC section 547(b)(4)(A) by plaintiff-Trustee seeking to recover $3,700 that debtor had paid to defendant-creditor pursuant to garnishment order during 90-day period prior to debtor filing bankruptcy petition, Bankruptcy Ct. erred in dismissing Trustee’s application for recovery of said payments, where Bankruptcy Ct. found that under Coppie, 728 F.2d 951, as matter of Indiana law, instant transfer of money to defendant occurred when garnishment order was entered, which was beyond applicable 90-day period. Under Barnhill, 503 U.S. 393, federal law, and not state law, defined meaning of “transfer” under section 547, and that under federal law, “transfer” occurs when money passes to creditor’s control. As such., Ct. of Appeals overruled Coppie and found that Trustee had viable cause of action to seek recovery of money actually paid to defendant-creditor during relevant 90-day period.
Plaintiff bank issued a notice of citation to the defendant to turn over 500 shares of stock to satisfy a money judgment. During the proceedings a third-party irrevocable trust filed an adverse claim as to 200 of the 500 shares, claiming that they were a bona fide purchaser and owned the shares free and clear of the bank’s lien. The trial court granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment and the appellate court affirmed, finding that the bank had perfected its lien and that the trust had constructive notice of the citation prior to the sale of the stock shares. (McDADE and PETERSON, concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s action, alleging that defendant breached contract to form partnership with plaintiff. While parties can enter into agreement to form partnership, and plaintiff alleged that it and defendant orally agreed to content of terms sheet that provided sufficient terms of partnership, plain language of term sheet showed no intent to bind parties in legally enforceable manner, where there were no definite and certain terms for performance. Moreover, other sections of term sheet used only aspirational terms such as what partnership “would” or “will do” in future that did not resemble contract language. Also, term sheet did not contain clear timelines when parties were to allegedly perform their obligations. As such, allegations in complaint indicated only that the parties were considering going into business together, and parties’ oral agreement to provisions in term sheet did not create contract.