(Currie, D-Chicago) amends the Code of Civil Procedure to provide that every individual is entitled to an estate of homestead to the extent in value of $150,000 (instead of $15,000) of his or her interest in real property occupied by him or her as a residence.
Provides that if two or more individuals own property that is exempt as a homestead, the value of the exemption of each individual may not exceed his or her proportionate share of $200,000 (instead of $30,000) based upon percentage of ownership. Scheduled for hearing in House Judiciary Committee next Tuesday and for a subject-matter hearing tomorrow in House Judiciary Committee.
(Guzzardi, D-Chicago) amends the Code of Civil Procedure to provide that a judgment may be revived by filing a petition to revive the judgment in the fifth year after its entry (instead of the seventh year after its entry, or in the seventh year after its last revival, or in the twentieth year after its entry, or at any other time within 20 years after its entry if the judgment becomes dormant. Changes the limitations period for the enforcement of certain judgments from seven to five years. Scheduled for hearing in House Judiciary next Tuesday and for a subject-matter hearing tomorrow in House Judiciary.
Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on res judicata grounds plaintiffs’ RICO action arising out of defendants’ administration of construction loan agreement that allegedly caused delays in distribution of loan proceeds, where plaintiffs had been losing parties in defendants’ prior state-court foreclosure and loan guaranty actions arising out of said construction loan, as well in plaintiffs’ prior state court fraud and breach of contract actions. All elements of res judicata had been met, where: (1) at time of dismissal there had been final judgments in all prior state-court actions; (2) there had been identity of parties or their privies in said prior actions and in instant federal action; and (3) all state and instant federal actions involved single group of operative facts that formed parallel allegations of misconduct in prior state-court actions and in instant federal action. Fact that plaintiff had unsuccessfully attempted to file instant RICO action in prior state-court proceeding did not preclude application of res judicata, where plaintiffs had failed to comply with timeline to file said action in prior state-court proceeding. Ct. further rejected plaintiffs’ claims that: (1) state-court decision in Wilson, 981 N.E. 2d 971, allowed them to proceed with instant RICO action, even though other theories of relief had been rejected in prior state-court proceedings; and (2) Dist. Ct. had improperly stayed instant case under Colorado River abstention principles so as to allow plaintiffs’ pending appeal in prior state-court action to become final, and then applying res judicata doctrine based, in part, on said final decision.
(Zalewski, D-Chicago) creates the Claims Against Real Estate Recordation Act. Provides that all claims against real estate must be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which the real estate is located. Scheduled for hearing Tuesday, April 10 in House Judiciary Committee.
(Zalewski, D-Chicago) amends the Conveyances Act. It provides that the Section concerning the interests of subsequent purchasers without notice is a pure-notice recording statute. Scheduled for hearing on April 10 in House Judiciary Committee.
Plaintiff sought to purchase certain loan documents from Defendant, pursuant to "Non-Recourse Loan Sale Agreement" (LSA). During time when parties intended to close on purchase, Plaintiff paid $400,000 to Defendant as a deposit. Closing never occurred, and Defendant retained the deposit Court properly granted summary judgment for Defendant. Defendant alleged that it was ready, willing, and able to sell loan documents, including promissory notes, to Plaintiff and that it had original documents ready to be turned over to Plaintiff at closing, which is all that was required under LSA. No showing that Defendant was unable to perform its obligations at closing. Plaintiff had no excuse for its failure to close and thus forfeited its deposits under LSA.(McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring.)
Plaintiffs are Cayman Islands investment funds. Plaintiffs invested in options for share of IFN, a fund that invests in stock of companies in India. CBOE traded IFN options, and OCC cleared and settled the trades. Court denied motion for summary judgment by Defendant CBOE but granted summary judgment for Defendant OCC. Private dissemination is not protected by regulatory immunity. Question of fact as to whether private dissemination occurred. Trial court disregarded appellate court's prior opinion and erred in finding that OCC's conduct was entitled to regulatory immunity. OCC's private and premature disclosures of strike price adjustment were not shielded from suit by regulatory immunity.(BURKE and McBRIDE, concurring.)
Bankruptcy Ct. did not err in confirming debtor’s proposed Chapter 13 repayment plan that required debtor to include prorated version of her annual earned income tax credit as monthly income on her Schedule I, but allowed debtor to offset said tax credit with reasonably necessary expenses to be incurred throughout year on her Schedule J. Tax credits must be included in CMI when calculating debtor’s disposable income, and instant debtor, who qualified for treatment as below-median income debtor, may prorate her annual income tax refund and associated expenses as part of her confirmed plan. Ct. rejected Trustee’s argument that entire income tax refund should be turned over to Trustee to make additional plan payments, and that debtor must then move to modify plan if he or she wanted to retain some or all of tax refund. It also rejected Trustee’s claim that instant approach of confirming plan based on projected tax refund would produce plan that was not accurate or proposed in good faith.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-debt collector’s motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiff alleging that defendant violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by failing to contact creditor directly to obtain verification of plaintiff’s debt, after plaintiff had disputed merits of debt. Record showed that after plaintiff had disputed merits of debt, defendant verified that plaintiff’s name, address, and last four digits of her social security number matched debt report it had received from creditor. Moreover, defendant was not required to do more, even though creditor eventually acknowledged that it had assigned wrong account number to plaintiff. Ct. further rejected plaintiff’s claim that section 1692(g) of FDCPA required defendant to contact creditor to confirm whether plaintiff actually owed instant debt.
This case present question as to whether trial court properly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-bank’s action alleging that defendants breached promissory note, where: (1) plaintiff’s predecessor in interest had filed foreclosure action against defendants based on defendants’ alleged default on said note that resulted in voluntary dismissal of said action; (2) plaintiff filed second action for breach of same promissory note that was also voluntarily dismissed; and (3) instant action represented third cause of action that alleged breach of same promissory note, as well as unjust enrichment claim. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court and directing dismissal of plaintiff’s action, found that for purposes of res judicata analysis, same set of operative facts gave rise to instant foreclosure and breach of promissory note causes of action. As such, instant lawsuit constituted impermissible second re-filing of original foreclosure action, and that trial court could not otherwise consider plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim. In its petition for leave to appeal, plaintiff argued that case law is in flux as to whether documents signed as part of loan transaction all arise out of same group of operative facts.
