Commercial Banking, Collections, and Bankruptcy

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ action alleging that defendant violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by placing on plaintiffs’ front door hanger that contained message for plaintiffs to call “Green Tree” that had serviced mortgage loan on which plaintiffs had defaulted. Defendant, which had contracted with Green Tree to perform lawn maintenance and winterizing services, had placed hanger on plaintiffs’ door as part of Green Tree’s compliance with HUD requirement to determine whether plaintiffs had vacated property. As such, defendant was not “debt collector” as defined under FDCPA, since its actions were too attenuated from Green Tree’s own debt collection services, especially where defendant did not know how much plaintiffs owed Green Tree, and message on hanger did not claim that plaintiffs owed anything to Green Tree. Ct. further noted that defendant’s principal purpose was not debt collection given its property maintenance duties that it usually performed for Green Tree, that defendant was not compensated based on whether plaintiffs had contacted Green Tree, and that defendant’s efforts to re-establish communication between plaintiffs and Green Tree did not implicate specific concerns set forth in FDCPA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-mining company’s motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiff-property owner alleging that defendant owed it $400,000 in royalty payments under terms of lease allowing defendant to mine sand and rock products, but also allowing defendant not to extract or sell sand or rock products by virtue of said lease. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant did not owe any royalty payments, where record showed that: (1) although defendant undertook certain infrastructure improvements on plaintiff’s land, defendant never extracted any sand or rock products from plaintiff’s land; and (2) lease provided that defendant pay plaintiff $1.50 per ton for first 65,000 tons of sand or rock products. While plaintiff argued that lease provision in same paragraph containing above royalty provision (i.e., “notwithstanding anything to contrary contained herein [defendant] shall pay [plaintiff annual minimum royalty of $75,000]”) guaranteed it $75,000 in royalty payments regardless of whether defendant had extracted any sand or rock products, Dist. Ct. could properly find that said provision only applied if defendant had extracted any sand or rock product in any given year, and that $75,000 provision applied as floor for royalty payments once obligation to pay royalties had been triggered.

Dist. Ct. did not err in affirming Bankruptcy Ct.’s order granting plaintiffs-creditors request to pierce corporate veil and hold defendant-owner of bankrupt corporation personally liable for judgment against said corporation. Record showed that plaintiffs had prevailed against corporation, where, as minority shareholders in said corporation, plaintiffs had filed action under Indiana Dissenters’ Rights Statute after defendant, as majority shareholder in said corporation, merged said corporation into different corporation controlled by defendant and then stripped subject corporation of assets to benefit of defendant so as to preclude plaintiffs from collecting on $7,522,879 judgment that plaintiffs had received under Dissenters’ Rights Statute. Ct. found that plaintiffs had met all requirements for piercing corporate veil of subject corporation and rejected defendant’s argument that: (1) Dissenters’ Rights Statute did not allow plaintiffs to obtain piercing corporate veil relief; (2) piercing corporate veil relief did not apply to plaintiffs as minority shareholders in same corporation at issue in piercing corporate veil action; and (3) certain economic questions involving allegations of fraud precluded disposition of instant case via summary judgment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that plaintiff had failed to prove its damages in action alleging that defendant breached contract calling for defendant to pay plaintiff referral fees for cell-phone activations and upgrades made through customers in plaintiff’s network of retail dealers. Dist. Ct. found for plaintiff, albeit under limited basis, when it concluded that plaintiff could recover for customers’ entry into two-year, post-paid phone contracts, and plaintiff presented damages calculation that aligned itself only with plaintiff’s broad theory of liability. Moreover, plaintiff’s evidence on damages could not be disaggregated and recalculated in accordance with Dist. Ct.’s narrower bases for finding liability, and plaintiff had otherwise failed to file motion to reconsider to present evidence of damages in accordance with Dist. Ct.’s liability findings.