Common Interest Community Association Act and the Condominium Property Act
(Haine, D-Alton; Martwick, D-Chicago) allows a board to close any portion of a noticed meeting or meet separately from a noticed meeting to do the following: (1) “Discuss” instead of “consider” appointment, employment, engagement, or dismissal of an employee, independent contractor, agent, or other provider of goods and services. (2) Interview a potential employee, independent contractor, agent, or other provider of goods and services. (3) Consult with the association’s legal counsel. Effective January 1, 2017.
Common Interest Community Association Act and the Condominium Property Act
(Mulroe, D-Chicago; Martwick, D-Chicago) provides that any assignment of a developer’s interest in the property is not effective until the successor obtains the assignment in writing and records it. Effective January 1, 2017.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiffs-FDIC and bank’s motion for summary judgment in action seeking to collect on two defaulted loans, even though defendants asserted that language in release in prior settlement agreement between FDIC and defendants with respect to third $157,300 loan between parties covered said loans at issue in instant complaint. Relevant language in release in settlement agreement referred only to $157,300 loan, and although agreement contained language releasing defendants from “any and all liabilities…claims and demands whatsoever,” extrinsic evidence from one defendant indicated that settlement release pertained only to $157,300 loan. Ct. rejected one defendant’s claim that his subjective belief that release covered all three loans was dispositive on issue, where: (1) said belief was contrary to same defendant’s own testimony regarding background of settlement agreement; (2) specific provisions in settlement agreement only referred to $157,300 loan; and (3) specific language in agreement should prevail over general language in agreement when there is a potential conflict in contract language.
General unsecured creditor lacked standing to object to attorney fee petitions submitted to Bankruptcy Trustee by certain law firms, even though creditor argued that work performed by said law firms never had chance of benefiting bankruptcy estate. While Bankruptcy Ct. had approved said fee petitions that arose out of law firm’s pursuit of section 363(n) claim against instant creditor, which purchased debtor’s assets under conditions that Trustee believed had produced lower than market price for said purchase, Bankruptcy Ct. should have dismissed said objection due to creditor’s lack of standing to raise objection given fact that creditor had failed to show that it would have benefited financially if it would have prevailed in said objection. Moreover, record showed that other creditors with higher priority would have received any proceeds had creditor prevailed in its objection.
Dist. Ct. did not err in entering judgment in favor of defendant in action seeking to enforce confidentiality clause in settlement agreement that prohibited each party from disclosing terms of settlement and set $10,000 as liquidated damage figure for each breach of confidentiality clause. While plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to $20 million in said damages, where defendant disclosed in its Franchise Disclosure Document amount of settlement and other details of plaintiff’s underlying lawsuit against defendant to 2,000 potential buyers of its franchise, Dist. Ct. could properly find that instant liquidated damage clause was unenforceable under Texas law, where there was no showing that instant disclosure had caused $20 million in loss to plaintiff or that damages to plaintiff were anywhere near average of $10,000 per unauthorized disclosure.
(Haine, D-Alton; Zalewski, D-Chicago) clarifies that a county or municipality may assess an administrative fee for impounding vehicles only for violations listed in the current Vehicle Code. If the administrative hearing officer finds that a county or municipality exceeded its authority to impound a vehicle under the Vehicle Code, the county or municipality is liable to the car’s owner for the storage fees and reasonable attorney’s fees. Makes other changes. Passed both chambers.
(Martwick, D-Chicago; Haine, D-Alton) requires insurers to periodically use the federal Death Master File to determine if a policyholder has died but the death benefits have not been made. If a match is found but the beneficiaries do not file a claim within 120 days, the insurer is required to make a good-faith effort to locate them. This Act will apply to all policies, annuity contracts, and retained asset accounts in force on after January 1, 2017. Passed both chambers.
House Bill 4633 (Martwick, D-Chicago; Haine, D-Alton) requires insurers to periodically use the federal Death Master File to determine if a policyholder has died but the death benefits have not been made. If a match is found but the beneficiaries do not file a claim within 120 days, the insurer is required to make a good-faith effort to locate them. This Act will apply to all policies, annuity contracts, and retained asset accounts in force on after January 1, 2017. Passed both chambers.
Plaintiff physicians allege that 2 of their former employees from their billing department embezzled millions of dollars in funds from them, and created sham entities with similar names then opened accounts at 2 banks. Court properly found that Defendants-Appelless' (2 health insurance companies whose insureds received medical services from Plaintiffs) obligations to two plaintiff physicians were discharged. There are not set of facts which Plaintiffs can allege that would entitled them to recover against Defendants under Illinois' Uniform Commercial Code. Section 3-414 of UCC extinguished insurers' obligation to pay when the checks were accepted at the depositing banks. Thus, insurers' obligation to pay for medical services performed by Plaintiffs was discharged pursuant to Section 3-414(c) of UCC. The checks were not dishonored and thus Section 3-414(b) is not triggered.(CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring.)
(Haine, D-Alton; Beiser, D-Alton) allows an association to correct an error, omission, or inconsistency in the community instruments of the association by an amendment adopted by vote of two-thirds of the board of directors without a membership vote. This applies to correct an omission, error, or inconsistency so that the community instruments conform to the Act or to another applicable law. Passed both chambers.