Criminal Law

Defendant was found guilty of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and was sentenced to an eight-year extended term of imprisonment because the gun had a laser sight attached to it. On appeal, defendant argued that the UUWF statute violates the second amendment and that the trial court committed plain error during jury selection when it misstated one of the four principles required under SCR 431(b). The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant’s status as a felon took him “outside the box of law-abiding citizens contemplated under the second amendment,” and that defendant did not satisfy his burden under the plain error test regarding his alleged violation of SCR 431(b). (MITCHELL, concurring and MIKVA, specially concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of home invasion and criminal sexual assault and was given a life sentence because he was eligible to be sentenced as a habitual criminal. Defendant’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and his initial post-conviction petition was denied. He was granted leave to file a successive post-conviction petition that was denied after it advanced to the second stage. Defendant appealed from that denial arguing that his sentence was improper due to an amendment to the habitual criminal statute and that he presented sufficient evidence to warrant a hearing on his claim of actual innocence. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the defendant was not entitled to retroactive application of the amendment to the statute and that he failed to present the type of evidence that could plausibly support a claim of actual innocence. (HARRIS and VANCIL, concurring)

The State appealed from a trial court order denying its petition for pretrial detention and granting the defendant’s release. The State argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that less restrictive conditions, other than detention, would be sufficient to protect the community from the defendant. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed “maximum conditions” of release that mitigated the threat posed by the pretrial release of the defendant. (HUTCHINSON and JORGENSEN, concurring)

The State appealed from a ruling of the circuit court excluding the admission of evidence obtin pursuant to a valid search warrant at a bench trial, arguing that while the evidence was excluded pursuant to a hearsay objection it was a midtrial motion to suppress evidence and was not properly granted by the trial court. The defendant argued that the exclusion of evidence was an evidentiary ruling and that the appellate court did not have juridiction under SCR 604(a) to consider the appeal. The appellate court agreed and dismissed the appeal.

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder under a theory of accountability and concealment of a homicidal death and was sentenced to 60 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made during a recorded police interview, that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance regarding the motion to suppress statements, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of statements made during an earlier, unrecorded police interview, that trial counsel was ineffective for not raising the affirmative defense of self-defense, and that the cumulative effects of these errors denied him a fair trial. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court erred when it allowed the admission of defendant’s recorded interview and that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the interview because counsel violated attorney-client privilege and elicited incriminating statements during the police interview. (LANNERD and DeARMOND, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder for the fatal beating of his girlfriend and was sentenced to 55 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the admission of the victim’s hearsay statements to law enforcement officers about prior incidents of domestic violence violated the confrontation clause and that those statements as well as statements that the victim made to acquaintances were inadmissible hearsay. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court properly applied the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing as an exception to both the confrontation clause and the rule against hearsay. (STEIGMANN and VANCIL, concurring)