Criminal Law

In this appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the Pretrial Fairness Act and how its enactment impacted defendants whose cases commenced prior to its effective date. Defendant was arrested and ordered released pending trial subject to monetary bail, which defendant did not satisfy. After the Act went into effect, defendant petitioned for release and the State responded with a petition to detain. The issue before the supreme court was whether the State may petition to detain in response to a defendant’s petition to remove the condition of monetary bail. The supreme court reversed the appellate court’s judgment, holding that the trial court did not commit error when it considered defendant’s petition for release and the State’s responding petition for pretrial detention. (THEIS, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, and CUNNNINGHAM, concurring and ROCHFORD and O’BRIEN, specially concurring)

Defendant violated the terms of his pretrial release, and the trial court granted the State’s motion to sanction the defendant to 30 days in the county jail without good-time credit. Defendant filed a SCR 604(h)(2) motion for relief, which the trial court denied, and plaintiff appealed, arguing that he was entitled to 15 days of credit under the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act. The appellate court reversed and vacated the order to the extent that it denied good-time credit, explaining that the legislature did not create an exception of good-time credit for pretrial release sanctions. (HUTCHINSON and SCHOSTOK, concurring)

Defendant filed an appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of his “motion for relief” that sought a reconsideration of the trial court’s finding that he should be detained prior to trial. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that defendant’s motion did not constitute a motion for relief under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) because it failed to properly identify alleged errors made by the trial court. (BARBERIS, concurring and MOORE, dissenting)

Defendant appealed from his convictions for aggravated vehicular hijacking, armed robbery, attempted aggravated vehicular hijacking, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the indictment for improper venue and that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was armed with a firearm and to determine the value of a stolen cell phone. The appellate court affirmed in part and vacated in part, accepting the State’s concession that the defendant was improperly tried in the wrong county for several of the convictions, vacated those convictions and remanded for a new trial. The appellate court also remanded for re-sentencing on two other charges. (BRENNAN and ANDERSON, concurring)