Criminal Law

Defendant, who pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, had his supervised release revoked and was sentenced to 20 months of imprisonment after he admitted to committing several violations of the terms of his release. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court procedurally erred because it failed to calculate his sentencing guidelines range and improperly relied on certain facts when determining his sentence upon revocation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the record demonstrated that the district court properly calculated and considered the advisory guidelines when imposing defendant’s sentence and that the district court’s sentencing decision was driven primarily by the proper sentencing factors. (SCUDDER and ST. EVE, concurring)

Defendant’s supervised release was revoked by the district court for using drugs and failing to keep in contact with his probation officer. The government argued that the district court should impose a revocation sentence of five years but the district court imposed a term of two years. The government appealed and the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s revocation sentence and remanded for resentencing. The Seventh Circuit explained that under the language of 18 U.S.C.  § 3583(e)(3), the proper term of the revocation sentence was five years. (ST. EVE, concurring and SCUDDER, concurring part and dissenting part)

Defendant appealed from the district court’s denial of his motion to reduce his prison sentence under U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Defendant argued on appeal that a retroactive amendment to the federal sentencing guidelines, which authorized a two-level reduction for offenders with no criminal history, should be applied to reduce his sentence. The district court rejected this argument by finding that defendant was not eligible for a reduction because he had received an aggravating-role adjustment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the role adjustment disqualified defendant from eligibility for a two-level reduction under the amendment.

Petitioner, a former immigration attorney, was found guilty of various crimes for conspiring with clients, interpreters, and his employees to defraud the government by submitting fabricated asylum applications. Petitioner moved to vacate his sentence and the district court denied the motion after allowing discovery and conducting an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, petitioner argued that the district court erred in its rulings about the benefits the government provided to some witnesses before and after trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that while information about pre-trial benefits was not properly disclosed it was immaterial and further that petitioner’s rights were not violated because some of the alleged post-trial benefits either were not offered to witnesses or would not have affected the outcome of the trial. (ROVNER and PRYOR, concurring)

Co-defendants were found guilty of carjacking with one of the defendants also being convicted of carrying and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The other defendant received a lesser conviction under the statute for carrying, but not discharging a firearm during and in relation to the carjacking. Both defendants appealed with the first contesting the firearm conviction and the second challenging only his sentence by arguing that the district court incorrectly applied a reckless endangerment enhancement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the firearm conviction and rejected the argument regarding improper sentencing, but nevertheless vacated the sentence and remanded for re-sentencing due to retroactive amendments to federal sentencing guidelines. (KOLAR, concurring and KIRSCH, specially concurring)

Petitioner, who is serving a sentence of 100 years in a state prison for committing two murders when he was 16 years old, petitioned the federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller v. Alabama because his sentence amounted to a de facto life sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court did not err when it concluded that the state-court rejection of petitioner’s constitutional claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. (RIPPLE and BRENNAN, concurring)

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of distributing methamphetamine and the district court applied two recidivist enhancements during sentencing. Defendant appealed, arguing that a prior state court conviction for aggravated robbery used by the district court to impose the enhancements was not a predicate offense because Illinois law did not require intentional use of force to sustain a conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the conviction qualified as a serious violent felony as well as a crime of violence because a conviction required proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened use of force. (EASTERBROOK and KIRSCH, concurring)

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to engage in racketeering, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm as a felon, and possession of a firearm in connection with a drug offense and the district court sentenced him to a total of 203 months in prison. Defendant appealed and argued that the district court should not have accepted his guilty plea on the racketeering charge because the colloquy under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 did not accurately inform him of the nature of the charge. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed, finding that even if the district court committed an error it was neither plain nor prejudicial and, as a result, defendant was not entitled to relief. (BRENNAN and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of four counts of wire fraud for fraudulently obtaining disability benefits from the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board. On appeal, defendant argued that his conviction should be set aside because the evidence did not show that he intentionally participated in a scheme to defraud or that he made representations that were material to the agency’s decision to grant him disability benefits. Defendant also appealed from the district court’s order that he pay restitution in the full value of the benefits that he received during the six-year period alleged in the indictment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the evidence presented at the trial was “more than sufficient” to support the jury’s verdict and that the prosecution had met its burden regarding the amount of restitution. (EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE, concurring)