Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from a circuit court order denying him leave to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the circuit court erred in concluding that he had not shown cause and prejudice for his failure to raise his claim of a coerced confession in his initial post-conviction petition. The appellate court agreed with the defendant and reversed, explaining that if defendant’s confession was coerced and involuntary then its use at trial was a violation of defendants right to due process. (ROCHFORD and MARTIN, concurring)

In a group of consolidated appeals, the Illinois appellate court considered whether the Illinois Driver Licensing Law, which treats judgments entered on bond forfeitures in traffic cases as equivalent to convictions, extends to beyond that Act to the sealing provisions of the Criminal Identification Act. The appellate court held that it did not and affirmed a trial court order denying the defendant’s request to seal records associated with a still-pending prosecution for driving on a suspended license. The court also found that the pending prosecution was not a barrier to expunging the records of three unrelated misdemeanor prosecutions. (ROCHFORD and HOFFMAN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated domestic battery and domestic battery. The trial court sentenced him to three years in prison for aggravated battery and vacated the remaining counts under the one-act, one-crime rule. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to consider his peremptory challenges of two prospective jurors during voire dire and that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to introduce evidence of other domestic violence offenses because the State failed to give him pretrial notice of its intent to introduce the offenses. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court abused its discretion and defendant was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial when the jury selection process resulted in the selection of a juror who had expressed clear bias during voir dire. (SCHOSTOK and BIRKETT, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 30 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence was not sufficient where the State presented no evidence that he was “consciously aware” of the risk involved to another, that his right to counsel was violated, that the court erred in various evidentiary rulings including a decision to bar defendant’s expert testimony, that the court imposed an excessive sentence and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to provide the court with mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s mental health and young age during the sentencing hearing. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that defendant was denied his right to counsel because defendant’s trial counsel had a per se conflict of interest where the attorney was on probation and the State’s attorney was attempting to revoke that probation in the same county where defendant’s case was being tried. (ZENOFF and VANCIL, concurring)

Defendant appealed from his convictions of being an armed habitual criminal and reckless discharge of a firearm, arguing on appeal that his removal from the courtroom during jury selection violated his constitutional rights and that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant endangered the bodily safety of another when he discharged the firearm. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that when viewing the record on the whole the defendant did not knowingly waive his right to legal representation when he was removed for misconduct during jury selection and that this constituted a structural error that was not subject to the harmless error analysis. (LAMPKIN and VAN TINE, concurring)

Defendant pled guilty to one count of first-degree murder and was sentenced to 35 years in prison. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition arguing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence. In a prior appeal, the appellate court reversed and remanded. The supreme court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment regarding actual innocence but reversed regarding the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and remanded to the appellate court for reconsideration of whether defendant satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test on this claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. On remand, the appellate court concluded that the defendant could not establish the required prejudice and remanded for further proceedings on defendant’s claims of actual innocence. (FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring)