Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm while ineligible for a FOID card, two counts of unlawful use of a weapon, and violation of the conditions of his bail bond. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by conducting a bench trial on stipulated evidence over a videoconference and that the latter three counts should be vacated on one-act, one-crime principles. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that conducting a bench trial on stipulated evidence via videoconferencing without defendant’s knowing consent to do so was structural error. (SCHOSTOK and KENNEDY, concurring)

Defendant submitted a claim to the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission alleging that his convictions in two underlying cases resulted from his torture by Chicago police and sought suppression of inculpatory statements defendant made during interrogation. The commission referred the matter for judicial review and, after holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found defendant had fabricated his claims of torture and denied defendant any relief. Defendant appealed and in a prior opinion the appellate court reversed the trial court judgment and remanded for new trials. The Illinois Supreme Court then issued a supervisory order directing the appellate court to reconsider its opinion pursuant to People v. Fair. The appellate court reconsidered its prior opinion and concluded that although the trial court identified the correct inquiry regarding defendant’s burden of proof, the trial court’s decision to deny relief was manifestly erroneous. (HYMAN, concurring and LAVIN, dissenting)

Defendant appealed from his conviction for aggravated battery of a police officer for wrapping his arm around an officer’s neck after the officer tackled him. Defendant had requested a jury instruction on self-defense but the trial court found there was insufficient evidence to support the instruction. Defendant argued on appeal that this was an abuse of discretion but the appellate court disagreed and affirmed. (HARRIS, concurring and TURNER, dissenting)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer and driving in excess of 35 miles per hour over the speed limit and was sentenced to 60 days in prison. The defendant appealed, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction where the evidence established that the officer was in a marked police vehicle and had turned on the vehicle’s lights when he began to pursue the defendant. (DOHERTY and LANNERD, concurring)

Defendant appealed after his pretrial release on conditions was revoked and the trial court found that defendant’s continued detention was reasonably necessary to ensure his appearance at court hearings and to prevent the commission of a future felony or Class A misdemeanor. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion where defendant had violated two of the “core” conditions of his initial release and where it had been proven that defendant’s release with conditions was not effective in guarding against re-offending. (ZENOFF and LANNERD, concurring)

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of violating an order of protection and was sentenced to 18 months of probation. Defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal from his guilty plea, arguing that the trial court’s post-plea admonishments did not comply with SCR 605(C) and requesting that the matter be remanded for proper admonishments and an opportunity to file a SCR 604(c) motion to withdraw guilty plea with representation of counsel. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court admonishments were insufficient because they connected the appointment of counsel with the appellate process and did not inform defendant of his rights in a meaningful and practical manner. (D.B. WALKER, concurring and REYES, dissenting)