Criminal Law

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on charge of wire fraud stemming from scheme in which defendant and others concocted multiple false sales of homes in order to obtain loan proceeds that defendant used to pay off prior loans and to retain certain proceeds for personal use. While defendant argued that he was entitled to acquittal since no one specifically identified him during trial as culprit, record contained sufficient circumstantial evidence of defendant’s identification where: (1) defendant’s son-in-law identified defendant’s signature on letter to one targeted victim and never suggested that individual on trial was not his father-in-law; (2) defendant’s failure to cross-examine son-in-law on identity issue allowed jury to infer that correct individual was on trial. Moreover, defendant’s trial strategy was inconsistent with identity-based defense.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 30-year term of incarceration on series of child pornography charges that occurred from 2002 to 2009, even though Dist. Ct. grouped some of these offenses and used 2011 sentencing guidelines in effect at time of sentencing for all offenses. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that use of 2011 guidelines violated Ex Post Facto Clause of Constitution, even though guidelines in effect in 2002 and 2009 were less severe, since under grouping and "one-book" rules, Dist. Ct. could use 2011 guidelines, where defendant had adequate notice that his continued criminal activity would subject him to newer version of guidelines. Moreover, any error in using 2011 guidelines for non-grouped offense was harmless, where sentencing range for said offense was same under both newer and older versions of guidelines.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion under 28 USC section 2255 that challenged his sentence that was based in part on finding that defendant was career offender that in turn was based in part on prior conviction for sexual assault. While defendant’s sexual assault conviction could not have formed basis for defendant’s career offender status, and thus he should not have been sentenced using career offender designation, defendant could not seek relief under section 2255 to correct his sentence as set forth in Hawkins, 706 F.3d 820. Fact that defendant could have received lower sentence absent career offender designation did not require contrary result.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in dismissing as untimely defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder conviction, after finding that defendant was not entitled to equitable tolling of relevant one-year deadline for filing habeas petition. Record showed that defendant’s counsel on direct appeal had unjustifiably withheld defendant’s file for all but 40 days that defendant had to file habeas petition, and prison rules allowed defendant access to prison library only 80 minutes every two weeks. Moreover, record showed that defendant was otherwise diligent with respect to his attempt to file timely habeas petition and had timely sought and obtained extension to file habeas petition from different Dist. Ct. judge.

In prosecution on drug distribution charge, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-parolee’s motion to suppress drugs seized from rental vehicle in which defendant was passenger at time of traffic stop, where Dist. Ct. improperly found that defendant lacked standing to file instant suppression motion. Although defendant was parolee, who was not supposed to be in Illinois at time of traffic stop pursuant to terms of his parole, he still had some cognizable privacy interests in contents of rental vehicle, where he was sole authorized driver of said vehicle, so as to give him standing to file instant suppression motion. Fact that defendant had violated terms of his parole, or that he might not have had valid driver’s license at time of traffic stop did not support govt. claim that defendant did not otherwise have subjective or objective expectation of privacy in rental vehicle. Accordingly, remand was required for Dist. Ct. to determine merits of suppression motion.