Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his murder conviction on ground that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise constitutional Speedy Trial issue, where govt. took 20 months to bring its case to trial. Defendant was responsible for 11 months of said delay, and although defendant requested speedy trial at his arraignment, he also sought numerous extensions of time. Moreover, defendant failed to establish any prejudice arising out of instant delay, where defendant was already incarcerated on separate offense, and where he did not claim that delay hindered his ability to prepare for his defense. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that trial court improperly gave accountability instruction to jury, after finding that defendant was on notice that he could be found guilty of murder on accountability theory, and that instruction was appropriate where: (1) defendant was seen with victim shortly before murder; (2) defendant possessed same caliber of gun used in murder; and (3) defendant’s identification cards were found near victim’s body.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s section 2241 petition, challenging his federal death penalty under 18 USC 3596(c) based on his claim that he lacked mental capacity to understand significance of death penalty and why it was imposed, after asserting that he had IQ lower than 70. Other experts, though, found that defendant was not mentally retarded and was malingering in effort to evade death penalty, and Dist. Court could properly find that section 2255(e) essentially blocked defendant from filing instant 2241 petition, where defendant had unsuccessfully litigated instant issue in prior section 2255 petition. Fact that defendant claimed that “newly discovered evidence” concerning his mental condition generated in unsuccessful application for Social Security disability benefits could have altered imposition of death penalty not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, even though defendant asserted that govt. breached terms of his plea agreement regarding ceiling on amount of drugs attributed to defendant as relevant conduct. While record showed that during sentencing hearing defendant continued to deny all offense conduct attributed to him in presentence report in contravention to plea agreement, and that govt. urged Dist. Ct. to find greater drug quantity than amount set forth in presentence report due to defendant’s denial, Ct. found that defendant could not withdraw his guilty plea, since defendant received all benefits contained in plea agreement when govt. ultimately stipulated to drug quantity contained in presentence report.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting video showing both defendants driving up to third-party’s home, get out of truck, enter home and then leave shortly thereafter, when defendants were arrested after said departure and $8,000 and gun were found in truck’s toolbox. Agent’s testimony established sufficient foundation to support entry of video into evidence where agent stated that camera used in surveillance produced accurate results throughout investigation; and (2) video was fair and accurate depiction of what agent saw through camera. Moreover, events depicted in video were corroborated by third-party. Fact that video skipped approximately 30 seconds out of 35 minutes did not render entire video untrustworthy.

Dist. Ct. did not err in revoking defendant’s supervised release, even though defendant argued that his term of supervised release had expired by time of violation because term of supervised release began on date his criminal sentence had expired. Record showed that upon expiration of his criminal sentence, defendant remained incarcerated during pendency of determination as to whether defendant would be civilly committed pursuant to Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. Ct. of Appeals found that defendant’s term of supervised release did not start until defendant was actually freed from custody after civil-commitment hearing was resolved in his favor. As such, defendant was still serving term of supervised release at time he violated conditions of said term.

Defendant was entitled to new hearing on his motion to reduce his 360-month sentence on crack cocaine distribution charges, where Dist. Ct. made relevant conduct finding that defendant was responsible for at least 16.9 kilograms of crack cocaine that had been sold by defendant and his two co-defendants. Defendant conceded responsibility for selling 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine, but argued that he was not responsible for additional amounts of crack cocaine sold by others, and Dist. Ct. improperly based relevant conduct finding on question as to whether additional sales of crack cocaine made by others were reasonably foreesable to defendant, without making additional required finding as to whether defendant had agreed to help others in selling their crack cocaine.

Ct. of Appeals denied motion by defendant’s appellate counsel to withdraw from case pursuant to Anders due to lack of non-frivolous ground to appeal defendant’s 24-month term of incarceration arising out of defendant’s violation of conditions of his probation. Record suggested that Dist. Ct. had already determined instant sentence at time he imposed original 18-month probation sentence, and although instant 24-month term of incarceration was reasonable in view of number of violations and short length of time in which defendant had committed said violations, Dist. Ct. could not commit himself to specified penalty for any violation of conditions of probation at time when said conditions were being imposed.