Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of clothing linking defendant to crime scene that defendant had given to police after his arrest, where defendant argued that said evidence was obtained in violation of Indiana Constitution. There is no federal right to counsel prior to defendant’s consent to search his property, even if suspect is in custody, and Indiana case law that recognizes such right under Indiana Constitution did not apply where instant police request for defendant’s shoes and clothing was limited in scope and was only minimally intrusive. Similarly, defendant failed to establish any prejudice to counsel’s failure to seek suppression of said clothing and/or his inculpatory statements made after he tendered said clothing, where: (1) suppression motion would have been denied; (2) defendant conceded that he had been at crime scene; and (3) defendant failed to show that his statements were product of unlawful seizure.

In prosecution on drug distribution and firearms charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s request to question prosecutor on his use of two peremptory challenges against female venirepersons, where defendant made request to ensure that prosecutor was not using said challenges on basis of gender, and where Dist. Ct. noted that prosecutor had also used challenges to excuse three male venirepersons. Defendant failed to establish any prima facie case of gender discrimination so as to require prosecutor to give any reason for his use of challenges. Fact that prosecutor eventually gave reasons for using said challenges did not obligate Dist. Ct. to evaluate said reasons. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in imposing as special condition of supervised release defendant’s participation in sexual treatment program, where Dist. Ct. failed to give reason for said condition, and where defendant’s 1997 misdemeanor conviction for criminal sexual abuse was unrelated to section 3553(a) factors used by Dist. Ct. to determine sentence for current offense.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on drug conspiracy charge, where defendant admitted to driving with third-party from St. Louis to Chicago in order for third-party to purchase crack cocaine on two occasions and to providing security during said drug deals, even though defendant argued that he did not actively participate in either drug deal and did not stand to gain financially from either deal. Defendant’s provision of driving and security services was enough evidence for trier-of-fact to determine that defendant was aware that drug deal was going down, and that he had agreed to play role in both deals.