Criminal Law

Record did not support defendant’s claim that prosecutor violated Speedy Trial Act by failing to indict him on instant bank robbery charges within 30 days of his arrest, even though record showed that: (1) defendant was initially arrested by state officials on state charge of felony eluding of police officer, where said officer attempted to arrest defendant on one of six bank robbery charges at issue in instant federal charges; (2) federal authorities obtained warrant and filed detainer with state officials holding defendant; and (3) federal authorities subsequently filed indictment while defendant was serving sentence on state charge. Instant 30-day period was not triggered when defendant was arrested by state authorities on state charge, and defendant’s arrest on state charges did not force federal authorities to initiate proceedings for same underlying conduct. As such, there must be both federal charge and federal custody for Speedy Trial Act to apply, and filing of instant detainer was not equivalent to federal arrest. Also no violation of Interstate Agreement and Detainers occurred when prosecutor tried defendant on additional bank robbery charges that were not included in detainer.

Defendant’s death during his direct appeal served to moot his criminal conviction, such that defendant’s underlying conviction must be vacated pursuant to abatement doctrine. Moreover, Dist. Ct.’s $547,597 restitution order that was imposed under 18 USC section 3556 must also be vacated, since defendant stands as if he never had been convicted of crime. Fact that criminal restitution serves compensatory purpose does not enable it to be imposed in absence of final conviction.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s guilty plea on charge of aggravated identity theft, even though defendant argued that he did not admit to knowing that identity he was using belonged to actual person, where defendant admitted during plea colloquy and during sentencing hearing to possessing vital information belonging to specifically named individual. Also, while Dist. Ct. erred in using sentencing guidelines in effect at time of sentencing, rather than at time of instant offense, any error was harmless, where Dist. Ct. indicated that it would have imposed same sentence under either guideline.

Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing 24-month term of re-imprisonment for violating terms of his supervised release, even though Dist. Ct. relied on factor contained in 18 USC section 3553(a)(2)(A), i.e., seriousness of original offense and need to promote respect for law, which was not included in section 18 USC section 3583(e), which governed post-revocation sentencing. Dist. Ct. may consider said factor, where, as here, Dist. Ct. primarily relied on factors contained in section 3553(a)(1) that concerned defendant’s personal characteristics and nature of his violations. Moreover, imposition of said sentence was reasonable where defendant had new criminal conviction and eight other violations of his terms of supervised release.

Dist. Ct. erred in imposing as terms of defendants’ supervised release, conditions such as bans on possession of any material containing nudity, use of mood-altering substance, or excessive use of alcohol, since said conditions were either too vague to be followed or covered conduct that was unrelated to their convictions. Moreover, Dist. Ct. gave inadequate explanations for why said conditions were being imposed. Ct. also generated list of “best practices” for Dist. Ct. to follow when imposing supervised release conditions that included: (1) requiring probation service to generate any recommendations for supervised release two weeks before sentencing hearing; (2) making independent judgment of appropriate nature of said recommendations that looked to particular conduct of defendant; and (3) requiring defendant to attend hearing with sentencing judge shortly before his or her release date to remind defendant of said conditions and to make any changes to said conditions.