Criminal Law

(Court opinion corrected 5/28/14.) Defendant was charged with aggravated battery. State filed motion for pretrial discovery, requesting Defendant to give written notice of any affirmative defenses he intended to assert at trial. Defendant did not give notice of any affirmative defense until day of bench trial when he disclosed that he intended to raise self-defense as an affirmative defense. Court barred Defendant from using self-defense as an affirmative defense, as a discovery sanction. Excluding any evidence of self-defense was unduly harsh sanction which prevented full presentation of all relevant facts, and effectively denied Defendant the opportunity to present any defense, as his entire defense would have been based on claim of self-defense.(WELCH and GOLDENHERSH, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed robbery and aggravated unlawful restraint. Aggravated unlawful restraint conviction must be vacated, as it was carved from same physical acts as armed robbery conviction, and there was no separate act of restraint. DNA indexing fee is vacated, as Defendant's DNA was previously obtained and indexed. (FITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of unlawful use of weapon by felon and simple possession of heroin. No ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to file motion to quash search warrant and suppress evidence. Despite lack of proof that informant was questioned in court, informant appeared before magistrate when warrant was issued and thus was available for questioning. Evidence provided judge with substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed to search apartment, and thus motion to suppress would not have been meritorious. That Defendant was on mandatory supervised release and on home monitoring had a severely diminished expectation of privacy in his person and residence. (GORDON and PALMER, concurring.)

Court declared woman, now age 22, a sexually dangerous person under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA), for touching 17-year-old girl in a group home in 2011, and forcible kissing and attempted touching of breast of 23-year-old female teacher in 2010. State failed to prove that Defendant demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or sexual molestation of children. Definition of sexual conduct in DCFS Administrative Code Rules more accurately corresponds with legislative intent of SDPA than definition of "criminal sexual assault" in Criminal Code. Without evidence of additional sex offenses, evidence of incident with teacher was insufficient to establish substantial probability that Defendant will engage in commission of sex offenses in future if not confined. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with home invasion and aggravated unlawful restraint after breaking into home of his estranged wife. Defendant later shot himself and suffered brain damage from self-inflicted gunshot wound. Court must consider totality of circumstances to determine whether a defendant is fit to stand trial. Three psychiatric experts concluded that Defendant had no recollection of events leading to charges against him, or of what occurred up to 48 hours prior to those events, and two concluded that his short-term memory was substantially impaired and would affect his ability to assist in his own defense. Thus, based on totality of circumstances, court's finding that Defendant remained unfit to stand trial was not against manifest weight of evidence. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 5/22/14.) Defendant was convicted of solicitation of murder for hire. Court properly dismissed Defendant's postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit. Court had no duty to inquire into potential conflict of defense counsel, but did so, with detailed inquiry, and found that defense counsel had not consulted with former prosecutor in PD's office, and that PD's office was structured so that this attorney was insulated from all cases that existed when he was with prosecutor's office. (HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring; WRIGHT, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent was a Sexually Violent Person (SVP) as defined by the SVP Act. Respondent did not ask court for adjournment or continuance of dispositional hearing, and no dispositional hearing occurred, contrary to clear mandate of Section 40(b)(1) of SVP Act. (GARMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant failed to plead, per 725 ILCS 5/116-3(a)(2), that Y-STR testing has potential to produce more probative results than DNA testing methods to which evidence was previously subjected. Defendant's conclusory allegation as to value of Y-STR in resolving mixed samples is itself insufficient for relief under Section 116-3. Evidence at trial, including DNA test results which produced a match of Defendant and semen on pants of rape victim, together with compelling circumstantial evidence, confirms that Y-STR testing lacks potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence in support of Defendant's assertion of actual innocence. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring.)