Criminal Law

Silence as Self-Incrimination after Salinas v. Texas

By Robin B. Murphy
April
2014
Article
, Page 184
After Salinas, non-custodial suspects must expressly invoke the right to remain silent, or silence can be held against them. But in Illinois, state law provides some evidentiary protection.

People v. Soto

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Second Amendment
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 121937
Decision Date: 
Friday, March 14, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 5th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
McBRIDE
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) by a felon. Defendant challenged, in this appeal, his prior conviction for Class 2 form of AUUW as unconstitutional. Defendant's prior AUUW conviction is not unconstitutional, as AUUW statute under which Defendant was convicted is a reasonable regulation of second amendment right to bear arms. Section 111-3 notice provision did not apply as State did not seek to enhance Defendant's sentence; and State proved prior felony conviction, as element of offense, at trial through stipulation. (PALMER, concurring; GORDON, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

People v. Boswell

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Search & Seizure
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 122275
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, March 19, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 3d Div.
Holding: 
Reversed; sentence vacated.
Justice: 
MASON
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of possession of a controlled substance. Officer's protective pat-down, made after observing what officer believed to be hand-to-hand narcotics transaction on street, was improper. It was insufficient for probable cause that area was known for narcotics activity, and that officer believed "drugs and guns go together". No officer observed any drugs in Defendant's possession, nor furtive movements, attempt to run, or bulges in clothing, and evidence does not support articulable suspicion that protective pat-down was necessary. (NEVILLE and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

U.S. v. Johnson

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 13-2732
Decision Date: 
March 19, 2014
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to reduce his sentence under 18 USC section 3582(c)(2) on his crack cocaine distribution conviction, even though defendant claimed that he was entitled to reduction under retroactive crack cocaine sentencing guidelines. Defendant’s original sentence was based on statutory mandatory minimum 120-month sentence under 21 USC section 841(b)(1)(B) due to his prior felony drug conviction, and under Poole, 550 F3d 676, defendant cannot reduce his sentence if original sentence was based on statutory minimum. Fact that defendant’s original sentence was below 120-month statutory minimum did not require different result.

U.S. v. Abair

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Evidence
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 13-2498
Decision Date: 
March 19, 2014
Federal District: 
N.D. Ind., S. Bend Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded
In prosecution on charge of structuring currency transactions in order to evade federal reporting requirements for transactions involving more than $10,000, Dist. Ct. improperly applied Rule 608(b) by allowing prosecutor to cross-examine defendant at length about alleged false statements made on her tax return and student financial aid applications. Record showed that prosecutor lacked good faith basis for believing that defendant had lied on said tax and financial aid forms, and said error was not harmless, where defendant’s credibility was crucial factor in determining defendant’s intent and knowledge with respect to her sizeable and daily ATM withdrawals that defendant claimed were necessary to fund purchase of house. (Dissent filed.)

People v. Mauricio

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (2d) 121340
Decision Date: 
Monday, March 17, 2014
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Kane Co.
Holding: 
Sentence vacated; remanded.
Justice: 
HUTCHINSON
Court improperly considered, in imposing 60-year sentence for first-degree murder, the personal traits of the victim. At sentencing, court noted that victim was a World War II veteran and was of great value to his family and to society, and thus improperly considered these traits as aggravating factor in sentencing. (McLAREN, concurring; HUDSON, specially concurring.)

People v. Boling

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Hearsay
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (4th) 120634
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, March 12, 2014
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
Coles Co.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
STEIGMANN
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. State committed error by introducing unduly prejudicial out-of-court statements for the purported purpose of explaining the steps of an investigation. Court should have sua sponte conducted a Cameron hearing, to determine appropriate extent to which State could use potentially prejudicial evidence in its case. Nurse, who was allowed to testify as expert, should not have been allowed to offer opinion that child victim's complaints were credible, and prosecutor improperly commented that jury should defer to nurse in determining credibility of child's claims; and prosecutor improperly expressed his own personal opinion on child's credibility. (APPLETON and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

People v. Kronenberger

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Confessions
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 110231
Decision Date: 
Monday, March 10, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co.,1st Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
CUNNINGHAM
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress his incriminating statements to police. During initial interrogation by police, it was unclear from Defendant's response whether he wished to invoke his right to remain silent. When Defendant unequivocally invoked his right to counsel later, police scrupulously honored that, and did not talk to him until Defendant reinitiated conversation with detectives, who again advised him of his Miranda rights.Under totality of circumstances, Defendant's videotaped confession was voluntary, as theme of questioning was urging Defendant to tell the truth, and police never misrepresented to him that he would escape legal consequences if he confessed.(CONNORS and HOFFMAN, concurring.)

White v. U.S.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Habeas Corpus
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 13-3396
Decision Date: 
March 14, 2014
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Appeal dismissed
Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing defendant’s habeas petition challenging his sentence on drug distribution conviction, where said petition constituted second habeas petition that had not been previously authorized by Ct. of Appeals. Defendant filed and lost first habeas petition, and although defendant subsequently obtained reduced sentence under Amendment 750 of sentencing guidelines that retroactively set new offense levels for crack-cocaine-related convictions, said sentence did not provide defendant with opportunity to file second habeas petition that raised different sentencing issue, since his prior reduction in sentence did not occur within context of “resentence” proceeding that allowed Dist. Ct. to examine issues other than those posed under Amendment 750.

U.S. v. Phillips

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Evidence
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 12-2532
Decision Date: 
March 14, 2014
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
In prosecution on tax conspiracy charge stemming from scheme in which defendant and her husband submitted tax returns on behalf of two trusts for two tax years in which said returns claimed sizeable tax refunds even though trusts had never paid any taxes, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting evidence of defendant’s submission of tax refund for trust in which she was trustee, even though indictment did not specifically mention said tax return. Tax return in which she was trustee also sought sizeable tax refund where trust had not paid any taxes, and while defendant argued that admission into evidence of said tax return constituted impermissible constructive amendment of indictment, Ct. found no constructive amendment, where indictment could be read to include all tax returns submitted by defendant and her husband during time frame set forth in indictment. Moreover, Ct. noted that disputed tax return was direct evidence of charged conspiracy.