Criminal Law

In prosecution on drug distribution and firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error, when it admitted evidence regarding details of defendant’s prior drug distribution conviction, even though defendant argued that said evidence was relevant only to establish his propensity to commit charged offense. Dist. Ct. indicated that it used said evidence to establish similarity in packaging of drugs, and such evidence was questionable since it had only minimal probative value because subject packaging was not distinctive in drug industry. However, any error was harmless given substantial evidence connecting defendant to drugs and firearm found in his bedroom. Ct. noted though, that result might have been different had jury, as opposed to Dist. Ct. in instant bench trial, been trier of fact.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendants to 195-month and 270-month terms of incarceration on conspiracy to commit money laundering and failure to appear at sentencing charges stemming from scheme to defraud investors out of more than $1 million under circumstances where both defendants had failed to appear at sentencing on conspiracy charges and remained fugitives for 12-year period. Defendants waived right to appeal sentences on conspiracy charges based on appeal waiver contained in their plea agreements, and fact that prosecutor subsequently charged defendants with failure to appear at original sentencing or that prosecutor failed urge Dist. Ct. to sentence defendants at lower end of guideline range did not serve to void said waivers, where defendants had breached agreements by failing to appear at original sentencing hearing. However, Ct. of Appeals could still review propriety of defendants’ sentences, where defendants had not waived appeal of sentence for charge of failing to appear at original sentencing, and where said charge was grouped with conspiracy charges for purposes of sentencing. Also, although Dist. Ct. used wrong guideline for calculating sentence on conspiracy charges, where Dist. Ct. used guideline that was in force at time of sentencing, rather than at time of offense, no error occurred under “one-book rule,” which allowed Dist. Ct. to use (for all three grouped convictions) later guideline in effect at time when defendants were apprehended on charge for failure to appear at sentencing.

Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 115-month term of incarceration, as well as imposing lifetime term of supervised release with various conditions on charges of receipt and possession of child pornography. Defendant was entitled to new sentencing hearing, where Dist. Ct. had failed to provide any reason for rejection of his main argument that child pornography guidelines did not approximate goals of sentencing when applied to first-time offenders. Moreover, Dist. Ct. similarly did not provide any reason for why life term of supervised release or any special conditions attached thereto were appropriate.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in refusing to consider post-verdict statements made by three jurors in subsequent voir dire proceedings in different case concerning their inability to follow court’s instructions regarding defendant’s failure to testify in his own defense. While all three jurors suggested that they viewed negatively defendant’s failure to testify on his behalf in spite of court’s prior instructions, said statements were inadmissible to establish any juror bias under Rule 606(b) because said statements touched upon jury’s internal deliberative processes, which fell within prohibition under Rule 606(b)(1). Moreover, although Rule 606(b)(2) contained three exceptions pertaining to outside influences that affect jury’s deliberations which would render juror’s statements admissible, instant statements did not fall within said exceptions.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition, alleging that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of potential lower sentence associated with alleged plea offer, which in turn led defendant not to accept said deal, where defendant took to trial first-degree murder charge that eventually resulted in guilty verdict and imposition of more severe sentence of life imprisonment with possibility of parole after 21 years. Dist. Ct. conducted evidentiary hearing on issue regarding alleged tender of plea offer, such that Dist. Ct. could properly find that no plea offer was actually tendered to defendant’s counsel based on testimony of two witnesses. Fact that defendant had presented evidence from one witness suggesting that actual plea deal had been tendered did not require different result, where Dist. Ct. did not find said evidence to be credible.

In prosecution on healthcare fraud charge associated with submission of $8.9 million in false healthcare claims, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s request for second competency examination filed shortly before start of her trial. Fact that defendant’s competency had been questioned two years prior to instant request did not generate serious doubts regarding instant request for competency examination, especially where defendant had previously been found competent to assist her counsel, even though defendant had been diagnosed with mental illness. Moreover, medical testimony supported finding that defendant’s medication did not prevent her from understanding court proceedings, and that her mental illness did not prevent her from assisting in her defense throughout four-year period in which defendant interacted with her counsel. Fact that defendant had displayed arguably irrational behavior by terminating several counsel and by filing irrelevant pro se motions did not require different result.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in failing to suppress evidence obtained from police through use of GPS device that police had installed on consenting informant’s vehicle. While Supreme Court in Jones, 132 S.Ct.945 (2012) found that police installation of GPS device was “search” that was valid only if reasonable, Ct. of Appeals found that regardless of whether instant police monitoring of GPS device was “search,” exclusionary rule would not apply to suppress instant evidence since, prior to Jones, existing case law would have led police to believe that installation of GPS device on consenting informant’s vehicle was not search, and thus was permissible.