Criminal Law

In prosecution on drug and unlawful possession of firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs seized from defendant’s bedroom located in 86-year-old relative’s home, where record showed that relative consented to police search of bedroom while police were seeking to enforce arrest warrant for another individual. While defendant claimed that relative was too mentally infirm to give valid consent, Dist. Ct. could rely on testimony of officers, who stated that relative was not experiencing symptoms of dementia or of intoxication at time consent was given. Fact that relative did not recall during suppression hearing all events surrounding defendant’s arrest at relative’s home did not require different result. Moreover, while relative did not have actual authority to give consent to search defendant’s bedroom, which, at times, was locked with padlock, police could have held reasonable belief that relative had apparent authority to consent to search, where relative owned home, and where defendant’s bedroom was unlocked at time of search.

In prosecution on charges of attempt to possess heroin with intent to distribute and unlawful possession of firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting evidence that defendant made trip to Canada in unsuccessful attempt to obtain heroin, even though said conduct was not charged in indictment. Instant evidence was admissible to establish defendant’s knowledge regarding his possession of heroin in charged offense, where said trip to Canada was for purposes of obtaining same heroin that was found in stuffed snowman eight days later that formed basis of charged offense. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in imposing as special condition of supervised release with respect to defendant’s separate conviction on child pornography charge, that defendant not view or listen to any child pornography or sexually stimulating material, since said condition was too vague and overbroad.

Ct. of Appeals found that defendant waived his appeal of his conviction and sentence due to waiver clause contained in plea agreement, even though defendant claimed that said agreement was rendered involuntary by subsequent change in law that precluded Dist. Ct. from imposing instant sentence that was based on sentencing Guidelines in force at time of sentencing, rather that Guidelines in force at time of offense that had lower sentencing range. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that his plea agreement was involuntary because he was unaware at time he entered plea that his plea agreement called for sentence that was in violation of Ex Post Facto Clause as subsequently determined in Peugh, 133 SCt 2072. Moreover, while Peugh represented change in law, said decision was not made retroactive.