Criminal Law

In prosecution on armed bank robbery charge, Dist. Ct. erred in admitting testimony from police detective that described characteristics of red dye pack used by bank to detonate on or near bank robbers after they left bank, since said testimony constituted expert witness testimony, and govt. had failed to disclose said testimony prior to trial as required under Rule 702. However, defendant failed to object to said testimony, and under plain error analysis, said testimony did not require new trial where: (1) defendant knew general nature of detective’s testimony prior to trial; and (2) detective’s testimony ultimately was not damaging to defendant’s case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition, after conducting evidentiary hearing and concluding that defendant had failed to establish his actual innocence on murder charge so as to allow Dist. Ct. to consider defendant’s three procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claims that formed basis of habeas petition. While defendant presented testimony and statements from three individuals, who asserted that someone else committed murder and that defendant was elsewhere at time of murder, said individuals suffered from credibility and reliability problems. Moreover, defendant’s proffered evidence of actual innocence was insufficient to overcome testimonies of three other individuals, who implicated defendant in murder.

In prosecution alleging that defendant violated criminal provisions of Clean Air Act by improperly removing, transporting and dumping asbestos-containing insulation, defendant waived any claim that govt. was required to show that he knew that asbestos that he had removed was regulated type of asbestos, where defendant failed to object to jury instruction on mens rea element of Clean Air Act. Moreover, Ct. noted that instant asbestos-containing material was covered by Clean Air Act, and fact that defendant was knowingly working with instant asbestos-containing material was sufficient by itself to meet mens rea requirement, since asbestos is of such dangerous material that probability of regulation is so great that defendant is presumed to have been aware of relevant regulation.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 120-month term of incarceration on drug conspiracy, even though Dist. Ct. based said sentence on finding that defendant was ineligible for reduced sentence under safety value provisions, where defendant had been caught lying on two separate “safety-valve” debriefings, during which defendant had attempted to provide details of his drug trafficking with customers. While defendant argued that he was entitled to safety-valve provisions, where he subsequently sent Dist. Ct. letter that identified his customers and his heroin supplier, Dist. Ct. was not required to ignore defendant’s false statements in his debriefings that denied events that were demonstrably true. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly find that information provided by defendant in his letter was not complete disclosure of facts surrounding charged offense.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy and firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs and firearms seized from defendant’s home pursuant to search warrant, even though defendant argued that confidential informant, who supplied information in affidavit used to support issuance of warrant, was unreliable. Informant’s credibility was not material where drug transactions used to support application for warrant were recorded, and where officer, who prepared affidavit, described what he saw and heard in reviewing recorded transactions. As such, recorded transactions supplied corroboration of informant that was sufficient to support issuance of warrant. Limited remand on issue of defendant‘s sentence, though, was warranted, where Dist. Ct. imposed 121-month sentence on misunderstanding that Fair Sentence Act of 2010 did not apply, and where Dist. Ct.’s remarks at sentencing did not indicate that it would have imposed same sentence had it known that lower statutory minimum sentence under Fair Sentencing Act applied.

In prosecution on illegal reentry into U.S and weapons-related drug charges, defendant failed to establish that his trial counsel was ineffective when he told jury that defendant had indeed distributed cocaine after reentering U.S. without permission, where trial counsel unsuccessfully tried to persuade jury that govt. did not establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt on weapons-related charges. Under Nixon, 543 US 175, counsel may concede guilt on some charges as part of effort to make defense credible, and although defendant claimed that counsel never informed him of said strategy, defendant failed to make record in instant direct appeal regarding what, if anything, counsel told him about trial strategy so as to allow Ct. of Appeals ability to consider issue.