Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering defendant’s guilty plea to three drug conspiracy charges after defendant submitted “Petition to Enter Guilty Plea” that acknowledged he was subject to mandatory minimum sentence of five years. While defendant argued that his guilty plea was not voluntary, where he lacked both education and language fluency to understand nature of conspiracy charge, record reflected that Dist. Ct. conducted thorough plea colloquy and allowed defendant to discuss said charges with counsel prior to accepting plea. Moreover, Dist. Ct. provided interpreter for defendant, and defendant ultimately agreed with fact summary of charges provided by govt. Dist. Ct. could also impose 210-month sentence based, in part, on finding that defendant’s conduct involved more than 150 kilograms of cocaine, even though charged offense only concerned 500 grams of cocaine, since Dist. Ct.’s relevant conduct finding did not have effect of increasing any minimum mandatory sentence.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying without evidentiary hearing, defendant’s habeas petition, alleging that prosecution violated Batson, 476 US 79, when it struck all five remaining African-Americans from jury venire, thereby producing all-white jury. Defendant’s statistical evidence was sufficient to establish prima facie case of race discrimination that entitled him to evidentiary hearing to explore prosecutor’s use of challenges in original trial that occurred approximately 32 years ago. Ct. further found that Ill. Supreme Ct. erred in finding that: (1) mere statistics that demonstrated existence of all-white jury might be insufficient to establish prima facie case of discrimination; (2) fact that prosecution used six challenges on white/Asian jurors meant that defendant’s race played no role in challenges used against African-American jurors; (3) any inference of discrimination was undermined by fact that defendant, three victims and all principal witnesses were African-Americans; and (4) prosecutor’s stated reasons for 4 of 5 challenges were sufficient to defeat any prima facie case of discrimination.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 1,380-month term of incarceration on multiple child pornography offenses, even though Dist. Ct. had failed to specifically mention fact that defendant’s psychiatrist opined that defendant’s prior history of sexual and psychological abuse as child contributed to his decision to commit charged offense, or that defendant was unlikely to re-offend. Record showed that Dist. Ct. could properly discount psychiatrist opinion, where defendant had filtered information to said psychiatrist, and that Dist. Ct. had actually made reference to said opinion. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not need to address every discrete point in psychological report tendered on behalf of defendant.

Record failed to contain sufficient evidence to support defendant’s guilty verdict on two charges of identity theft, under 18 USC section 1028(A), arising out of defendant’s sale of fake credential to third-party, who unsuccessfully attempted to use said certificate to purchase handgun, where instant credential contained name and birth-date of third-party. Section 1028(A) prohibits anyone from knowingly transferring, possessing or using without authority, means of identification “of another person,” who Ct. construed as person who did not consent to use of his or her identification. As such, defendant could not be guilty of any infraction under section 1028(A), where third-party had consented to use of her identification information on fake credential.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on mortgage fraud charge stemming from defendants’ submission of false statements in home loan application, where record showed that defendants inflated their incomes and made false statement as to who would live in home. While govt. case rested largely on testimony of loan broker, who had history of duping his clients, jury could properly look to said testimony, as well as loan application itself, which consisted of several pages containing false statements that had been initialed by defendants, to support instant guilty verdict. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in excluding evidence that broker had prepared false loan applications for other borrowers, since relevant evidence in instant case pertained to defendants’ own knowledge regarding false statements made in their loan application.

In prosecution on unlawful possession of child pornography and tampering with potential witness, Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error when admitting certain pornographic pictures and videos, even though defendant stipulated that said evidence contained child pornography. Gov’t. was not required to accept said stipulation as adequate substitute for showing content of pictures to jury where, as here, defendant took position that he did not know that he was in possession of child pornography or did not understand wrongfulness of receiving such pictures. While Dist. Ct. erred in failing to adequately explain any balancing process used to determine whether said pictures and videos were unreasonably prejudicial, any error was harmless given strength of other evidence against defendant. Record also supported defendant’s conviction on witness tampering, where defendant made eight telephone calls to his wife, urging her to lie for him by changing her prior statements that implicated him in child pornography possession charge.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on drug conspiracy charge stemming from long series of drug sales between defendant and his drug supplier. Jury could properly find existence of drug conspiracy, where defendant’s drug supplier testified that, for period of seven years, he regularly provided defendant with large quantities of drugs, as well as allowed defendant to pay for said drugs after reselling them to customers and to return drugs if he could not resell them at retail. Supplier additionally stated that defendant acted as his agent by identifying customers willing to purchase drugs in bulk quantities. However, defendant was entitled to new sentencing hearing, where Dist. Ct. failed to describe reliable evidence it used to support drug quantity finding.

In prosecution on charge under 18 USC section 1014 that defendants made knowingly false statements regarding their income to bank in order to obtain home mortgage, Dist. Ct. erred in excluding evidence that mortgage broker told defendants that including non-borrower’s income in “borrower’s income” blank on mortgage form was not improper since bank only cared about total income available to service loan, and since non-borrower’s income was “available” because non-borrower was borrower’s future spouse. Said evidence was not hearsay since it was only offered to show defendants’ understanding of term “borrower’s income” in instant loan application, and such evidence was relevant on issue as to defendants’ belief that inclusion of non-borrower’s income was not false statement. Moreover, record contained evidence that bank did not care if defendants had ability to repay loan since bank had primary intent to package instant mortgage with others for resale as mortgage security. (Dissent filed.)