Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly found defendant to be sexually dangerous person under Sexually Dangerous Persons Act based on allegations that defendant touched, slapped or fondled buttocks of various individuals, as well as grabbed breasts of teacher. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that although State proved that defendant had serious difficulty in controlling her sexual behavior, trial court failed to make requisite finding that it was “substantially probable” that defendant would engage in commission of sex offenses in future if not confined. Appellate Court further found that State failed to prove that defendant exhibited propensities to commit sex offenses, where record failed to show that defendant had penetrated or had attempted to sexually penetrate anyone.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress cannabis that was seized from defendant, who was passenger in vehicle stopped for alleged violation of section 3-413(b) of Ill. Vehicle Code, where parts of trailer hitch on vehicle obscured some numbers on license plate. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that officer should not have stopped vehicle because section 3-413(b) only prohibits obstructive objects that are attached to license plate and does not pertain to obstructions, like trailer hitch, that are not attached to license plate. Appellate Court further noted that officer had conceded that he was able to clearly see entire plate once he had stopped and approached vehicle.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s request for leave to file successive post-conviction petition alleging that his appellate counsel and his original post-conviction counsel were ineffective for failing to raise issue in either direct appeal or in original post-conviction petition that prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to produce any testimony to support claim made in opening statement that witness would identify defendant as having gun on date of charged offense. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, failed to establish that he was prejudiced by said misstatement so as to allow him to file successive post-conviction petition, where underlying record showed that prosecutor had honestly anticipated that witness would testify as to defendant’s possession of gun and acknowledged lack of said evidence in his closing argument. Moreover, Ct. found that evidence of defendant’s guilt on accountability theory was overwhelming.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed at first stage of proceedings defendant’s post-conviction petition, where said dismissal order was entered more than 90 days after filing of said petition. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court and remanding matter for second-stage proceedings, found that dismissal was void because it was not rendered within applicable 90-day period for doing so. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that dismissal order was timely since it had been signed by trial court on 90th day. Appellate Court, though, found that it was untimely since it had not been file-stamped or docketed by circuit court clerk until 91st day after filing of post-conviction petition. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether automatic transfer provision of Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILCS section 405/5-130(1)(A), is constitutional, where defendant, who received 30-year sentence, was prosecuted as adult on first degree murder charge under circumstances, where defendant was 16 years old at time of charged offense. Appellate Court rejected defendant’s claims that automatic transfer provision violated due process clause because it prevented trial court from making individualized assessment of defendant’s capacity to commit charged offense, and that said provision violated 8th Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, as well as proportionate penalties clause of Ill. Constitution. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether automatic transfer provision of Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILCS section 405/5-130(1)(A), is constitutional, where defendant, who received 50-year sentence, was prosecuted as adult on first degree murder charge under circumstances, where defendant was 15 years old at time of charged offense. Appellate Court rejected defendant’s claims that automatic transfer provision violated due process clause because it prevented trial court from making individualized assessment of defendant’s capacity to commit charged offense, and that said provision violated 8th Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, as well as proportionate penalties clause of Ill. Constitution.