Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing 46-year-old defendant to 50-year term of incarceration on four counts of production of child pornography that involved repeated sexual assaults of 11-year-old girl over approximate three-year period. Dist. Ct. fashioned sentence by giving defendant statutory maximum 30-year sentence on one count, and then imposing consecutive sentences of 20 years for remaining counts, which was appropriate under sentencing guidelines, even though defendant would be 96 years old at completion of sentence.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder conviction even though his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain independent expert to counter state’s expert whose supplemental opinion tendered to defendant on day of trial called into question defendant’s version of incident. While independent expert could have refuted opinion of state’s expert, defendant failed to establish prejudice prong of Strickland where: (1) defense expert could not have established identity of shooter; (2) state court found that defendant’s version of incident was incredible and illogical; and (3) other evidence introduced at trial, including independent confession by defendant to fellow inmate, overwhelmingly implicated defendant as culprit.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 66-month term of incarceration on charge of illegal re-entry into U.S. after having been deported, even though Dist. Ct. applied 16-level enhancement under section 2L1-2(b)(1)(A)(i) after finding that, prior to his deportation, defendant was convicted of drug offense that resulted in prison term exceeding 13 months. While defendant’s original sentence for sale of $50 of cocaine was less than 13 months imprisonment, defendant still qualified for enhancement where: (1) defendant subsequently violated terms of probation for instant cocaine offense and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment; and (2) defendant’s initial conviction and probation revocation occurred prior to his deportation and re-entry.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charge of failure to surrender for service of prison sentence in violation of 18 USC section 3146. While defendant argued that govt. failed to prove either specific location or date for his surrender to federal authorities where Dist. Ct. had previously granted his request to report directly to one of three prisons without specifying particular prison, record showed that defendant was aware of new report date, as well as location of said report when U.S. Marshall’s office told defendant to report to its offices after original reporting date had elapsed, but defendant instead fled to Tennessee with his personal possessions on date he was to report to federal authorities.