Criminal Law

Ct. of Appeals dismissed defendant's appeal, which challenged his life sentence imposed after entry of his guilty plea, where plea agreement contained waiver of all issues arising out of defendant's conviction and sentence, even though defendant argued that govt. breached agreement by failing to seek reduction in his sentence under 18 USC section 3553(e) based on his substantial assistance to govt. No breach occurred where plea agreement reserved for govt. right in its discretion to request lower sentence for defendant, and defendant failed to show that prosecutor's reason for not seeking lower sentence, i.e., that defendant's information did not lead to any arrests or charges, was based on any unconstitutional motives or was unrelated to any legitimate govt. end. Moreover, instant promise to evaluate in good faith whether defendant's cooperation warranted section 3553(e) motion provided sufficient consideration for his guilty plea.

In prosecution on charge of felon in possession of firearm charge, govt. did not violate defendant's constitutional rights by conducting reverse sting operation by which agents selected from its inventory of guns subject firearm that had been manufactured out of state to be part of said sting. Ct. rejected defendant's claim that govt. had improperly "federalized" what could otherwise have been purely local gun-possession offense.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's Rule 60(b) motion that essentially sought reconsideration of prior Dist. Ct. order denying defendant's habeas petition that challenged his guilty plea to charge of transportation of minor in interstate commerce for purpose of prostitution on grounds that his trial counsel labored under conflict of interest arising out of counsel's prior representation of one of defendant's prostitutes in different case. Record showed that instant Rule 60(b) motion qualified as improper second successive request for collateral relief, which was barred under 28 USC section 2244(b), where instant Rule 60(b) motion attacked Dist. Ct.'s original denial on its merits. Fact that appeal of original denial of habeas petition was pending at time Rule 60(b) motion was filed was irrelevant. Ct. further affirmed original denial of habeas petition where defendant failed to show any prejudice arising out of counsel's prior representation of prostitute.

In prosecution on drug and firearm offenses, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress drugs and gun seized after traffic stop where stop was based on perceived violation of Indiana statute requiring defendant to use turn signal prior to making right turn. While defendant argued that his traffic stop was improper because he was not required to give signal prior to making instant 120-degree turn into adjoining street, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant sufficiently rotated his steering wheel so as to qualify as turn under language of Indiana statute and to justify instant traffic stop. Ct. also found that govt. did not constructively amend indictment, which charged that traffic stop occurred "on or about July 13, 2010," even though record showed that traffic stop occurred on July 14, 2010.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting govt. forfeiture petition in amount of $279,500 on 23 counts on charge of structuring bank transaction so as to avoid $10,000 reporting requirement in violation of 31 USC section 5324(c). While defendant argued that amount of forfeiture violated 8th Amendment since it was grossly disproportionate to offense for which she had been convicted, Ct. found no 8th Amendment violation where: (1) record showed that defendant violated said statute 23 times over substantial period of time that interfered with bank's attempt to comply with reporting obligation; (2) defendant's conduct frustrated govt. attempt to uncover crime and fraud; and (3) instant forfeiture amount was well within statutory penalty range. Fact that defendant's acts deprived govt. of information that did not pertain to any other criminal act or that withdrawn funds did not belong to defendant did not require different result.

In prosecution on charge of felon in possession of firearm, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress certain inculpatory statements made after defendant had answered police question at start of first interview as to whether he understood his Miranda rights by slightly nodding his head and making dismissive noise from his mouth. While defendant argued that his nod and noise did not establish valid waiver of Miranda rights, record showed that defendant understood and waived said rights where: (1) defendant's nod and vocalization indicated understanding of his rights; (2) defendant subsequently indicated at second interview that he understood his Miranda rights; (3) defendant had substantial experience with criminal justice system and answered certain questions during first interview with expectation of making deal with police; and (4) defendant's failure to answer all of police's questions indicated that he was aware of his right to remain silent.

In prosecution on charge of felon in possession of firearm, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress seizure of firearm found in defendant's residence pursuant to search warrant that had been supported by affidavit from confidential informant, who indicated that he had recently seen defendant in defendant's residence with firearm. While informant's affidavit lacked certain details, contents of affidavit provided sufficient reliable information to support issuance of search warrant where: (1) informant's information was obtained through first-hand observation made within 72 hours of warrant application; (2) police partially verified information supplied by informant by confirming defendant's address; (3) informant's statement that rival gang shot at defendant's home was consistent with police understanding that defendant was active member in gang that was often involved in weapons-related incidents; and (4) informant was reliable where he had provided information that led to three prior arrests in past six months.

In prosecution on drug and firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress inculpatory statement given during second interview even though defendant initially indicated during first interview that he wished to consult with his attorney prior to giving any written statement. Dist. Ct. could properly have found that defendant's invocation of his Miranda right to remain silent was limited in scope to request to give written statement where: (1) defendant had previously been given Miranda warning prior to first interview and directly responded to request to make written statement; (2) defendant's response of needing to consult attorney "before I do that" operated as clear limitation of his invocation of right to remain silent; and (3) defendant signed additional Miranda waiver at start of second interview. (Dissent filed.)