Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 56 counts of criminal sexual assault, sexual abuse, and sexual relations within families as to his 14-year-old daughter. Defendant's admission to detectives was corroborated by Defendant's testimony at trial, and thus his extrajudicial confession and in-court testimony sufficiently established corpus delicti of offense. Defendant presented no evidence that victim was able to voluntarily, intelligently, and actively concur with Defendant's sexual advances, and evidence showed that victim was unable to give knowing consent to the sexual acts. No ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file motion to suppress statements to detectives, as Defendant waived any error by giving in-court testimony consistent with substance of his statements. (CAHILL and GARCIA, concurring.)

Probation officers possess the authority to file petitions charging violation of probation. Section 5-6-4 of Unified Code of Corrections does not give a State's Attorney the power to veto a probation officer's decision to offer intermediate sanctions, so long as sanction requirements are timely completed, and this does not violate separation of powers principles. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendants overbilled Illinois Medical Assistance Program for transporting low-income patients to their medical appointments, and were convicted of vendor fraud, theft, and money laundering. The term "proceeds" in money laundering statute refers to receipts, rather than profits. Although statute is ambiguous, legislative intent and context of statute indicate it should be read to mean receipts. Requirement of showing profits would make it exceedingly difficult to prove guilt for this servious offense. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 11/29/11.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault. Defendant failed to make substantial showing of constitutional violation in his postconviction petition claiming counsel was ineffective for giving incorrect information as to plea offer made prior to trial. Defendant's contention, that if his counsel had raised correct good-conduct credit calculation the State would have made offer with more generous credit applying, is speculative and presumes facts not established. (HUTCHINSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of unlawful possession of controlled substance (cocaine), which was found in hair gel container, inside his luggage which police searched after arresting him at train station. Police had received a tip that Defendant, who had a civil warrant for child support, would be traveling by train. Defendant dropped his luggage, upon officers' order, and was then handcuffed. Defendant was within arms' reach of luggage, though handcuffed prior to search, and luggage was not locked. Officers knew Defendant to be a gang member and were concerned he might have dangerous weapon. Search was reasonable and valid incident to Defendant's arrest. (STEIGMANN and POPE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of defacing ID marks of a firearm and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. Unidentified citizen flagged down a police officer and told him that a man wearing white shirt and yellow pants had a gun, and told of man's location. Tip was not sufficiently reliable to provide office with reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity to justify Terry stop. Thus, court should have granted motion to suppress evidence of gun found on Defendant in pat-down search, and his statements as to gun. (STEELE and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder, and sentenced to 40 years. Court allowed Defendant to proceed pro se at trial. Court had no obligation to inform Defendant of his responsibility to request second degree murder instruction, or to introduce it sua sponte, as decision to request instruction was solely up to Defendant. (McCULLOUGH and COOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted and sentenced to concurrent terms of 35 years for attempted first degree murder, 15 years for home invasion, and 6 years for armed robbery, and ordered to pay $200 DNA analysis fee. That fee is not punitive, but is to cover costs incurred in collecting and testing DNA sample, and thus is a fee and not a fine. Thus, Defendant could not apply his presentencing credit to satisfy his $200 DNA fee. (HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring; WRIGHT, dissenting.)