Criminal Law

Defendant pled guilty to four counts of possession and delivery of controlled substance and cannabis. Court sentenced Defendant to concurrent prison terms of 12 years, 5 years, and 3 years, and denied Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. While proceeds of crime of unlawful delivery of controlled substance are not an aggravating factor, they can be proper considerations at sentencing when proceeds relate to extent and nature of a defendant's involvement in a criminal enterprise, motivation, or need for deterrence. (STEIGMANN and POPE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of predatory criminal sexual assault. The reliability requirement of Section 115-10 of Criminal Code does not affect its constitutionality, because hearsay testimony still must meet constitutional requirements in addition to statutory requirement of reliability. Considering totality of circumstances, court did not abuse its discretion in allowing child's 'videotaped statement to be shown to jury. Jury could have found videopated statement more complete and trustworthy than her trial testimony, given its proximity in time to the incident. Any inconsistences affect weight rather than admissibility of taped statement. Victim is not required to testify to every element of a charged offense before evidence of her hearsay statements can bew admitted per Section 115-10. (TURNER and STEIGMANN, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing.) Defendant, age 13, was convicted of armed robbery under Criminal Code and sentenced to 21 years in prison. Defendant had been charged by juvenile petition with armed robbery of a bank. Court did not adequately address two statutory transfer factors, and critical nonstatutory factor of potential term of sentence, in deciding to permit prosecution of juvenile under criminal law. State failed to present any evidence that gun was loaded; when officers recovered handgun, it was empty and inoperable. (CARTER, concurring; WRIGHT, specially concurring.)

Court improperly granted a certificate of innocence to Defendant who had been found not guilty at retrial on first-degree murder charges. Contrary to statute, court improperly equated finding of not guilty at retrial and actual innocence of the charged offenses. Under Section 2-702 of Code of Civil Procedure, in determining whether Defendant showed by preponderance of evidence that he is innocent of murders, court was required to consider materias attached to Defendant's petition in support of his innocence claim (his affidavit and stipulated-to testimony of witness) in relation to evidence presented against him at both trials. (R.E. GORDON and GARCIA, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to one count each of aggravated discharge of a firearm and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. One same date Defendant also pled guilty to aggravated fleeing and eluding, filed in separate case, and was sentenced to three years imprisonment, sentences to be served concurrently. Court prematurely denied, sua sponte and without 30 days having passed for State to file response, Defendant's petition to withdraw guilty plea, and a pro se "motion for specific performance of plea agreement", wherein he argued that he had not been informed that he would be required to serve 85% of his sentence for aggravated discharge of firearm. Even though State appeared at hearing, mere silence by State, within 30-day period allowed for it to respond, does not render petition ripe for adjudication. (HOFFMAN and HALL, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. After stopping Defendant for running a stop sign, officer found that his license was suspended. Officer did pat down search and found small amount of cocaine in Defendant's crotch area. Defendant wore his pants low, and his underwear was visible even before officer unzipped Defendant's pants. Court's factual determination that officer did not arrange Defendant's clothing "so as to permit a visual inspection of" Defendant's underwear was not manifestly erroneous, and thus Defendant was not strip searched within meaning of Section 103-1 of Criminal Code, which limits use of strip searches. Court erred in not holding hearing to determine whether Defendant could afford $100 public defender fee. (CARTER and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with disorderly conduct, under Section 26-1(a)(13) of Criminal Code, and court dismissed indictment for failure to state an offense. Indictment alleged that Defendant had threatened bodily harm directed to a person at a school, by threatening to shoot him. At preliminary hearing State presented testimony that Defendant had sent intended victim text message and photo of himself holding two guns. Statute's language is unambiguous in prohibiting threats against "persons", which is properly read as including both the singular and the plural. Thus, statute applies where threat is made against only one person. (LYTTON, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of residential burglary. After trial, City Police Department notified Defendant that he could pick up his property ($651 in cash) after his appeal period ran or appeal was completed. At sentencing, Defendant was ordered to pay $1462 in restitution, and cash at police department was determined forfeited for application to restitution. Defendant's counsel filed motion for summary remand for compliance with Supreme Court Rule 606(b). Defendant had filed a pro se motion to recoup funds, but he had no authority to file pro se motions as he had been consistently represented by counsel, and thus this motion had not been properly before the trial court. Money is to be held pending resolution of Defendant's appeal. (KNECHT and APPLETON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of participation in methamphetamine manufacturing. State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that substance weighed more than 100 grams. Chunky black and white powder found in gift bag in Defendant's bedroom, a mixture of different chemicals created by Defendant's husband and with Defendant's participation in manufacture of methamphetamine, constituted a single substance within meaning of statute. Powder's components remained blended together when the powder was found, and powder was found in a single container. Substance was permissibly weighed and tested in the state in which it was found, and was a "substance containing methamphetamine". (TURNER and STEIGMANN, concurring.)