Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder after bench trial. Defendant, age 16 at time of murder, was tried and sentenced, as an adult, to 18 years imprisonment. Court was within its discretion in granting witness' request to be excused from testifying at trial, based on his invoking Fifth Amendment, as witness had been interviewed by police as to his involvement in incident. Thus, Defendant was not arbitrarily denied his Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses. Court was required to sentence Defendant as an adult per Juvenile Court Act, because he was at least 15 at time of offense and was charged with first-degree murder. Even though Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, that offense was a lesser mitigated version of the same charged offense, and was "covered by" pertinent section of Act because it arose out of same incident as first-degree murder charge. (LAMPKIN, concurring; HALL, dissenting in part.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder. Defendant filed postconviction petition alleging his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a continuance to investigate officer's statement that he recognized Defendant from the neighborhood. State was not obligated, per Rule 412, to specify the types of witnesses it may call at trial, including identification witnesses, and thus State did not violate discovery, so defense counsel had no basis to request continuance. Thus, court properly dismissed postconviction petition. (GARCIA, concurring; R.E. GORDON, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of home invasion, residential burglary, and aggravated battery. At midnight, Defendant rang doorbell of residence; after no one answered, he kicked in the door and went into a bedroom where he demanded "the stuff." Evidence was sufficient to show that Defendant knew the home was occupied, as it is not uncommon for a person to not answer the doorbell late at night. Home invasion consists of two separate physical acts; the fact that one act is the same as residential burglary does not mean that convictions for the two offenses violates the one-act, one-crime rule. Only one conviction for residential burglary can stand, as all three convictions of this offense were based on the same act of entry into the residence. (STEIGMANN, concurring; POPE, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery. After trial, two jurors wrote letters to trial court, one stating that he and other jurors were not sure of what jury instructions meant by the word "threatening". Other letter stated that juror did not believe that State proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and alleged that jury deliberations were improper, including some jurors asserting that Defendant's decision to not testify was an indication of his guilt. These allegations, based on jurors' letters, cannot be verified by evidence other than jury's own motive, method, or process, and thus may not be considered to impeach jury's verdict. (STEIGMANN and COOK, concurring.)

Court properly dismissed criminal prosecution and discharged Defedant from custody because he was not brought to trial within statutory speedy trial period. Plain language of statute allows court to continue cause on application of State for not more than an additional 60 days. To interpret statute to mean that State may seek and obtain multiple continuances and that each one may be for "not more than an additional 60 days" would conflict with clearly expressed legislative intent. (CHAPMAN and STEWART, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 9/14/11.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated battery to peace officer and resisting or obstructing peace officer, from physical altercation between Defendant, police officer, and detention aide at police station. TIming of prosecution, which was after Defendant had filed a civil rights suit alleging excessive force in her arrest, is itself insufficient to carry burden of proof in establishing actual vindictiveness of prosecution. Court properly restricted cross-examination to relevant issues. (PUCINSKI and STERBA, concurring.)

(Correcting court designation.) Defendants were separately convicted on drug possession charges, and challenged $10 charge, imposed with their sentence, for "Arrestee's Medical Costs Fund", claiming that they received no medical care while in custody. Statute provided no exception for arrestees who do not receive medical care, and fund benefits all arrestees, as it serves as a medical insurance policy. (KILBRIDE, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant entered guilty plea to attempted murder, and claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel had failed to contact victim, who stated in affidavit that defense counsel failed to return her phone calls, and that she was willing to testify in support of insanity defense that Defendant was not taking his medication for mental illness at time of incident. Factual basis for plea did not include that victim would testify that Defendant did not mean to harm her and that his actions were due to his mental illness. Court's admonishments were insufficient, and thus do not overcome showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. That some statements in victim's affidavit might be inadmissible hearsay does not necessarily mean that victim could not otherwise support defense. (HUTCHINSON and ZENOFF, concurring.)

Defendant, having confessed to history of pedophilic behavior, was involuntarily committed as a sexually dangerous person. Persons subject to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act and the Sexually Violent Persons Act are not similarly situated. Thus, Defendant's equal protection claim, that he was not allowed to retain his own expert at public expense, as is allowed for those found to be sexually violent, must fail. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 9/14/11.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of possession of cocaine. Court improperly cross-examined Defendant about his postarrest silence. Defendant's explanation of how drugs were in his jacket and denial that he dropped the bag were intrinsic to his defense. Thus, the improper use of Defendant's postarrest silence to impeach him undermined his credibility and was not harmless error. Evidence at trial was close and verdict depended on credibility of witnesses, who offered different versions of events. (HOWSE and EPSTEIN, concurring.)