Criminal Law

Winston v. Boatwright

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Peremptory Challenge
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 10-1156
Decision Date: 
August 19, 2011
Federal District: 
E.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective when he used peremptory challenges to systematically eliminate all males from jury in defendant’s trial on second-degree sexual assault charge in violation of Equal Protection Clause and his 6th Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel’s intentional violation of Equal Protection Clause by using gender as factor to exclude potential jurors constituted conduct that fell below performance standards established by Strickland even though counsel explained, and Wisc. courts agreed, that said conduct was part of counsel’s trial strategy. Moreover, while said error would normally require automatic reversal of defendant's conviction, denial of habeas petition was appropriate since at time Wisc. courts rejected defendant’s claim by applying harmless error standard to intentional Batson violations, U.S. Supreme Court had not clearly indicated that said error required automatic reversal of defendant’s conviction.

U.S. v. Morales

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Jury
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 09-2863 et al. Cons.
Decision Date: 
August 18, 2011
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
In prosecution on series of RICO charges stemming from defendants' activities in or with gang, Dist. Ct. did not err in empanelling anonymous jury where instant defendants had history of intimidating witnesses, as well as history of interfering with administration of justice. Moreover, Dist. Ct. took steps to mitigate any potential prejudice arising from jurors' anonymity by informing jury that their names were being withheld only to prevent contact, as opposed to protect their personal safety. Also, Ct. rejected defendants' claims that anonymous jury precluded them from using peremptory challenges or undermining effectiveness of voir dire. Dist. Ct. also did not err in failing to conduct hearing on juror's note suggesting that other jury members were participating in premature deliberations of case. Hearing was not required where alleged intra-jury misconduct came to light only after verdict had been issued, and Rule 606(b) did not permit post-verdict interrogation of jurors regarding scope of their deliberations. Additionally, while alleged intra-jury discussion of case may have violated Dist. Ct.'s order, nothing in juror's note indicated that jury's objectivity had been compromised.

U.S. v. Benabe

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Pretrial Procedure
Citation
Case Number: 
Nos. 09-1190 et al. Cons.
Decision Date: 
August 18, 2011
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
In prosecution on RICO, murder and drug charges arising out of defendants' activities as gang members, Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error when it removed two defendants from courtroom prior to first day of trial due to said defendants' disruptive behavior. No Sixth Amendment violation occurred where said defendants, after raising series of frivolous arguments regarding Dist. Ct.'s jurisdiction, refused to confirm that they would not interrupt jury selection or trial. Moreover, while Dist. Ct. erred under Rule 43 in barring defendants from trial (with option to view proceeding from jail) prior to first morning of trial, any error in timing was harmless. Dist. Ct. also did not err in granting govt. request to empanel anonymous jury where defendants had history of intimidating witnesses and were charged with murder of individual whom they believed had cooperated with police. Additionally, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion for new trial based on allegations that two jurors had provided false information during voir dire about employment, knowledge of relatives of defendants, and existence of relatives in gangs. No hearing was required on defendants' motion where alleged bias concerned intrinsic influence on jurors, and Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that individual was mistaken with regard to claims that jurors had lied with respect to their employment and relationship to one defendant's family member.

People v. Carballido

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 2-09-0340
Decision Date: 
Thursday, March 17, 2011
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Lake Co.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
JORGENSEN
(Court opinion modified 8/10/11 upon denial of rehearing.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder. At time of offense, Defendant was 17, and drove the car to and from the scene where a 21-year-old member of gang allegedly shot and killed 15-year-old victim whom shooter believed was member of rival gang. Defendant raised gist of claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as counsel failed to pursue motion to suppress his statements from police interview, where Defendant's statement of knowledge that shooter had a gun was key to State's case; and defense counsel was aware of Defendant's youth and fatigue, his intelligence and maturity, and Defendant's father testified that police refused to allow him to speak to his son. Defendant raised gist of constitutional claim in that officer who interviewed Defendant's 14-year-old sister failed to provide State with his interview field notes, and thus notes were not disclosed to defense. (HUDSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Public Act 97-362

Topic: 
Juvenile justice
(Yarbrough, D-Maywood; Collins, D-Chicago) amends the Juvenile Court Act to reduce recidivism of troubled youth by encouraging juvenile courts to explore less restrictive alternatives before incarcerating them. It will also help Illinois recover federal IVe funds for services to delinquent youth. Effective January 1, 2012.

Public Act 97-383

Topic: 
DNA from registered sex offenders and some arrestees
(Mendoza, D-Chicago; Raoul, D-Chicago) requires all registered sex offenders to provide a DNA sample regardless of their conviction or where they were convicted. It also requires a DNA sample from arrestees of serious, violent crimes and sex crime after a grand-jury indictment or a section 109-3 hearing in which a judge finds probable cause to believe the arrestee committed one of the triggering offenses. Effective January 1, 2012.

U.S. v. Robertson

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 10-3543
Decision Date: 
August 15, 2011
Federal District: 
S.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Vacated and remanded
Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 34-month term of incarceration when revoking defendant's supervised release on drug conviction where revocation was based on incident in which defendant was growing 52 marijuana plants. Recommended guideline for revocation of supervised release was 12 to 18 months, and Dist. Ct. failed to articulate any rationale for imposing above-guideline sentence.

U.S. v. Gayton

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Reasonable Doubt
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 09-3601
Decision Date: 
August 12, 2011
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury's guilty verdict on drug distribution charges arising out of two controlled purchases that were witnessed in part by police. Govt. was not required to produce informant as witness at trial, and fact that police did not personally observe defendant take police-supplied money from informant and give informant drugs in exchange for said money did not require different result where govt. showed that informant was searched before and after both purchases to preclude any other reason for informant having drugs after his encounter with defendant. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in allowing police officials to testify about matters that occurred out of their sight without calling informant as witness since said officials could testify about what they heard on recordings of said purchases.

Public Act 97-294

Topic: 
Students, schools, and the courts
(Eddy, R-Hutsonville; Righter, R-Mattoon) makes several changes affecting students who are respondents under the Stalking No Contact Order Act, the Civil No Contact Order Act, and the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986. (1) Provides that the court may order that the respondent accept a change of educational placement or program, as determined by the school. (2) The respondent bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence that the educational transfer, change of placement, or change of program of the respondent is not available. The respondent’s agreement is irrelevant to whether a remedy is “not available.” (3) The respondent must also share the burden for the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school. (4) Provides that the court may make the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the respondent responsible for costs associated with the respondent's placement under the order. (5) Prohibits a court in the enforcement of an order from holding a school district or private or non-public school or any of its employees in civil or criminal contempt unless the school district or private or non-public school has been allowed to intervene. (6) Allows a court to hold the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the minor respondent in civil or criminal contempt for a violation of an order for conduct of the minor in violation of the Act if the parents, guardian, or legal custodian directed, encouraged, or assisted the minor in the conduct. Effective Januar 1, 2012.

U.S. v. Johnson

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Reasonable Doubt
Citation
Case Number: 
Nos. 10-1762 & 10-2230 Cons.
Decision Date: 
August 11, 2011
Federal District: 
S.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury's guilty verdict on charge of obstruction of federal agency's investigation under 18 USC section 1512(c)(1) arising out of incident in which defendant barricaded police in front of her home for 20 minutes while police were attempting to enforce search warrant targeted for drugs, and where police subsequently heard flushing toilets in defendant's home during said 20-minute period. Ct. rejected defendant's claim that section 1512(c)(1) was limited to destruction of documents associated with white-collar crimes, and record otherwise contained sufficient evidence to show that defendant intended that her actions in destroying drug contraband would affect foreseeable official proceeding.