Criminal Law

In prosecution on mail and wire fraud charges stemming from scheme to submit bogus mortgage applications, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting confession of non-testifying co-defendant that implicated defendant in charged offense where govt. substituted term "straw buyer" for defendant's name. Use of term "straw buyer" in said confession was not obvious reference to defendant even though jury could have concluded that defendant was "straw buyer" by comparing facts in confession to other properly admitted evidence. Dist. Ct. also did not commit prejudicial error in admitting business records under Rule 902(11) even though certificate from records custodian required under Rule 902(11) was signed by co-defendant, who had previously pleaded guilty to falsifying documents at issue in defendants' conspiracy, where record showed that many of subject records were duplicates of business records that had been admitted into record without objection.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions on mail fraud charges stemming from scheme whereby defendants took checks made out to defendants' agency and used said funds for personal purposes without performing services associated with said funds. Ct. rejected defendants' claim that govt. failed to establish that checks were actually sent via U.S. mail where record showed that envelopes had been run through postal meter, but failed to contain postal marking indicating that they had actually been delivered through postal service, where envelopes otherwise showed that defendant's agency had received envelopes. Ct. also did not err in giving jury instruction on advice-of-counsel defense where defendants argued that they had acted in good faith after listening to legal advice by their attorney.

In prosecution on charges of Medicaid fraud and conspiracy to defraud govt. based on scheme to submit false bills for Medicaid services, defendant was not entitled to new trial under Brady based on claim that govt. failed to direct (prior to trial) private company to run computer program that could have uncovered potentially supportive evidence regarding frequency that bills were submitted to Medicaid officials since govt. is under no duty to create exculpatory evidence when it was otherwise unaware of its existence. Moreover, govt. timely tendered results of computer program that was generated mid-trial, and results of said program did not rule out defendant's participation in charged scheme.

Defendant was entitled to remand to Dist. Ct. for reconsideration of his objection to prosecutor's use of two peremptory challenges on two African-American jurors where Dist. Ct. failed to make specific credibility finding with respect to prosecutor's explanation that said challenges were used because one juror articulated bias toward defendant and another juror seemed agitated during voir dire. Moreover, prosecutor could not attempt to convince judge of her race-neutral explanation by reminding judge that she shared same race as excluded jurors.

In prosecution on drug distribution charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting evidence of defendant's connections to third-party who was subject of unrelated and uncharged DEA investigation. Said evidence was admissible to show both background information regarding drug transaction at issue in charged offense, as well as defendant's role in delivery of drugs.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in prosecution on charge of harboring illegal aliens when counsel failed to object to certain videotaped testimony of subject aliens and prevented defendant from testifying on his own behalf. Ct. found that counsel’s failure to object to videotaped testimony was part of legitimate trial strategy, and record otherwise showed that defendant’s failure to testify was voluntary decision on his part. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that any language barrier did not prevent defendant from communicating with counsel where defendant participated in trial and never notified Dist. Ct. of any problems understanding proceedings or his counsel. Moreover, counsel’s failure to propose specific intent instruction was not ineffective where there was no controlling case law or pattern instruction covering instant charged offense.