Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of financial exploitation of an elderly person and theft; evidence showed that Defendant had taken and depleted more than $300,000 in savings from elderly woman with severe dementia, using general and durable powers of attorney. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 11 years. Evidence, including expert testimony, established beyond a reasonable doubt that victim's dementia precluded her from authorizing Defendant's use of her funds. Sentences were proper and within statutory guidelines. Court made logical inference that Defendant retained access to large amounts of money belonging to victim at time of trial. Evidence established that Defendant did not act in victim's best interests in not seeking medical care for her. (CUNNINGHAM and KARNEZIS, concurring.)

First-stage dismissal of Defendant's post-conviction petition was proper. In polling jury after verdict, Clerk called out alternate juror's name and asked a portion of polling question, and alternate juror then responded in the affirmative. Facts were insufficient to establish inference that alternate had actually deliberated or that Defendant was deprived of right to fair trial. Defendant's assertion that an alternate juror participated in jury deliberations was rebutted by the four verdict forms bearing signatures of the 12 jurors. No ineffective assistance of counsel shown, as Defendant did not show that he was prejudiced by counsel failing to exercise perempory challenge as to juror who was named jury foreperson.(CAHILL and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Defendant, Jesse Coleman, was convicted, after bench trial, of violating armed habitual criminal statute. The name on one of the certified copies of prior felony conviction was "Jessie Coleman", and Defendant contended that State was required to offer additional evidence to establish that "Jessie" Coleman" was the Defendant. The trier of fact could have found that Defendant was the same person named in the certified copy. Defendant never asserted that he did not commit the prior crime and was not the Defendant in that case; the variance between "Jesse" and "Jessie" is not sufficient to defeat the initial presumption of identity, and Defendant presented no evidence to rebut it. The armed habitual criminal statute is a constitutionally permissible restriction of second amendment right to bear arms, and does not violate ex post facto clause, because it punishes for new and separate crime committed while having already been convicted of two prior felonies. (GARCIA and CAHILL, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of DUI and failure to yield. In voir dire, court said, "You must follow the law as I give it to you even if you disagree with it", and asked each juror whether they would "follow the law even if you disagree with it". Court's violation of Rule 431(b), in failing to state in voir dire that the defendant's failure to testify cannot be held against him, was not a structural error, and Defendant does not argue that evidence was closely balanced; thus, no plain error. (LYTTON, concurring; McDADE, specially concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 5/5/11.) Defendant was convicted of murder and aggravated battery. State's witnesses identified Defendant as the shooter, but defense witnesses identified Defendant's cousin as the shooter. Court committed plain error when it allowed the use of transcript from a witness's guilty plea as evidence against Defendant. Transcript in evidence contained prosecutor's statement of the factual basis for the witness's guilty plea, which included collateral matters not necessary for the guilty plea to illegal possession of a gun in connection with the same incident, but severely prejudicial to Defendant. Prosecutor should not have used the risk the cousin faced as a soldier in Iraq as a reason for the jurors to find him credible; this argument exceeds the bounds of propriety, as it could bias the jury with sympathy for soldier. (QUINN and STEELE, concurring.)

(Cour opinion corrected 5/31/11.) Defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and four counts of aggravated kidnapping of 13-year-old girl who had sneaked out of her parents' home at night. Defendant's mandatory consecutive sentences of seven years for each of the counts of criminal sexual assault did not violate proportionate sentencing provision. The lack of a need to prove an aggravating factor for criminal sexual assault created differences between the elements of the two offenses, and the elements of the two offenses are not identical. Mandatory consecutive sentencing structure for the sexual assault offense affects only the manner of carrying out the sentence, and not the punishment itself. (KARNEZIS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of obstructing justice. Defendant had furnished false information to police as to whether the father of her children was in the house, when police came to her house with a warrant for him. In such case, the potential that investigation will be compromised is exceedingly high, and the obstruction may be completed in a short time, at the moment the false information is given. Evidence was sufficient for her conviction, as Defendant impeded the investigation at the time that she misled them by lying. (APPLETON and McCULLOUGH, concurring.)