Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to statutory minimum sentence of 120-month term of incarceration on charge of attempted possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. While defendant argues that his sentence was improper because Dist. Ct. included in relevant drug quantity calculation drugs that third-party intended to purchase for himself, record showed that defendant pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting third-party’s attempted possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. Thus Dist Ct. could properly include in instant drug calculation all drugs at issue in controlled purchase.

In prosecution on series of drug charges, Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error in directing defense counsel to not discuss any aspect of defendant’s case during nightly recess of trial that occurred during middle of defendant’s cross-examination and during dispute between parties over whether defendant could be impeached by certain phone records. While defendant should have been able to discuss aspects of case with his counsel during recess as part of his right to counsel, Dist. Ct. could properly preclude defense counsel from discussing disputed phone records until Dist. Ct. made ruling as to their use at trial, and thrust of Dist. Ct.’s direction was to preclude discussion of phone records. Moreover, defense counsel should have clarified with Dist. Ct. scope of its direction if he had believed that any right to counsel was being violated.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction on charge of attempted murder arising out of defendant's stabbing of cellmate, even though defendant asserted at trial that he did not attack victim. Ct. rejected defendant's claim that trial court should have sua sponte suggested to defendant's trial counsel that defendant assert entrapment defense based on fact that victim was member of rival gang that defendant's gang had obligation to kill. Entrapment defense was factually inconsistent with defendant's claim that he did not attack victim, and any error in failing to raise entrapment defense would lie, if at all, in claim of ineffective assistance of counsel rather than any judicial error. Ct. also rejected defendant's suggestion that placement of rival gang member in his cell compelled defendant to attack him.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying govt.'s request in sentencing hearing on charge of unlawful possession of firearm to sentence defendant as armed career criminal under 18 USC section 924(e) based on defendant's prior convictions for murder, attempted murder (twice), aggravated battery and domestic battery. While Dist. Ct. properly could not count either defendant's murder or aggravated battery convictions as qualifying predicate offenses since State had issued two letters indicating that defendant's civil rights to vote and hold office had been restored upon completion of defendant's sentences for those offenses, Ct. could still count defendant's prior convictions on separate attempted murder incidents, as well as his domestic battery conviction to satisfy three-prior-violent-felony conviction requirement for armed career criminal status. Ct. rejected govt.'s argument that Dist. Ct. could count all five prior convictions where defendant failed to establish that he had actually read instant two letters sent by State, and Ct. rejected defendant's argument that instant letters covered both attempted murder convictions where sentences for said convictions had been served by time instant two letters had been sent.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant's habeas petition challenging application of career offender enhancement on his sentence following his bank robbery conviction where said enhancement was based on two prior escape convictions involving his failure to return to confinement. Under Begay and Chambers, defendant's prior convictions did not qualify as violent felonies for purposes of applying career offender enhancement, and Ct. further found that Begay and Chambers applied retroactively to defendant's case, so as to entitle him to new sentencing hearing without consideration of career offender enhancement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to mandatory minimum 10-year term of incarceration on charge of distributing crack cocaine under 21 USC section 841(a)(1). Ct. rejected defendant's claim that 100-to-1 crack-powder sentencing disparity set forth in section 841(b) violated his Due Process and Equal Protection rights where Ct. found that there was some evidence supporting determination that crack cocaine is more dangerous than powder cocaine.