Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing as one condition of defendant’s term of supervised release, ability of probation officer with assistance of law enforcement to search defendant and his property upon reasonable suspicion that he had violated condition of supervised release or other unlawful conduct. Instant sentence was imposed upon defendant’s conviction on charge of failure to register as sex offender under 34 USC section 20901, and record showed that said failure occurred over 2.5-year period, under circumstances where defendant was employed, among other places, at elementary school. Dist. Ct. could properly find that said condition was appropriate, given defendant’s extensive criminal history and his demonstrated inability to comply with his legal responsibilities. Moreover, instant condition comported with both section 3583(d) and sentencing guidelines that permit instant search condition where probation officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or violation of supervised release. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that search could not pertain to his electronic devices, since his underlying conviction did not pertain to any misuse of said devices.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition, challenging his first-degree murder conviction arising out of fatal shooting, even though defendant asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge murder verdict, where, according to defendant: (1) prosecution extensively argued at trial that defendant was individual that shot victim; (2) jury rendered special verdict indicating that defendant was not shooter; and (3) instant inconsistent verdicts required that his murder conviction be vacated. Inconsistent verdicts are generally in and of themselves insufficient to justify federal collateral relief. Moreover, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to advance inconsistent verdict challenge, where: (1) at time of defendant’s trial, Illinois law provided that defendants could not challenge convictions solely on basis that they were inconsistent with acquittal on other charges; and (2) record showed that prosecutor did just enough to advance accomplice theory to jury, which would reconcile jury’s two verdicts, where record indicated that defendant and only other possible shooter were accomplices in plan to rob victim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his murder and firearm convictions on grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue in trial court pending motion to suppress his videotaped confession. While defendant raised issue in his post-conviction petition, Illinois Appellate Court, in appeal of denial of said petition, found that defendant had waived said issue by failing to raise it in his direct appeal when facts supporting his claim were already in record. As such, defendant had procedurally defaulted said issue in his habeas petition, because Illinois Appellate Court’s conclusion that defendant had waived said issue constituted adequate, independent state-law ground for claim’s dismissal, which, in turn, precluded federal habeas review. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s claim that Illinois Appellate Court’s finding of waiver departed from established state practice, especially where defendant failed to allege in his post-conviction petition any new facts about voluntariness of his video-taped confession.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 156-month term of incarceration on drug distribution charge, even though defendant argued that he was entitled to new sentencing hearing, where government denied him due process by withholding existence of plea agreement with respect to government witness testifying at sentencing hearing. While defendant could have used said evidence for impeachment purposes, record showed no Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, violation arising out of government’s failure to disclose existence of written plea agreement, where defendant failed to establish that timely disclosure of plea agreement would have resulted in different sentence. This is so, because: (1) fact that witness (who was defendant’s son) was testifying on behalf of government was itself sufficient to convey to defendant that witness was cooperating with government, especially where witness conceded during his testimony that he had hoped for lesser sentence; (2) second government witness provided key testimony in favor of government stance on disputed issue as to whether defendant qualified for safety-valve sentencing treatment; and (3) Dist. Ct., which imposed instant sentence, was actually aware of plea agreement prior to imposing defendant’s sentence.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 360-month term of incarceration on drug distribution charge, even though said sentence was based, in part, on imposition of obstruction of justice enhancement based on claim that defendant evaded arrest for 42-month period while he was in Texas. While defendant argued that imposition of said enhancement was improper because government’s failure to locate him in Texas was not evidence that he was evading arrest, record showed that Dist. Ct. had indicated that she would have imposed same sentence regardless of applicability of said enhancement. Record showed that applicable guideline range was 292-365 months with enhancement and 235 to 293 without enhancement. Moreover, any remand following any finding that enhancement did not apply would be pointless, where Dist. Ct. gave detailed justification for instant sentence, that included defendant’s leadership role in extensive drug trafficking operation, value of drugs at issue in charged offense, as well as section 3553 factors, that included defendant’s culpability, his extensive criminal history, need to protect public, and seriousness of charged offense.