Criminal Law

Defendant was found guilty of armed robbery, first-degree murder, and attempted first-degree murder and was sentenced to 70 years in prison. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition and defendant filed a notice of appeal. The appellate court dismissed petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the postage meter stamp was insufficient to prove that defendant timely mailed his notice of appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the question of jurisdiction. The court agreed with the appellate court and affirmed, holding that the sole means of establishing “time of mailing” under Rule 373 in the case of a pro se incarcerated litigant is by the certification described in Rule 12(b)(6). (THEIS, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and ROCHFORD, concurring and O’BRIEN, dissenting)

Defendant was charged with two counts of forgery and the State filed a motion to compel production of his cell phone passcode. The circuit court held that the privilege against self-incrimination prevented it from granting the motion to compel as the information sought would constitute testimonial communication. The appellate court disagreed and reversed the circuit court’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, finding that compelling the act of producing the passcode to a cell phone is testimonial only to the extent that performing the act of entering the passcode implicitly asserts that the person entering it has the ability to unlock the phone. The court further held that the foregone conclusion test is applicable in the context of compelled production of cell phone passcodes and applied as an exception to the fifth amendment under the facts of the case. (THEIS, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and ROCHFORD, concurring. NEVILLE, dissenting. O’BRIEN took no part in the decision)

Petitioner challenged the second-stage dismissal of her post-conviction petition, arguing that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel after the trial court allowed appointed counsel to withdraw and appointed successor counsel. The Supreme Court held that where the circuit court grants statutory appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw without making a finding that the petition lacks merit and before the State files an answer or motion to dismiss, the withdrawal order is interlocutory. The court further found that counsel’s failure to amend defendant’s pro se petition and failure to correct an unnotarized affidavit rebutted the Rule 651(c) certificate’s presumption of reasonable assistance. (CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring. THEIS, OVERSTREET, and HOLDER WHITE, dissenting.)

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced to 24 months’ probation. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of violating his probation and sentenced to 10 years in prison. The appellate court initially held that the court applied the incorrect sentencing range and reversed and remanded. The State filed a petition for rehearing, arguing for the first time that the trial court properly recognized that the defendant was eligible for up to 30 years in prison under section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act. The appellate court granted the State’s petition for rehearing and withdrew its previous order. The appellate court declined to find that the State had forfeited the issue, noting that the parties were given a full and fair opportunity to brief the issue. (STEIGMANN and DOHERTY, concurring)

State appealed from the trial court’s orders granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence recovered during a search of the defendant on the basis that the officer lacked probable cause to believe that the defendant was engaged in criminal behavior prior to the search. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the physical search of defendant exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk for weapons and, as a result, was more akin to a search incident to a lawful arrest. (HUTCHINSON and SCHOSTOK, concurring)

Defendant, who pled guilty to first-degree murder, appealed from a trial court order finding that defendant’s waiver of post-conviction counsel was knowing and intelligent. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court incorrectly admonished him concerning the risks of self-representation. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and explaining that the trial court was not required to give defendant SCR 401 or 651(c) admonishments. (CAVANAGH and STEIGMANN, concurring)

Defendant, who was 18 years old at the time of the offense, was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to a total of 45 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that his Miranda waiver was not valid and that the trial court erred when it did not consider the constitutionality of defendant’s sentence due to his age. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the waiver was valid and that trial counsel did not properly raise an as-applied challenge. The court further noted that the defendant could raise the constitutional argument in a post-conviction petition. (HOWSE and COBBS, concurring)