Education Law

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that plaintiffs-parents were not entitled to attorney’s fees as prevailing parties in their action under Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) seeking special education services for their disabled child. Record showed that after plaintiffs had filed petition for due process hearing related to seeking said services, plaintiffs reached stipulation with defendant-school district in which defendant agreed to provide plaintiff’s child with every student-related remedy set forth in plaintiff’s due process request, and that independent hearing officer eventually found that child was eligible for said services and dismissed plaintiff’s due process petition without hearing. While Dist. Ct. based denial of attorney’s fees request on existence of stipulation, Ct. of Appeals observed that: (1) there was nothing in stipulation that was binding on defendant; and (2) it was not until independent hearing officer issued its finding of child’s eligibility for special education services that legal relationship was materially altered between parties that rendered plaintiffs as prevailing parties in instant lawsuit. As such, plaintiffs were entitled to attorney’s fees associated with filing and prosecuting said petition. Ct. emphasized that on remand, Dist. Ct. will have discretion when awarding any attorney’s fees.

Upon remand, Dist. Ct. did not err in entering declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiffs-parents and Catholic school in their action alleging that defendants-school district and school official violated their First Amendment rights when defendants denied parents’ request for transportation benefits under Wisconsin statute, where defendants based denial on said statute allowing benefits for students in only one type of organization within designated attendance area, and where students in different Catholic school had already been receiving said benefits. Ct. of Appeals eventually found, with input from Wisconsin Supreme Court, that defendants’ denial of benefits violated state law and remanded case back to Dist. Ct. to fashion remedy. Plaintiffs, though, mistakenly took position that Dist. Ct. could not fashion remedy under state law, because it had previously released state law claims back to state court when it had denied any federal remedy, and that Dist. Ct. still needed to rule on their constitutional federal claims. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiffs had waived any financial recovery (other than attorney’s fees) under state law and entered declaratory judgment reflecting that defendants had violated state law. Moreover, resolution of plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims was unnecessary, where plaintiffs had received adequate state law remedy. As such, plaintiffs were entitled to only declaratory judgment based on state law and attorney’s fees based on said declaratory judgment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-University and University officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-student’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants denied him due process, when it suspended him for two semesters, after finding that he had hosted party at fraternity house during COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant-University was properly dismissed because it is not “person” for purposes of section 1983 action. Moreover, plaintiff failed to adequately plead that he had requisite property interest, where: (1) plaintiff merely pleaded that he had property interest in his continued education because he had “paid tuition;” (2) attending university, by itself, does not automatically create constitutional property right because law does not entitle each person to education at public university; and (3) plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead that defendants violated specific contractual right between parties. Dist. Ct. also did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s claim that defendants deprived him of constitutionally protected liberty interest in pursuing his chosen field of healthcare consultant, where plaintiff’s allegations of reputational harm associated with instant suspension were too speculative to plausibly suggest that it would be virtually impossible for him to pursue career as healthcare consultant.