Education Law

Plaintiffs, 22 school districts, filed complaint against State of Illinois and Governor Pritzker, arguing that they are being held accountable for Learning Standards for assessment of students, including the PARCC examination for high school students, without adequate funding to meet the Standards. Court properly dismissed State of Illinois on grounds of sovereign immunity. Court is bound to follow precedent of Illinois Supreme Court, which has determined that State’s system of funding public education is rationally related to the legitimate State goal of promoting local control. Thus, circuit court properly dismissed claims of violation of the equal protection clause based on disparities in educational funding. Illinois Supreme Court has also held that determination of whether State was fulfilling its duty of providing for a quality education is outside the judicial function. Thus, circuit court properly dismissed count alleging violation of the qualify education clause.  (WELCH, concurring; WHARTON, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Circuit court erred when it concluded that Plaintiffs (construction companies) are barred from recovering the remaining sums they seek for emergency repair and reconstruction work they performed, after a serious fire at Proviso East High School, on behalf  of Board of Education solely because certain steps normally required by School Code for approval of contracts may not have been followed. Appellate court properly held that construction companies are entitled to proceed against the Board based on quantum meruit. The fact that the Board may not have strictly complied with the bidding and approval procedures does not doom Plaintiffs' right to seek payment. Based on allegations of Plaintiffs' complaint, Plaintiffs furnished valuable services which Board received under circumstances that would make it unjust to retain without paying a reasonable sum in compensation. (BURKE, KILBRIDE, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Section 24-6 of the Illinois School Code does not allow a teacher who gives birth at the end of the school year to use her accumulated paid sick leave at the start of the next school year. Legislature intended that sick leave for birth must have a temporal connection to the birth. No evidence in the text that legislature intended to create a vested right in an employee to take paid sick leave on any days the employee chooses. Under Section 24-6, teachers may use up to 30 days of accumulated paid sick leave during the 6-week period immediately following the birth. Once that 6-week period has elapsed, a teacher may not use her paid sick days for birth unless he or she provides a physician's certificate as set forth in statute. (GARMAN and THEIS, concurring; KARMEIER and KILBRIDE, specially concurring.)

Petitioners filed petition for school district boundary change to detach 2010 acres of land from school district 229 and annex it to school district 340. After hearing and rehearing, School Board granted the detachment petition. District 229 filed complaint for administrative review, and motion for default judgment against 8 Petitioners. Trial court found that, without a written finding and record, it could not determine whether Board's allowance of petition for rehearing was proper, and remanded for a new hearing. Court later granted District 229's motion to reconsider, and reinstated Board's decision denying detachment. Board was required to file an answer consisting solely of the entire record of proceedings during hearing on petition for rehearing, including evidence heard by the Board and the Board's findings and decisions. Thus, without adequate record, trial court could not properly review its rehearing determination. Board's failure to keep a record in accordance with Administrative Review Law constituted a reversal of its decision. (SCHMIDT and LYTTON, concurring.)

Court properly dismissed complaint of former community college student, who alleged that his due process rights were violated when he was sanctioned (by being required to write an essay) for making inappropriate comment during a theater class. Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge college's policies, as he is not currently a student.Plaintiff has not alleged any injury from imposition of the sanction. Plaintiff's choice not to participate in the process offered to him resulted in the waiver of his right to be heard.(McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)