Education Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-state officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-special education students’ action under Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that defendants’ open-enrollment program that, among other things, allowed special education students to transfer to non-resident school districts only if non-resident school district had services or space necessary to meet student’s special needs, was discriminatory to said students’ disabilities. While record showed that nonresident school districts denied plaintiffs‘ requests to transfer based on claim that they lacked services or space to accommodate plaintiff‘s special needs, record also showed that program had similar space and service considerations for regular education students seeking transfer. Fact that non-resident school districts made transfer decisions on actual, as opposed to stereotypical needs of disabled students was not discriminatory. Moreover, plaintiffs could not proceed on request for accommodation theory, since: (1) any demand that non-resident school districts accept and provide requested special needs of all disabled students requesting transfer, even where said districts lacked services or space to accommodate said needs, would fundamentally alter defendant’s program; and (2) ADA did not require such fundamental alteration.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-School District’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-student’s action under Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of Rehabilitation Act alleging that defendant failed to accommodate her anxiety/depression by allowing her to complete her senior year of high school after plaintiff had moved out of defendant’s school district. Record showed that defendant disallowed plaintiff from attending its high school because of its residency policy and not because of her alleged disability, and thus plaintiff could not show that but for her disability she would have been able to obtain her requested accommodation of attending school in defendant’s school district.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff-special education student’s request under IDEA to reverse hearing officer’s denial of his request for public funding for several Individual Education Evaluations (IEE) of plaintiff, where plaintiff claimed that defendant-school board’s assessment of plaintiff’s educational needs were inadequate. Plaintiff’s mother did not voice any objections to IEP team’s report of plaintiff educational needs at IEP meeting, but subsequently asserted that seven IEEs were needed in areas such as psychology, speech and language, and physical and occupational therapy. However, hearing officer could find as credible defendant’s professionals who had personally examined plaintiff over opinions of two experts provided by plaintiff who had never met plaintiff. Also, although plaintiff was critical of assessments made by defendant’s professionals, factual findings made by hearing officer and Dist. Ct. were entitled to significant deference.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-school district’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-middle school student’s Title IX action alleging that she was sexually assaulted by security guard employed by defendant while plaintiff was in 8^th grade. Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that school principal had actual knowledge of security guard’s sexual misconduct of plaintiff, since: (1) plaintiff could only show, at best, that principal held concern when plaintiff was in 7^th grade that there might be risk of security guard having inappropriate relationship with plaintiff, where plaintiff was perceived to have crush on security guard and had attempted to kiss him; (2) principal took measures to address said concern at that time; and (3) school principal was unaware of any physical contact or any other indication of relationship between plaintiff and security guard in plaintiff’s 8^th grade when alleged sexual assault occurred. As such, reasonable jury could not find that prior to alleged sexual assault, principal had actual knowledge of risk that was so great that harm to plaintiff from security guard was almost certain to materialize if nothing were done about it.