House Bill 2233
(Thapedi, D-Chicago) repeals Section 2-1108 of the Code of Civil Procedure allowing special interrogatories in verdicts. House Bill 2233 is assigned to House Judiciary Committee.
(Thapedi, D-Chicago) repeals Section 2-1108 of the Code of Civil Procedure allowing special interrogatories in verdicts. House Bill 2233 is assigned to House Judiciary Committee.
Plaintiffs filed complaint for deaths of 2 persons and serious injuries to 1 person in car accident with another vehicle whose driver was also killed, and who Plaintiffs allege proximately caused deaths and injuries by his negligence. Three counts of complaint requested declaratory judgments as to coverage on policy issued on car driven by Defendant. Court entered judgment order finding coverage limits to be stacked at $400,000 per person and $1.2 million per accident. Antistacking provision in policy limits liability to that shown on the declarations pages. Relevant limits of liability, for bodily injury at $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident, are listed twice on the 3 pages of declarations. Thus, limits are to be stacked twice, for total limits of $200,000 per person and $600,000 per accident. (WELCH and CHAPMAN, concurring.)
Court erred in dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs' 2nd amended complaint, in concluding that insurance policies issued by Defendants did not provide coverage for Plaintiff's underlying claim of malicious prosecution against City. Language of policies, when read in context, is plain in providing that coverage is triggered by the "offense" of malicious prosecution "happening" within the policy period and the offense of malicious prosecution only happens once all elements of the tort are met. Coverage trigger was Plaintiff's exoneration in 2014, which was within effective policy periods. (HYMAN, concurring; MASON, dissenting.)
Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-insurance company’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-malpractice insurance company’s action alleging that defendant breached insurance policy issued to plaintiff, where defendant had refused to indemnify plaintiff for excess payment it made in underlying medical malpractice action that resulted in judgment that exceeded limits of policy issued by plaintiff to physician under circumstances, where: (1) plaintiff had rejected two offers to settle malpractice action with proceeds of policy it issued to physician; (2) malpractice action went to trial during which jury awarded damages in excess of policy limits, and (3) plaintiff paid excess judgment to plaintiffs in underlying malpractice action under physician's claim that plaintiff had wrongfully refused to settle malpractice action. Defendant’s policy to plaintiff had exclusion for any claim arising out of plaintiff’s wrongful act occurring prior to inception of policy if plaintiff knew or could have reasonable foreseen that such wrongful act could lead to lawsuit, and Dist. Ct. found that said exclusion applied, since as of date that plaintiff obtained policy, plaintiff knew or should have foreseen that its failure to settle malpractice action within policy limits could lead to lawsuit seeking recovery for excess judgment in malpractice action. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that there was triable issue as to whether plaintiff had committed any wrongful act in failing to settle malpractice action, where, at time plaintiff had rejected settlement offers, more discovery was contemplated, and where plaintiff had reason to believe that any jury verdict would not lead to extra-contractual liability, since any judgment would have been offset by $2.3 million settlement that plaintiffs in malpractice action had received from other defendants.
Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiffs’ class action complaints alleging that insurance policies issued by defendants violated section 224(e) of Insurance Code, since, although said policies allowed plaintiffs to receive some annual dividends based upon defendants’ profits, it still permitted defendants to have discretion to set dividend amounts. While plaintiffs argued that section 224(e) required defendants to allow plaintiffs to have “full annual participation” with respect to said dividends, which required defendants to distribute to policyholders any surplus profits beyond contingency-reserve limits, section 224(e) does not regulate dividend amounts. Moreover, Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ claim that term “participate” as used in section 224(e) requires defendants to provide set dividend amount and further found that section 243 of Insurance Code does not limit insurer discretion to set dividend amount.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-insurance company’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-insured’s action alleging that defendant breached terms of its insurance policy by failing to provide defense or indemnity in underlying action alleging that plaintiff used DirecTV’s satellite television programming for its businesses without paying for higher commercial subscription rate. While defendant’s policy provided coverage for claims against plaintiff’s companies for “slander, invasion of privacy, defamation or humiliation,” Dist. Ct. could properly find that instant policy did not cover underlying lawsuit, since there was no reasonable interpretation of underlying lawsuit that could possibly place underlying lawsuit within category of libel, slander or defamation. Moreover, underlying lawsuit contained no allegations that plaintiff made any kind of statement, let alone make any false or defamatory statement about DirecTV.
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Plaintiff filed underinsured motorist (UIM) claim against insurer of all 16 of his employer's vehicles, after he was injured in an accident while driving one of his employer's vehicles. The policy's limit of liability section directs the insured to find the limit of UIM coverage in the declarations page. In declarations page, a "W", which stands for UIM coverage, is repeated 16 times, once for each vehicle covered. This creates an ambiguity which can reasonably be interpreted as favoring aggregation of the 16 vehicles' limits of liability for UIM coverage. Although policy contains language which insurer claims to be an antistacking provision, that does not cure the ambiguity on the declarations page. (WELCH and CATES, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-doctor’s action under ERISA, alleging that defendant-health care plan underpaid plaintiff for medical services rendered to one of plaintiff’s patients, and that defendant owed statutory penalties based on its failure to timely furnish plan documents upon plaintiff’s request. While Dist. Ct. dismissed plaintiff’s underpayment claim based on plaintiff’s failure to identify specific plan provision that covered services at issue in plaintiff’s claim, plaintiff need not cite in her complaint specific plan provision establishing coverage at amount billed by plaintiff. Also, Ct. rejected Dist. Ct.’s ruling that plaintiff, as assignee of patient-plan participant, could not seek statutory penalties based on defendant’s failure to timely provide requested documents that pertained to defendant’s calculation of plan benefits, since: (1) assignee designated to receive plan benefits is considered beneficiary and can sue for unpaid benefits; and (2) bringing lawsuit against plan for said benefits requires access to information as to how defendant determined usual and customary billing rate.
Court erred in dismissing complaint for breach of contract against insurer for terminating its contract with exclusive agent selling its policies, and insurer's denial of Plaintiff's proposed sale of her economic interest in her agency to her husband. Plaintiff pleaded facts that sufficiently allege an improper motive, and abuse of insurer's contractual discretion, in violation of its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Notice of termination was not an affirmative matter defeating Plaintiff's claim.(DELORT and HARRIS, concurring.)