Insurance Law

(Court opinion corrected 2/5/18.) Insurance dispute arising out of monies paid in survival and wrongful death action filed by mother of 15-year-old boy who died after a drug overdose; mother alleged that City's paramedics failed to provide any treatment to boy, who was unresponsive upon their first arrival at  family home; several hour later, paramedics were again summoned to the home and boy was found unresponsive and blue, later declared dead at hospital.Court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant insurer. "Products-Completed Operations Hazard" provision of policy is specifically included in aggregate coverage, and it relates to construction operations by City, and does not relate to failure of treatment and transport by City's EMTs and paramedics. (COBBS and HOWSE, concurring.)

Plaintiffs (driver and passenger) were injured when driver's vehicle was struck by underinsured (UIM)driver. Plaintiffs filed declaratory judgment action, asking court to find that policy provides $300,000 in UIM motorist coverage to both Plaintiffs, as policy allowed aggregation of liability limits of UIM coverage on 4 vehicles. Listing multiple limits on declarations page creates an ambiguity that is not cured by antistacking clause, which prohibits combining of coverages, as opposed to prohibiting the combining of the limits of liability. (CATES and MOORE, concurring.)

Court found insurer had no duty to defendant Plaintiff construction company in underlying action filed by employee of its subcontractor, which had procured insurance coverage with insurer on company's behalf. Court found that policy excluded bodily injury to subcontractor's employees. As injured plaintiff in underlying action was employee of subcontractor, the broad employee exclusion applied, negating any duty of insurer to defend subcontractor in underlying action.(FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 1/18/18.) Defendant trucking company tendered defense of underlying claims in 2 environmental contamination suits, and settled suits for total $9 million. Insurer filed declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of parties' rights as to existence, terms, and conditions of various missing insurance policies allegedly issued by insurer to Defendant in the 1960s and 1970s. Neither party could locate originals or copies of the disputed policies, and no witnesses had contemporaneous knowledge about those aspects of disputed policies.  Defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of CGL policies issued to it by insurer for policy periods of 1961-62, 1962-63, and 1963-64. Defendant presented sufficient evidence to show that material terms and conditions of CGL policies issued by insurer 1961-1965 CGL policy were more probably than not the same terms and conditions in 1961 and 1965 CGL policies. Defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that there are auto policies for 1961-1960 with the same material terms and conditions as a known auto policy for policy period of 1960-61. (HARRIS and MIKVA, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed suit as to underinsured motorist coverage on Plaintiff's vehicle. Court properly granted summary judgment for Defendant as suit was time-barred. Insurance policy required Plaintiff to file her suit within 1 year from receiving payment from the at-fault motorist, and such provision was not ambiguous and must be applied as written.Equitable estoppel does not apply, as record affirmatively contradicts any claims of detrimental reliance on adjustor's purported misrepresentations as to time limit to file suit, and Plaintiff's attorney could not say when the adjustor told him that the limitations period was to be extended. Plaintiff has not shown that 1-year policy provision is unconscionable. (BURKE and ELLIS, concurring.)

In insurance declaratory judgment action, court properly entered summary judgment for insurers, finding that insured company's asbestos related losses resulted from single occurrence of continuous manufacturing and selling ash-handling conveyor systems containing asbestos parts. Because Plaintiff's asbestos losses resulted from a continuous and systematic process, insurer's lower per-occurrence limit (and not higher aggregate limit) applies. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend, as its motion was not timely filed and Plaintiff had prior opportunities to amend before court entered summary judgment. (PUCINSKI and HYMAN, concurring.)