Plaintiff, who was injured while a passenger in van owned and operated by Defendant PTI,alleged that PTI failed to obtain required limits of uninsured (UM) and underinsured (UIM) coverage. Court should have dismissed Plaintiffs suit because Section 8-101(c ) of Illinois Vehicle Code does not give rise to or imply a private right of action. (HYMAN, concurring; PUCINSKI, specially concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-insurance company’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-insured’s action alleging that defendant wrongfully stopped making disability payments under terms of insurance policy. Record showed that defendant initially made said benefit payments after plaintiff had been diagnosed with cancer that left plaintiff with permanent hearing loss, fatigue, migraines and tinnitus. However, defendant ceased making payments in 2014 after plaintiff had been cancer free since 2009 and was working regularly as president of his company. Moreover, while plaintiff argued that he was entitled to receive said payments because he still could not perform one-on-one contacts with prospective clients, which formed important aspect of his job, Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff failed to meet policy’s definition of totally disabled, since: (1) plaintiff could perform all other aspects of his job; and (2) plaintiff contradicted his claim that he could not have one-on-one contacts with prospective clients, where plaintiff admitted that he had one-on-one contacts with existing clients. Fact that plaintiff could not discharge his duties as company president in precisely same manner as he did prior to cancer diagnosis did not require different result. Also, policy had residual disability provision that potentially applied, where plaintiff could show that he had reduced capacity to do his job.
Insurer, which issued auto liability policy, filed complaint for declaratory judgment against insured's employee, who was driving semitruck and lost control, flipping truck over. Insurer had denied coverage, and driver filed demand for arbitration. Court's finding, after bench trial, that accident was not caused by a 2nd vehicle and that therefore the uninsured coverage under the policy did not apply, was not against manifest weight of evidence.(McDADE and SCHMIDT, concurring.)
Illinois Director of Insurance filed action against 3 insurance companies, seeking to liquidate their assets. Guarantee Association objected on grounds that petition improperly required it to reimburse itself from funds held in a special deposit. The funds held in special deposits are not general assets of the insurance companies' estate.The funds in question are held in a special deposit as security for payment of workers' compensation claims in California, and are, per statutory language, expressly excluded from general assets of the insurance companies' estate. Thus, because these funds were "deposited as security" for special benefit of local policyholders in California, they are not "general assets" of the companies' estate. (CUNNINGHAM and DELORT, concurring.)
(Court opinion corrected 6/5/18.) Former employee sued employer for injuries suffered due to long-term exposure to asbestos. Insurance policies which Plaintiff insurer issued to employer for 1977 to 1985 imposed on employer a duty to notify plaintiff insurer of every occurrence, regardless of whether potential liability exceeded employer's self-insured retention (SIR), and policies established insurer's duty to defend claims that appeared likely to exceed the SIR. Contemporary documents show that insurer and empoyer understood that policies at issue provided primary insurance subject to a SIR. Court properly granted employer's motion for summary judgment and declared that insurer's policies provided primary coverage. (PUCINSKI and MASON, concurring.)
(Court opinion corrected 5/30/18.) Plaintiff malpractice insurer filed declaratory judgment action, contending it had no duty to defend insured against complaint, because insured's actions constituted intentional conduct and was excluded from coverage. Court erred in granting judgment for insured. Conduct of insured, as alleged in underlying complaint (alleging self-dealing, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of trust for failure to administer a trust), is intentional misconduct, which is excluded from coverage. (DeARMOND and TURNER, concurring.)
Plaintiff filed declaratory judgment, seeking determination of cab company's insurance coverage in an underlying suit for damages from collision between cab and motorcycle. Date that coverage under policy issued by Ullico (which later went into liquidation) was transferred from taxi involved in collision to the replacement vehicle was prior to date of collision, and thus taxi involved was not covered at time of accident.Ullico and cab company plainly agreed that coverage for taxi in question would transfer on certain date, which was prior to accident. (HOWSE and LAVIN, concurring.)
Insurer filed declaratory judgment action against its insured, a private investigator for Northwestern who was sued for malicious prosecution in connection with investigative journalism class. Plaintiff in underlying suit alleged that investigator and others "framed" him for a 1982 double murder, of which he was convicted in 1999, but exonerated in 2014. Investigator filed a 6-count counterclaim. Court properly dismissed 5 counts of counterclaim and later granted summary judgment for insurer, including as to remaining count of counterclaim, as each count of counterclaim was defective .Alleged "offense" was misconduct allegedly committed by investigator leading to 1999 plea and conviction, which predated policy, so that insurer did not owe coverage. (HOFFMAN and DELORT, concurring.)