Real Estate Law

Plaintiff initiated legal proceedings seeking to foreclose and reform a mortgage concerning residential property located in East St. Louis. The mortgagor died prior to the commencement of the action but before her death, the defendant had executed and recorded a quitclaim deed transferring the property to defendant and his siblings as tenants in common. Defendant argued that the mortgage should have been discharged upon the mortgagor’s death because she merely reserved a life estate and that the plaintiff’s actions constituted fraudulent and deceptive practices under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The circuit court granted the plaintiff’s motion, finding that the deed was testamentary in nature and that defendant did not bring forth sufficient facts in support of his counterclaim. The appellate court reversed the order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment on his first affirmative defense by finding that the deed conveyed immediate title to defendant in fee simple as a tenant in common while reserving a life estate so that upon the decedent’s death the mortgage was extinguished and vacated any orders that adversely affected defendant’s interest in the property. (McHANEY and SHOLAR, concurring)

In a mortgage foreclosure action that has been pending for more than a decade, the defendants appealed from a circuit court order approving the sale of the property and from the circuit court’s judgment of foreclosure. On appeal, the appellate court considered whether defendant had standing to appeal and found that the issue was both waived and not reviewable. The appellate court also reviewed the trial court’s application of the merger doctrine and concluded that the trial court exercised its equitable powers in a fair and equitable manner and rejected the defendants’ arguments to the contrary. In addition, the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a constructive trust on a portion of the sale proceeds. (MITCHELL and MIKVA, concurring)