Real Estate Law

(Court opinion modified 6/1/11.) Court properly granted Section 2-1401 petition to vacate judgment in eminent domain condemnation proceeding, which gave Village title to land in Village, including property that Petitioners were using for their driveway. Village had not obtained personal jurisdiction over Petitioners, so that judgment was void as to them. Village did not obtain personal jurisdiction over Petitioners by publication service, as a plaintiff cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant that it has never sought to identify, and has described only as a class of nonrecord claimants. In an eminent-domain action, a court must have personal jurisdiction over affected persons. No statutory provision giving the effect of in rem judgments to condemnation judgments exists in Illinois. In rem actions bear formal markers of being in rem that are absent in eminent-domain actions. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Trustee filed suit against developer and development companies, alleging fraud and breach of fiduciary duties in management of company. After bench trial, court ordered Defendants to pay compensatory and punitive damages for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, finding that developer made numerous large transfers of funds to benefit his other enterprises. Court abused its discretion neither in determining the compensatory base nor in awarding the 3:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. Court properly ordered forfeiture of "loan fees" in finding that they were inappropriate transfers and not actually earned. Court was within its discretion in setting 13% prejudgment interest rate, as reasonable rate for developer having taken "interest-free loans". (CUNNINGHAM and HARRIS, concurring.)

Parties entered into condominium purchase agreement before the Plaintiff had finished construction on the site. Plaintiff sued for declaration of entitlement to escrowed funds, damages for contract breach, and specific performance. Defendants filed counterclaims for contract breach, negligence, and fraud. Circuit court order with language indicating that it is "final and appealable", but not referencing immediate appeal, justness of delay, or Rule 304(a), does not trigger Rule 304(a), and is thus not appealable. Measure of damages is not the value of the items bargained away as part of closing agreement, but the difference in current position and the position which would have been attained had Plaintiff fully performed its duties under the contract. (HALL and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Plaintiff church entered into contract for purchase of former restaurant building in area zoned commercial, and paid $50,000 in earnest money. Zoning contingency in contract gave 120 days to try to obtain zoning change, but City denied request for special use permit. Plaintiff knew, at time of entering into contract, of commercial zoning and that church use was allowed only by special use permit. Plaintiff could not rely in good faith on probability that City would approve use of property as church. Plaintiff thus failed to establish "probability" that City would approve special use permit, and it had no vested right to do so; thus, court properly denied Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. (MURPHY and STEELE, concurring.)