Real Estate Law

Public Act 98-821

Topic: 
Transfer on death instrument
(Barickman, R-Bloomington; Sims, D-Chicago) makes several changes to the Illinois Transfer on Death Instrument Act. (1) Makes the recording of a notice of death affidavit a permissive action that can be taken by the beneficiary to confirm title to the residential real estate but is not a mandatory requirement to perfect title. (2) Allows a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice before the recordation of a lis pendens for an action to set aside or contest the transfer on death instrument ("TODI") to take free and clear of any such action or contest. (3) Clarifies that acceptance of the TODI by the beneficiary during the owner's lifetime is not a requirement. (4) Eliminates the right of an agent acting under a durable power of attorney from creating or revoking a TODI. But it doesn't affect the agent's right or power to sell, transfer, or encumber the residential real estate if so authorized under the POA. (5) Clarifies that only substantial compliance with the execution formalities is required. Effective January 1, 2015.

Public Act 98-836

Topic: 
Small estate affidavit
(Bivins, R-Dixon; Demmer, R-Dixon) expands the small estate affidavit (SEA) statute to include much more detailed information about the known debts of the decedent. Requires the affiant to sign under a notary public to aid in the enforcement of the civil and criminal penalties for misusing a SEA. Syncs up the SEA and the Safety Deposit Act. It applies to estates in which the decedent's date of death is on or after January 1, 2015.

Chamness v. Mays

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Real Property
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (5th) 130381
Decision Date: 
Monday, August 4, 2014
District: 
5th Dist.
Division/County: 
Union Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
STEWART
Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, whose access to their property was solely via a county gravel road. Court properly found that county did not abandon road, and that road remains a public roadway. Disputed portion of road was in disrepair, and had become overgrown with brush and trees over the years. As there has never been legal right to an alternate route serving same purpose as disputed portion of the road, and as a road is an indispensible public necessity that the public would not abandon without replacing, county did not abandon the disputed portion of the road.(SPOMER and SCHWARM, concurring.)

Urban Partnership Bank v. Winchester-Wolcott, LLC

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Mortgage Foreclosure
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 133556
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, July 23, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 3d Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
MASON
Condo is not "residential real estate" under Mortgage Foreclosure Law if it is not occupied by mortgagor. Thus, bank's right to possession was dependent only on showing that such relief was warranted by provisions of mortgage and reasonable probability of prevailing in foreclosure. No requirement that mortgagee seek possession or appointment of receiver within certain time. (HYMAN and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Public Act 98-764 (corrected)

Topic: 
Mechanics Lien Act
(Mulroe, D-Chicago; Kelly Burke, D-Oak Lawn) provides that language barring certain agreements does not prohibit an agreement to subordinate a mechanics lien to a mortgage lien that secures a construction loan if that agreement is made after more than 50% of the loan has been disbursed to fund improvements to the property. Allows contractual provisions to be binding between the owner and contractor or a contractor and subcontractor that no lien or claim may be filed or maintained or that a contractor’s lien must be subordinated to the interests of any other party as long as it is not otherwise prohibited by this Act. Deletes language providing that the only admissible evidence of specified conditions of a contract as against a subcontractor or material supplier shall be proof of actual notice thereof to him or her before his or her contract is entered into. Deletes language providing that certain subordination provisions of contracts is not binding on the subcontractor unless set forth in its entirety in writing in the contract between the contractor and subcontractor or material supplier. Effective July 16, 2014.

CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Sconyers

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Mortgage Foreclosure
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 130023
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, July 16, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
MASON
(Court opinion corrected 7/17/14.) In mortgage foreclosure case, bank sustained its burden to show that it was holder of original note and mortgage and Defendants failed to adduce any competent evidence that endorsement on note had been altered, despite allegation that endorsement was "smudged." Thus, court properly granted summary judgment for bank. Undisputed fact that bank took assignment of mortgage from MERS gave it standing to maintain foreclosure action so that it was unnecessary to address claim of altered endorsement. (HYMAN, concurring; NEVILLE, dissenting.)

Public Act 98-764

Topic: 
Strict foreclosure of an omitted subordinate interest
(Mulroe, D-Chicago; Nekritz, D-Buffalo Grove) creates a procedure for the holder of title from a judicial sale to foreclose and clear title on an “omitted subordinate interest.” An OSI is a junior lienholder that was not made a party defendant in the previous foreclosure action and whose OSI was not terminated by the judgment of foreclosure when the property was sold by judicial sale. If the junior lienholder wishes to redeem, it must do so within 30 days after entry of the order redeeming title. The redemption sum will include the bid at the prior foreclosure sale, any costs and fees incurred after the sale for the payment of taxes, preservation of the property, or any other actions by the holder of the certificate of sale required to protect its interest in the property. The redemption amount will not include any costs or fees incurred by the holder of title that filed the strict foreclosure case. Effective July 16, 2014. Editor's Note: This is incorrect; the text of this bill is on the Governor's desk but he has taken no action on it yet. The text above relates to Senate Bill 2730. Therefore, Senate Bill 2730 is not a public act. My apologies.

Knight v. Enbridge Pipelines (FSP) LLC

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Easements
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 13-3481
Decision Date: 
July 16, 2014
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed and vacated in part
Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs-landowners’ action seeking to quiet title on 1952 easement given to defendants to construct second underground pipeline across plaintiffs’ property. Instant easement granted defendants right to build second pipeline within 10 feet of first pipeline, and Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claims that said right had expired or that Rule Against Perpetuities applied to instant easement. Ct also rejected as speculative plaintiffs’ claim that proposed pipeline would be incompatible with existing surface farming.

Feliciano v. Geneva Terrace Estates

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Easements
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 130269
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, June 25, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 3d Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HYMAN
Plaintiffs filed declaratory judgment action seeking declaratory judgment that there was no enforceable driveway easement between the vacant lot they purchased and adjoining lot. Court properly granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, concluding that no driveway easement had been created, as there was no evidence of driveway easement in later filed association declarations, which include extensive description of other easements in planned development but do not mention this specific driveway easement. Court properly granted summary judgment for Defendants on alleged breach of fiduciary duties and indemnification. Plaintiffs failed to present sufficient facts for finding of breach of fiduciary duties or that breach was proximate cause of their damages, and proximate cause could not be shown, as a matter of law.(NEVILLE and PUCINSKI, concurring.)