Real Estate Law

Senate Bill 1048

Topic: 
Presumptively void transfers in probate
(Silverstein, D-Chicago; Welch, D-Westchester) creates a civil action in the Probate Act if a “presumptively void transfer” is challenged that applies to “caregivers.” If a “transfer instrument” transfers property in excess of $20,0000 to a caregiver and is challenged, it creates a rebuttable presumption that this transfer is void. A caregiver is defined as anyone who has assumed responsibility for all or a portion of the care of another person who needs assistance with daily living activities. A caregiver doesn’t include a “family member” of the person receiving assistance. There are two exceptions to this rebuttable presumption. (1) If the transferee’s share under the transfer instrument is not greater than the share of the transferee was entitled to under the transferor’s testamentary plan in effect before the transferee became a caregiver. (2) If the transfer was not the product of fraud, duress, or undue influence as proved by clear and convincing evidence. If the caregiver attempts and fails to overcome the presumption, the caregiver must bear the cost of the proceedings, including reasonable attorney’s fees. The statute of limitation for challenging a presumptively void transfer is two years unless the Probate Act requires a shorter period. Senate Bill 1048 applies only transfer instruments executed after January 1, 2015. Passed both chambers.

House Bill 4783

Topic: 
Condominium Property Act
(E. Chris Welch, D-Westchester; Steans, D-Chicago) makes the following declarations unenforceable as against public policy if the declarations affect the common elements or more than one unit and require any of the following before the board can take legal action on behalf of the association: (1) consent of a percentage of unit owners, (2) arbitration, (3) mediation before an action may be filed in court, or (4) a restriction or delay in the board’s ability to bring an action affecting the common elements or more than one unit. An otherwise unenforceable provision may be enforced after the election of the first-unit owner board of managers if it is approved by a unit-owner percentage vote of not less than 75% of the total in the aggregate of the undivided ownership of the common elements.

Senate Bill 2829

Topic: 
Administrative review and attorney's fees
(Link, D-Lake Bluff; Zalewski, D-Chicago) allows court to award attorney’s fees for the prevailing party in certain administrative-review actions. It applies only to the decision of a code-hearing officer that imposes a fine or penalty against the owner of a single-family or multi-family residential dwelling for a violation relating to the condition or use of that residential property. It is limited to municipalities with a population of 500,000 or less. The court may award the plaintiff all reasonable costs, including court costs and attorney’s fees, if the court finds that (1) the hearing officer’s decision was arbitrary and capricious; or (2) the defendant failed to file a record under Section 3-108 of the Code of Civil Procedure that is sufficient to allow the court to determine whether the hearing officer’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court may award the municipality the same damages if the court finds that the plaintiff’s action seeking administrative review is not reasonably well grounded in fact, is not warranted by existing law, or is not accompanied by a reasonable argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Passed both chambers.

First Mortgage Company, LLC v. Dina

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Mortgage Foreclosure
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (2d) 130567
Decision Date: 
Monday, March 31, 2014
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Lake Co.
Holding: 
Vacated and remanded.
Justice: 
BURKE
(Modified upon denial of rehearing on 5/22/14.) Material issue of fact existed as to Plaintiff mortgage company's status as a licensed lender under Residential Mortgage License Act, thus precluding summary judgment in foreclosure actions. A mortgage made by entity lacking authorization under License Act to conduct such business is void as against public policy.(ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

The Bank of New York Mellon F/K/A The Bank of New York v. Karbowski

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Mortgage Foreclosure
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 130112
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, May 28, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 3d Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
MASON
Court entered judgment of foreclosure and confirming foreclosure sale, after allowing service by publication. Affidavit is at odds with notary's seal, and date that affidavit was executed and notarized cannot be determined. Thus, Bank's motion to serve by publication did not strictly comply with requirements of 735 ILCS 5/2-206 and thus publication notice was insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Defendant, and subsequent orders based on that service are void.(HYMAN and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc. v. Frederick

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Mortgage Foreclosure
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 123176
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, May 27, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 2d Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HARRIS
Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on foreclosure complaint. Although Defendant alleged that sale was unconscionable because she was misled about date of confirmation sale, nothing in record shows that sale was to take place at another date or that Defendant was misled into thinking sale would be continued. Argument of allegedly meritorious defense to underlying foreclosure judgment is insufficient once trial court enters order confirming judicial sale. (PIERCE and LIU, concurring)

House Bill 5395

Topic: 
Evictions
(Monique Davis, D-Chicago) amends the Forcible Entry and Detainer section of the Code of Civil Procedure to do three things. (1) Limits the number of motions a tenant may file to stay the enforcement of an order for possession to two unless good cause is shown by written motion. (2) Allows a "peace officer" to execute an order for possession. (3) Also allows service of an order of possession by an off-duty peace officer who is employed on a part-time basis by a licensee under the Private Detective, Private Alarm, Private Security, Fingerprint Vendor, and Locksmith Act of 2004. In the House on third reading.

US Bank v. Avdic

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Foreclosure
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 121759
Decision Date: 
Friday, May 2, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 5th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
PALMER
Court properly entered order confirming judicial sale of property in foreclosure action. Bank complied with Section 15-1504 of Foreclosure Law in its foreclosure complaint and set forth required information, and established that, as holder of note, it was also holder of mortgage and thus had standing. Bank employee's affidavit was sufficient to comply with Rule 191, as she stated that payment histories were made in regular course of Bank's business, and entries were made at or near time of occurrence. (GORDON and TAYLOR, concurring.)

Edelman v. Belco Title & Escrow, LLC

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Real Estate
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 13-2363
Decision Date: 
April 25, 2014
Federal District: 
S.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment by defendant-title insurance company/escrowee in action alleging that defendant violated fiduciary duty owed to plaintiffs-lenders in real estate transaction by failing to inform plaintiffs that they were not going to receive first priority mortgage that had been promised to them by third-party/real estate developer in loan agreement between plaintiffs and third-party. Defendant owed plaintiffs duty only to comply with terms of escrow agreement calling for disbursement of closing costs and did not have any principal-agent relationship with plaintiffs with respect to loan agreement where: (1) defendant was not party to said loan agreement; (2) plaintiffs had disbursed loan proceeds to third-party before defendant had become involved in instant transaction; and (3) loan proceeds were never placed in escrow with defendant. Ct. also rejected plaintiffs’ contention that defendant had duty to ask plaintiffs whether they still wanted to proceed with loan transaction even if plaintiffs would only receive junior mortgage on real estate used to secure said loan.