Workers’ Compensation Law

Workers’ Comp and Temporary or ‘Borrowed’ Workers

By James P. Looby
August
2013
Article
, Page 426
With more employers turning to staffing agencies, determining who the real employer is and isn't - and thus whom the worker might be able to sue in civil court - is trickier than ever.

Kawa v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Workers' Compensation
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (1st) 120469WC
Decision Date: 
Monday, June 3, 2013
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co.,WC Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part; remanded.
Justice: 
STEWART
Claimant was employed as launch engineer for auto maker assembly plant and was in job-related vehicle accident. Commission's finding that claimant reached MMI was not supported by evidence; employer's medical expert concluded four months later that claimant was not at MMI and could not do overhead lifting with right shoulder. Claimant's refusal to participate in unnamed, unapproved multidisciplinary pain managment program cannot be basis for denying him further TTD benefits or medical benefits.(HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, and HUDSON, concurring; TURNER, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

National Freight Industries v. The Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Workers' Compensation
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (5th) 120043WC
Decision Date: 
Thursday, June 13, 2013
District: 
5th Dist.
Division/County: 
Madison Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed and remanded (5-12-0043WC); affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded (5-12-0047WC).
Justice: 
HUDSON
Claimant filed worker's compensation claim for injuries from 12/08 motor vehicle accident while employed by trucking company employer; and on same day filed workers compensation claim for previous employer from 11/06 work-related accident. Prior to car accident, back surgery was limited to one level, but after car accident surgery was indicated at multiple levels. Evidence showed that car accident changed the nature of claimant's injury, was sole cause of his current condition, and thus broke causalo chain from original accident. Second accident was not just a continuation of injury from first accident, but caused separate and distinct injury that broke causal chain. Thus, claimant should be allowed to seek permanency award for each accident. (HOLDRIDGE and HOFFMAN, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

United Airlines, Inc. v. Illinois Wokers' Compensation Commission

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Workers' Compensation
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (1st) 121136WC
Decision Date: 
Monday, June 3, 2013
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., WC Div.
Holding: 
Reversed; Commission decision reinstated.
Justice: 
HOFFMAN
Airline ramp service worker sustained wrist injury in 2004, and right shoulder injury in 2006 in course of his employment, while loading and unloading luggage bags. Treating physician released employee to return to work in 2007, but with permanent restrictions which precluded him from returning to ramp service position. Section 8(d)(1) of Workers' Compensation Act requires the wage differential to be determined as of the date of the arbitration hearing. Commission was not required to consider mandatory overtime hours in determining wage differential amount, as employee's pay history did not whow that he worked mandatory overtime on regular basis. (HOLDRIDGE, HUDSON, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

Accolade v. The Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Workers' Compensation
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (3d) 120588WC
Decision Date: 
Thursday, May 30, 2013
District: 
3d Dist.
Division/County: 
Tazewell Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HUDSON
Caregiver at assisted-care facility claimed neck injury from reaching to remove soap dish, to avoid suds from accumulating, while assisting resident in shower. Employee sustained injury while attempting to ensure safety of resident, which was reasonably expected of employee incidental to her job duties. Thus, thus injury arose out of her employment. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

The Venture-Newberg Perini Stone & Webster v. Ill. Worker’s Compensation Commission

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
Civil Court
Workers’ Compensation Act
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
May 29, 2013
Docket Number: 
No. 115728
District: 
4th Dist.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly set aside Commission’s determination that claimant was entitled to Workers’ Compensation benefits arising out of his accident, which occurred while claimant was riding in vehicle from his motel to jobsite. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court and reinstating Commission's award, found that claimant’s injuries were compensable under Workers’ Compensation Act since claimant met requirements of traveling-employee exception where claimant was assigned to jobsite that was not employer’s premises, but rather was premises of client of employer. Dissent, as well as employer in its petition for leave to appeal, argued that claimant’s assigned location became employer’s premises (so as to preclude claimant from qualifying for traveling-employee exception) under circumstances where, as here, claimant was hired only on temporary basis and was assigned only to work at one specific jobsite for duration of his employment.

Senate Bill 1912

Topic: 
Tort cases and settlement
(Raoul, D-Chicago) amends the Code of Civil Procedure create an enforcement mechanism for cases that settle but the defendant won’t comply with the settlement. It is limited to cases seeking money damages involving personal injury, wrongful death, or tort action. It requires a settling defendant pay all sums due to the plaintiff within 21 days of tender of all applicable documents required under this new Section. The procedure is as follows: (1) Requires a “settling defendant” to tender a release to the plaintiff within 14 days of written confirmation of the settlement. If the law requires court approval of a settlement, the plaintiff must tender to the defendant a copy of the court order approving the settlement. (2) If there is a known third-party right of recovery or subrogation interest, the plaintiff may protect the third-party’s right of recovery or subrogation interest by tendering to the defendant: (a) A signed release of the attorney’s lien. (b) Any of the following: (i) a signed release of a healthcare-provider lien; (ii) a letter from the plaintiff’s attorney agreeing to hold the full amount of the claimed lien in his or her client-fund account pending final resolution of the lien amount; or (iii) an offer that the defendant hold the full amount of the claimed right of recovery pending final resolution of the amount of the right of recovery. (c) Any of the following: (i) documentation of the agreement between the plaintiff and Medicare, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, or the private health insurance company as to the amount of the settlement that will be accepted in satisfaction of right of recovery; (ii) a letter from the plaintiff’s attorney agreeing to hold the full amount of the claimed right to recovery in his or her client-fund account pending final resolution of the amount of the right to recovery; or (iii) an offer that the defendant hold the full amount of the claimed right to recovery pending final resolution of the amount of the right of recovery. (3) If the applicable court finds after a hearing that timely payment has not been made under this Section, judgment must be entered against that defendant for the amount in the executed release, costs incurred in obtaining the judgment, and 9% interest from the date of the plaintiff’s tender. (4) Senate Bill 1912 exempts units of local government, the State of Illinois, and state employees. Parties may agree to some other procedure if they wish. It passed the Senate yesterday and is in the House.

Diaz v. The Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Workers' Compensation
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (2d) 120294WC
Decision Date: 
Monday, April 8, 2013
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Kane Co.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
STEWART
Village patrol officer filed for workers' compensation benefits for PTSD from extended standoff with person who appeared to be armed with a handgun, and aimed it at officer, when officer responded to a call of disturbance between neighbors. Officer was exposed to risk which arose out of and in the course of his employment, and officer did not realize until later that gun was probably a toy gun. Whether a worker has suffered emotional shock sufficient to warrant recovery should be determined by an objective, reasonable-person standard, rather than a subjective standard that takes into account the claimant's occupation and training. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, and HUDSON, concurring; TURNER, dissenting.)

Curtis v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Workers' Compensation
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (1st) 120976WC
Decision Date: 
Monday, March 11, 2013
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., WC Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HUDSON
(Court opinion corrected 3/26/13.) Claimant, a police officer/paramedic, alleged accidental hand injury sustained when he tripped and fell while chasing a suspect. Under Workers Compensation Act, although permanent injuries can "increase" or "diminish", only temporary disabilities can "recur". Only TTD payments may thus be "re-established".Thus, scope of 19(h) of Act is not limited to permanency benefits, but also covers TTD benefits. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

Chicago Transit Authority v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Workers' Compensation
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (1st) 120253WC
Decision Date: 
Monday, March 11, 2013
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., WC Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed; remanded.
Justice: 
HOLDRIDGE
Claimant bus driver was awarded TTD for psychological injuries sustained from having experienced fatal collision with pedestrian. Evidence was sufficient to support reasonable inference that claimant suffered sudden, severe emotional shock which caused psychological injury, and her claim may be compensable even if resulting psychological injury did not manifest itself until sometime after the shock. Failure to seek immediate professional help does not defeat claim. (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and STEWART, concurring; TURNER, dissenting.)