Summary of Statutory and Caselaw on the Unauthorized Practice of Law in Illinois (UPL Manual)

Compiled for educational purposes by The Illinois State Bar Association’s Task Force on Unauthorized Practice of Law

Revised September 15, 2026

  • Timothy Moran, Esq.
  • Scott Kozlov, Esq.
  • Adita Dogra, Extern, University of Illinois College of Law
  • Krista Appenzeller, ISBA Assistant Counsel

Preface

The regulation of the practice of law in the State of Illinois has evolved over time. For almost a century, the Supreme Court and the Legislature have both taken action to establish guardrails for those that act on behalf of others to impact legal rights or responsibilities. This manual will explore that progression.

The ISBA 2016 “Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on the Future of Legal Services” identified several potential challenges to lawyers, including: (1) what constitutes the practice of law; (2) who may be involved in the practice; and (3) how this involvement may result in law firm disruption? Ten years later, many of the challenges outlined in the Recommendations of the Future’s Task Force have come to pass, and in a sense some of these challenges are accelerating. In this report, which was last updated in 2009, we focus on item no. 1, above, examining what constitutes the practice of law. Perhaps more accurately, we review important Illinois laws and court cases concerning what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”). This report is not intended to be a static resource for attorneys, the judiciary, or administrative agencies. Instead, we hope that it will become part of a larger evolving narrative, which includes information and updates dealing with item nos. 2 and 3, above.

The “how” raised in no. 3 above might include the use of AI and its possibilities as a resource tool (addressed by the Illinois Supreme Court in its Policy on Artificial Intelligence) , but also its potential to usurp or even replace attorney representation; tension between return to non-attorney investors vs obligations to clients (e.g., confidentiality, zealous representation, etc.), or issues of staffing and job opportunities.

The “who” raised in no. 2 above may include, among others, non-attorney participants seeking to address the serious and growing ‘access to justice’ problem, which has resulted in a growing number of non- or underrepresented litigants; non-attorney investment or ownership of law firms (e.g., private equity); or those in violation of the prohibition against UPL, which is the subject of this report.

Illinois has neither statute, nor rule, nor regulation, which defines the practice of law, and the Courts have shied away from any mechanistic formula to define it. Nevertheless, some common principles can be identified:

  1. Acting in a representative or advocacy capacity in connection with legal proceedings;
  2. Drafting documents intended to affect or secure legal rights;
  3. Negotiating legal rights or responsibilities for a specific person or entity;
  4. Expressing or preparing legal opinions;
  5. Providing professional legal advice or services where there is a client relationship of trust or reliance; or
  6. Applying of legal principles and judgement with regard to the circumstances or objectives of another which require the knowledge and skill of a person trained in the law.

With these principles in mind, this report reviews the case law, administrative decisions, and statutory references as to what constitute violations of the prohibitions against UPL.

Table of Contents

  1. Historical Perspective of Unauthorized Practice of Law
    1. Judicial Prerogative
      1. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E. 2d 941, 944 (1937).
      2. U.S. v. Johnson & Robinson & Nation Legal Professional Associates, 327 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2003).
      3. Chicago Bar Association et al. v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38 N.E. 2d 349, 351 (1st Dist. 1941).
    2. Unauthorized Practice of Law: Early Common Law History
      1. Chicago Bar Association v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E. 2d 693, 696 (1948).
      2. Janiczek v. Dover Management Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 543, 545 (1985)
      3.  Johnson v. Pistakee Highlands Community Association, 72 Ill. App. 3d 402, 309 N.E. 2d 640, 28 Ill. Dec. 473, 474 (2d Dist. 1979).
    3. The Struggle to Define the Practice of Law
      1. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch, 406 Ill. 253, 256 (1950).
      2. People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Association v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E. 773 (1949).
      3. In re Yamaguchi, 118 Ill. 2d 417, 515 N.E. 2d 1235 (1987).
      4. In re Howard, 188 Ill. 2d 423, 721 N.E. 2d 1126 (1999).
      5. People ex rel Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch, 406 Ill. 253, 94 N.E. 2d 148 (1950).
      6. In re Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d 515, 645 N.E. 2d 906 (1994).
      7. Chicago Bar Association v. Quinlan & Tyson, 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E. 2d 771 (1966).
      8. People v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, 173 N.E. 2d 417 (1961).
      9. Housing Authority of the County of Cook v. Tonsul, 115 Ill. App. 3d 739, 450 N.E. 2d 1248 (1st Dist. 1983).
      10. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E. 2d 693 (1948).
  2. Unauthorized Practice of Law; Statutory Authority
    1. Attorney Act, (705 ILCS 205)
    2. Corporate Practice of Law Prohibition Act, (705 ILCS 220/1)
    3. Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, (815 ILCS 505/2BB); (815 ILCS 505/2AA)
    4. False Personation Act (720 ILCS 5/32-5(a))
    5. Legal Business Solicitation Act (720 ILCS 210/1)
  3. Unauthorized Practice of Law; Specific Court Holdings
    1. Court Filings and Appearances
      1. Fruin v. Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, Inc., 194 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 551 N.E. 2d 1010 (1st Dist. 1990).
      2. Housing Authority of the County of Cook v. Tonsul, 115 Ill. App. 3d 739, 450 N.E. 2d 1248 (1st Dist. 183).
      3. Marken Real Estate & Management v. Adams, 56 Ill. App. 3d 426, 371 N.E. 2d 1192 (1st Dist. 1977).
      4. People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 22 Ill. App. 3d 316, 317 N.E. 2d 121 (2d Dist. 1974).
      5. Aarrow Ambulance v. Davis, 16 Ill. App. 3d 318, 319, 306 N.E. 2d 363 (3d Dist. 1974).
      6. Blue v. Illinois, 223 Ill. App. 3d 594, 585 N.E. 2d 625 (2d Dist. 1992).
      7. Midwest Home Sav. & Loan v. Ridgewood, 123 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 463 N.E. 2d 909 (5th Dist. 1984).
      8. Chicago Bar Association v. Friedlander, 24 Ill. App. 2d 130, 164 N.E. 2d 517 (1st Dist. 1960).
      9. Janiczek v. Dover Management Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 543, 481 N.E. 2d 25 (1985).
      10. Paddock v. Dept. of Employment Security, 184 Ill. App. 3d 945, 540 N.E. 2d 1053 (1st Dist. 1989).
      11. In re Polito, 132 Ill. 2d 294, 547 N.E. 2d 465 (1989).
      12. National Bank of Austin v. First Wisconsin National Bank, 53 Ill. App. 3d 482, 368 N.E. 2d 119 (2d Dist. 1977).
      13. City of Chicago v. Witvoet, 12 Ill. App. 3d 654, 299 N.E. 2d 128 (1st Dist. 1973).
      14. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch, 406 Ill. 253, 94 N.E. 2d 148 (1950).
      15. People v. Alexander, 53 Ill. App. 2d 299, 202 N.E. 2d 841 (1st Dist. 1964).
    2. Giving of Advice or Rendering of Services Requiring the use of Legal Knowledge: Actions Performed Outside of Court
      1. Meeting clients, planning strategy, explaining documents
        1. People v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776 (1949).
        2. Howard, 188 Ill. 2d 423, 721 N.E. 2d 1126, 242 (1999).
        3. In re Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d 515, 645 N.E. 2d 906 (1994).
        4. U.S. v. Johnson 327 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2003).
      2. Settling Cases and Controversies
        1. In re Bodkin, 21 Ill. 2d 458, 173 N.E. 2d 440, 442 (1961).
        2. People v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, 173 N.E. 2d 417, 421 (1961).
        3. Herman v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co., et al., 41 Ill. 2d 468, 244 N.E. 2d 809 (1969).
      3. Real Estate Related Matters
        1. Chicago Bar Association v. Quinlan and Tyson, Inc. 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E. 2d 771, 774 (1966).
        2. People v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E. 2d 773 (1949).
        3. Chicago Bar Association v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E. 2d 693 (1948).
        4. Chicago Bar Association v. Friedlander, 24 Ill. App. 2d 130, 164 N.E. 2d 517 (1st Dist. 1960).
        5. In re Luster, 12 Ill. 2d 25, 145 N.E. 2d 75 (1957).
        6. Chicago Bar Association v. Clausen, 1 Ill. App. 2d 140, 117 N.E. 2d 321 (1953).
        7. Wolfenberger v. Madison, 43 Ill. App. 3d 813 (2d Dist. 1976).
    3. Administrative proceedings.
      1. In re Yamaguchi, 118 Ill. 2d 417, 515 N.E. 2d 1235 (1987).
      2. Chicago Bar Association et al. v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38 N.E. 2d 349 (1st Dist. 1941).
      3. People v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E. 941 (1937).
      4. Perto v. Board of Review, 274 Ill. App. 485, 654 N.E. 2d 232 (2d Dist. 1995).
      5. Stone Street Partners, LLC v. City of Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings, 2017 IL 117720, 88 N.E. 2d 699 (2017).
    4. Paralegal activities
      1. People v. Hill, 2012 IL App (1st) 091933-U (2012).
      2. People v. Alexander, 53 Ill. App. 2d 299, 202 N.E. 2d 841 (1964).
      3. U.S. v. Johnson & Robinson & Nation Legal Professional Associates, 327 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2003).
    5. Parents, relatives, and powers of attorney
      1. In re Estate of Carol Mattson, 2019 IL App (1st) 180805.
      2. People v. Wilson, 2023 IL App (1st) 220032.
      3. Kimbrell v. State Bank of Speer, 2018 IL App (3d) 170498.
      4. People v. Indoval, 2023 IL App (4th) 220774-U.
      5. Roskowiak v. Roskowiak, 2024 IL App (2d) 230265.
      6. Bertrand v. Gundogdu, 2023 IL App (1st) 220203-U.
      7. In re Estate of Lorraine Phillips, 2022 IL App (1st) 192409-U.
    6. Attorneys on inactive status and law students
      1. Applebaum v. Rush University Medical Center, 376 Ill. App. (3d) 993 (2007).
      2. In re Denzel W. & People v. Kenneth Smith, 237 Ill. 2d 285 (2010).
  4. Corporate, State, or Municipal Employee Acting on Behalf of Employer
    1. Application of Statutory Authority
      1. People v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931).
      2. Meza v. Rodriguez & Children’s Home & Aid Society, 305 Ill. App. 3d 777, 713 N.E. 2d 764 (2d Dist. 1999).
      3. Kittay v. Allstate Insurance Co., 78 Ill. App. 3d 335, 397 N.E. 2d 200 (1st Dist. 1979).
    2. Work performed for the sole benefit of the corporation
      1. King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 828 N.E. 2d 1155 (2005).
      2. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Bureau County v. Sadnick, 162 Ill. 3d 581, 582-583, 515 N.E. 2d 1354 (3d Dist. 1987).
      3. Johnson v. Pistakee Highlands Community Association, 72 Ill. App. 3d 402, 390 N.E. 2d 640 (2d Dist. 1979).
      4. Downtown Disposal Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL112040.
      5. In re IFC Credit Corp., 663 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2011).
      6. Illinois EPA v. Illinois Pollution Control Board & Prime Location Properties, 2012 IL App (5th) 100072-U.
    3. Work performed for insureds and third-parties
      1. Bowers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 403 Ill. App. 3d 173 (2010).
  5. Relief for the Unauthorized Practice of Law
    1. Rathke v. Lidisky, 59 Ill. App. 3d 560, 375 N.E. 2d 871 (5th Dist. 1978).
    2. Torres v. Fiol, 110 Ill. App. 3d 9, 441 N.E. 2d 1300 (1st Dist. 1982).
    3. King v. First Capital Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 828 N.E. 2d 1155, 293 Ill. Dec. 657 (2005).
    4. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, 173 N.E. 2d 417 (1961).
    5. Lozoff v. Shore Heights, Ltd., 66 Ill. 2d 398, 362 N.E. 2d 1047, 6 Ill. Dec. 225, 227 (1977).
  6. Conclusion

I. Historical Perspective of Unauthorized Practice of Law

A. Judicial Prerogative

As long as the practice of law has required licensure, the issue of the unauthorized – the unlicensed – practice of law has been a concern for the Illinois courts. The Supreme Court has explained that the “power to regulate and define the practice of law is a prerogative of the judicial department” derived from the Illinois Constitution. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E. 2d 941, 944 (1937); see alsoU.S. v. Johnson & Robinson & Nation Legal Professional Associates, 327 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2003), in which the Seventh Circuit held, “...considering the serious threat that the unauthorized practice of law poses both to the integrity of the legal profession and to the effective administration of justice, resort to the inherent powers is an appropriate remedial measure.” The Illinois Supreme Court has further explained that its licensing requirements have been instituted to protect the public against “incompetency and dishonesty”, not for the purpose of “creating a monopoly in the legal profession nor for its protection.” Chicago Bar Association et al. v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38 N.E. 2d 349, 351 (1st Dist. 1941).

B. Unauthorized Practice of Law: Early Common Law History

While the Supreme Court recognizes that a person is privileged to appear in court on his own behalf, it has held that a person has no such privilege or authority to represent other persons unless the person is admitted to practice. Chicago Bar Association v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E. 2d 693, 696 (1948); Janiczek v. Dover Management Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 543, 545 (1985).

In Illinois “certain minimum levels of education, training and character must be acquired before one may receive a license to practice law.” Johnson v. Pistakee Highlands Community Association, 72 Ill. App. 3d 402, 309 N.E. 2d 640, 28 Ill. Dec. 473, 474 (2d Dist. 1979).

The Supreme Court has held that the practice of law, both in courts and out of courts, by one not licensed, is an illegal usurpation of the privilege of a lawyer and is a contempt of this court. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Goodman, 8 N.E. 2d at 944.

C. The Struggle to Define the Practice of Law

While the Supreme Court of Illinois has stated that the definition of the practice of law defies mechanistic formulation, the court will examine the character of the actions in question to determine the issue. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch, 406 Ill. 253, 256 (1950); In re Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d 515, 645 N.E. 2d 906, 206 Ill. Dec. 654, 658 (1994). At the heart of the inquiry is whether the “activity in question required legal knowledge and skill in order to apply legal principles and precedent.” In re Discipio, 206 Ill. Dec. at 658. The Supreme Court has stated that arguments like “widespread disregard” of the use of lawyers to perform said task or “considerations of business expediency” are not persuasive. In re Yamaguchi, 118 Ill. 2d 417, 515 N.E. 2d 1235 (1987).

Generally, Illinois case law defines the practice of law as:

  • Providing to another advice or services under circumstances that imply possession and use of legal knowledge or skill to achieve a legal result, People v. Barasch, 406 Ill. 253, 94 N.E. 2d 148 (1950); People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Association v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E. 773 (1949).
  • Representing the interests of another before a court, tribunal, political subdivision, board, commission, committee, government officer, or other entity established by the State of Illinois or any of its political subdivisions, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, other than in the presentation of facts, figures or factual conclusions, as distinguished from conclusions or interpretations of the law; In re Yamaguchi, 118 Ill. 2d 417, 515 N.E. 2d 1235 (1987).
  • Giving legal advice to another in any matter involving the application of law or legal principles to specific circumstances, facts, status, rights, obligations, purposes or desires when such advice is intended to be or may be reasonably relied upon; In re Howard, 188 Ill. 2d 423, 721 N.E. 2d 1126 (1999); People ex rel Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch, 406 Ill. 253, 94 N.E. 2d 148 (1950);
  • Preparing, recommending, selecting, executing, or approving of the use of any document or instrument for another by which legal rights are or may be obtained, secured, or transferred or which applies laws or legal principles to a person’s specific circumstances, facts, status, rights, or obligations. In re Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d 515, 645 N.E. 2d 906 (1994); Chicago Bar Association v. Quinlan & Tyson, 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E. 2d 771 (1966); People v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, 173 N.E. 2d 417 (1961); Housing Authority of Cook County v. Tonsul, 115 Ill. App. 3d 739, 450 N.E.2d 1248 (1st Dist. 1983); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E. 2d 693 (1948).

II. Unauthorized Practice of Law; Statutory Authority

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that while the legislature may pass acts declaring the unauthorized practice of law illegal and punishable, such statutes are merely in aid of, and do not supersede or detract from, the power of the judicial department to control the practice of law. Lozoff v. Shore Heights, Ltd., 66 Ill. 2d 398, 362 N.E. 2d 1047 (1977); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Goodman, 8 N.E. 2d at 944 (1937); Perto v. Board of Review, 274 Ill. App. 485, 654 N.E. 2d 232 (2d Dist. 1995).

There are five such acts that govern the unauthorized practice of law.

A. Attorney Act, 705 ILCS 205

First, the Illinois Attorney Act authorizes the filing of a complaint in any circuit court against “[a]ny person practicing, charging or receiving fees for legal services or advertising or holding himself or herself out to provide legal services within this State, either directly or indirectly, without being licensed to practice.” This Act codifies, restates, and supplements the court’s inherent authority to regulate the practice of law. (705 ILCS 205) Remedies available under the Attorney Act include not only contempt of court and restraint of the unauthorized practice of law (the only remedies prior to January 1, 2008), but also appropriate equitable relief, a civil penalty not to exceed $5,000 (monies collected would be directed to the Illinois Equal Justice Foundation), and actual damages.

The Attorney Act has gone through two recent amendments to arrive at the Act Illinois has today. Public Act 94-659, which took effect January 1, 2006, prohibits a non-lawyer from advertising or holding himself or herself out as able to provide legal services. With these amendments, an action may be brought against a non-lawyer who advertises that he/she can perform legal services. This same prohibition was already contained in the Corporate Practice of Law Prohibition Act (705 ILCS 220/1), and this legislation makes the two Acts uniform.

Public Act 95-410, which took effect August 24, 2007, created statutory remedies for the unauthorized practice of law including: (1) appropriate equitable relief; (2) a civil penalty not to exceed $5,000 with monies collected going to the Illinois Equal Justice Foundation to fund legal services to the working poor and indigents; and (3) actual damages.

Before enactment of Public Act 95-410, the only remedies specifically mentioned in the Act were contempt of court and restraint of the unauthorized practice of law. Illinois Supreme Court precedent provided no private cause of action for damages for the unauthorized practice of law under the Attorney Act. Instead, harmed individuals who wished to recover damages had to separately plead and provide negligence against the non-lawyer. Public Act 95-410 allows harmed parties to seek damages and provides actual recourse for them rather than just a finding of contempt of court.

B. Corporate Practice of Law Prohibition Act, 705 ILCS 220/1

Second, the Corporate Practice of Law Prohibition Act supplements the Attorney Act providing that a corporation may not practice law, or hold itself out as entitled to practice law, or to render legal services or advice. (705 ILCS 220/1)

C. Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/2/BB; 815 ILCS 505/2AA

Third, the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act prohibits any corporation or non-lawyer from assembling, drafting, executing or funding any living trust document. (815 ILCS 505/2BB) The Act also governs what actions non-lawyer immigration services may perform for consumers. (815 ILCS 505/2AA)

D. False Personation Act, 720 ILCS 5/32-5(a)

Fourth, the Criminal Code makes it a Class 4 felony for a person to falsely represent himself or herself as an attorney. (720 ILCS 5/32-5(a))

E. Legal Business Solicitation Act, 720 ILCS 210/1

Finally, the Legal Business Solicitation Act makes it a Class B misdemeanor for a non-lawyer to solicit any demand or claim for personal injuries or for the death of another for the purpose of settlement or filing a claim. (720 ILCS 210/1)

III. Unauthorized Practice of Law; Specific Court Holdings

Having identified the five acts that regulate the practice of law, we now review decisions that apply these acts and the Court’s inherent authority to prohibit UPL.

A. Court Filings and Appearances

Illinois case law is clear on the question of whether a nonlawyer may represent another in a court proceeding: a nonlawyer may not. For example, a pleading signed by a nonlawyer on behalf of another is a nullity. Fruin v. Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, Inc., 194 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 551 N.E. 2d 1010 (1st Dist. 1990) (pleading filed by lawyer not licensed in Illinois, only in Wisconsin, is void); Housing Authority of the County of Cook v. Tonsul, 115 Ill. App. 3d 739, 450 N.E. 2d 1248 (1st Dist. 1983) (forcible entry and detainer action judgment void because filed by a nonlawyer agent of the county housing authority; subsequent lawyer appearance does not cure defect); Marken Real Estate & Management v. Adams, 56 Ill. App. 3d 426, 371 N.E. 2d 1192 (1st Dist. 1977) (complaint filed by nonlawyer agent of corporation void); People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 22 Ill. App. 3d 316, 317 N.E. 2d 121 (2d Dist. 1974) (nonlawyer may not represent a class); Aarrow Ambulance v. Davis, 16 Ill. App. 3d 318, 319, 306 N.E. 2d 363 (3d Dist. 1974) (judgment for money and garnishment order void because complaint filed by nonlawyer on behalf of corporation).

Additionally, the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings is the unauthorized practice of law. Blue v. Illinois, 223 Ill. App. 3d 594, 585 N.E. 2d 625 (2d Dist. 1992) (father’s filing pro se habeas corpus petition on behalf of son void); Midwest Home Sav. & Loan v. Ridgewood, 123 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 463 N.E. 2d 909 (5th Dist. 1984) (defendant-corporation’s notice of appeal struck because it was filed by nonlawyer secretary of the corporation); Chicago Bar Association v. Friedlander, 24 Ill. App. 2d 130, 164 N.E. 2d 517 (1st Dist. 1960) (representation and preparation of filings for condemnation proceedings, special assessment proceedings, tax rate proceedings, and proceedings related to the valuation of real estate for tax purposes is the practice of law); but see Janiczek v. Dover Management Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 543, 481 N.E. 2d 25 (1985) (Complaint filed by licensed Illinois lawyer, who was subsequently disbarred, unbeknownst to plaintiff, not void. Purpose of the rule prohibiting nonlawyer filings not met and application of the rule would harm innocent plaintiff.).

A nonlawyer may not represent another in court proceedings. Paddock v. Dept. of Employment Security, 184 Ill. App. 3d 945, 540 N.E. 2d 1053 (1st Dist. 1989) (trial court erred in allowing nonlawyer to appear on behalf of plaintiff who was out of state despite inaccurate information provided by clerk’s office that plaintiff could send a family member or friend to represent her); In re Polito, 132 Ill. 2d 294, 547 N.E. 2d 465 (1989) (disbarred lawyer committed UPL when he entered an appearance and obtained a continuance on behalf of another); National Bank of Austin v. First Wisconsin National Bank, 53 Ill. App. 3d 482, 368 N.E. 2d 119 (2d Dist. 1977) (a nonlawyer partner of a partnership cannot represent the partnership in court); City of Chicago v. Witvoet, 12 Ill. App. 3d 654, 299 N.E. 2d 128 (1st Dist. 1973) (nonlawyer husband may not represent wife); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch, 406 Ill. 253, 94 N.E. 2d 148 (1950), (nonlawyer, sole owner of corporation may not represent corporation in court proceedings); but seePeople v. Alexander, 53 Ill. App. 2d 299, 202 N.E. 2d 841 (1st Dist 1964) (Law clerk did not commit UPL when he worked with opposing counsel to draft an order reciting the jury verdict. Court finds this was a ministerial act done for the benefit of the court and same law clerk did not commit UPL when he appeared in court and sought a continuance explaining that his supervising lawyer was engaged at the federal courthouse.).

B. Giving of Advice or Rendering of Services Requiring the use of Legal Knowledge: Actions Performed Outside of Court

The practice of law is not limited to court appearances or practice in the courts but extends to services performed outside of court and includes “the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge.” People v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776 (1949).

1. Meeting clients, planning strategy, explaining documents

In re Howard is the Supreme Court’s most recent statement on the unauthorized practice of law. In Howard, the court found that a suspended lawyer engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when he consulted three clients. In re Howard, 188 Ill. 2d 423, 721 N.E. 2d 1126, 242 Ill. Dec. 595, 604 (1999).

While defendant argued that he did not appear in court or file any motion in court and, therefore, did not practice law without a license, the Supreme Court held that the practice of law “encompasses not only court appearances, but also services rendered out of court and includes the giving of any advice or rendering of any service requiring the use of legal knowledge.” Howard, 242 Ill. Dec. at 600, 603.

The Supreme Court noted that Defendant considered client 1’s case and told him that a “motion to suppress was necessary and would be filed.” Defendant met with client 2 and “after taking notes of the meeting, advised him concerning future action in his case.” Defendant met with client 3 and after examining what client 3 believed to be legal books told client 3 “that he would seek a reduction in her father’s prison sentence.” Howard, 242 Ill. Dec. at 600.

In the case of In re Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d 515, 645 N.E. 2d 906, 206 Ill. Dec. 654, 658 (1994), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a licensed lawyer aided in the unauthorized practice of law when he allowed a disbarred lawyer to (1) interview clients for information needed to complete standard workers’ compensation forms, (2) ask clients to execute medical authorization forms and (3) ask clients to sign lawyer representation agreements. The court rejected the argument that the disbarred lawyer merely acted as a paralegal. In re Discipio, 206 Ill. Dec. at 658. The court explained that the disbarred lawyer located clients, performed the initial interview of clients, gathered pertinent information from clients, ensured that clients signed the appropriate forms, and collected one-half of the fee generated from each case he brought to the licensed lawyer. In re Discipio, 206 Ill. Dec. at 659.

The Supreme Court also held that the worker’s compensation forms which the nonlawyer asked clients to complete “required a degree of legal skill and knowledge for their comprehension and completion” when they requested information on temporary total disability and petitions for immediate hearings. Id.

In U.S. v. Johnson,327 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Illinois Case law, found that a paralegal’s preparation of pre-trial motions and recommendations on litigation strategies done without lawyer supervision was the unauthorized practice of law.

2. Settling Cases and Controversies

In the case of In re Bodkin, 21 Ill. 2d 458, 173 N.E. 2d 440, 442 (1961), the Supreme Court held that negotiating the settlement of a personal injury case is the practice of law. See alsoPeople v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, 173 N.E. 2d 417, 421 (1961).

In Herman v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co., 41 Ill. 2d 468, 244 N.E. 2d 809 (1969), the Supreme Court held that an unauthorized practice of law cause of action was sufficiently pled when plaintiffs alleged defendant-insurance company employees (1) advised persons suing their insurers not to notify their lawyer because the nonlawyer would explain, and did fraudulently explain the legal relationship and the nature of releases, drafts and documents shown to the person and (2) filled out and completed such releases and drafts and fraudulently obtained from the person suing the company’s insured a release of all claims against insured for $100 and plaintiffs relied on the nonlawyer’s representations, which were false and made willfully and maliciously with the intent to induce the client to act thereon and to deceive and defraud.

3. Real Estate Related Matters

In Chicago Bar Association v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc. 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E. 2d 771, 774 (1966), the Supreme Court held that while a realtor may fill in the blanks of a preliminary or earnest money contract where doing so “involves merely the supplying of simple factual data,” a realtor may not draw or fill in “blanks on deeds, mortgages, and other legal instruments subsequently executed.” Such practices “constitutes the practice of law.” Id. The court explained that these actions were not “incidental to the performance of brokerage services” but fall “outside the scope of the broker’s function.” Id.; see alsoPeople v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E. 2d 773 (1949) (preparation of deeds, contracts, and mortgages in real estate transactions is the practice of law); Chicago Bar Association v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E. 2d 693 (1948) (disbarred lawyer found to have practiced law when he wrote to settle a real estate matter and prepared a notice of rescission of oral contract and warranty deed for another real estate transaction).

In Chicago Bar Association v. Friedlander, 24 Ill. App. 2d 130, 164 N.E. 2d 517 (1st Dist. 1960), the Supreme Court held that the representation and preparation of filings for condemnation proceedings, special assessment proceedings, tax rate proceedings, and proceedings related to the valuation of real estate for tax purposes is the practice of law. See also In re Luster, 12 Ill. 2d 25, 145 N.E. 2d 75 (1957) (lawyer aided in the unauthorized practice of law when he accepted referrals from and shared fees with a nonlawyer who negotiated with public bodies on behalf of persons in condemnation proceedings); Chicago Bar Association v. Clausen, 1 Ill. App. 2d 140, 117 N.E. 2d 321 (1953); see also Wolfenberger v. Madison, 43 Ill. App. 3d 813 (2d Dist. 1976) (holding that a real estate broker who counseled a seller on tax consequences of a property transfer would be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law).

C. Administrative proceedings.

Whether a nonlawyer may act on behalf of another in an administrative action, is an issue frequently addressed by the Supreme and Appellate Counts. Most cases are very fact specific. In the case of In re Yamaguchi, 118 Ill. 2d 417, 515 N.E. 2d 1235, 113 Ill. Dec. 928 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a lawyer aided in the unauthorized practice of law when he allowed a nonlawyer to use his name and signature to file real estate valuation complaints in property tax appeal proceedings. Comparing Quinlan & Tyson to the case before it, the Supreme Court explained that the completion of a “valuation complaint is quite unlike the completion of a form contract.” In re Yamaguchi, 113 Ill. Dec. at 932.

In Chicago Bar Association et al. v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38 N.E. 2d 349 (1st Dist. 1941), the Supreme Court held that accountants who solicited taxpayers seeking to represent them before the Department of Revenue “in the preparation and presentation of claims for the credit and refund of Illinois Occupation taxes” or represent them “in the preparation, presentation and prosecution of claims for credit and refund of Illinois Retailers’ Occupation taxes” were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

In People v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E. 941 (1937), the Supreme Court held that a nonlawyer engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when he negotiated workers compensation settlements with employers and insurance companies; prepared and filed petitions with the Industrial Commission; if there was no settlement, he prepared and filed a claim for adjustment and brought it to a hearing before an arbitrator; and worked on appeals.1

In Perto v. Board of Review, 274 Ill. App. 485, 654 N.E. 2d 232, 210 Ill. Dec. 933, 939 (2d Dist. 1995), the Appellate Court held that the legislature has no authority to grant a nonlawyer the right to practice law even if such grant of right was limited to practice before an administrative agency. The Appellate Court held that a nonlawyer employee of a corporation was not practicing law when he (1) responded to a form letter from the Illinois Department of Employment Security, marking a box indicating that the employer wished to contest the Department’s finding a former employee eligible for benefits and writing on the form that the employee was fired for neglect of duties; (2) wrote a letter to the Department seeking to appeal a second finding that employee was eligible for benefits writing that the former employee was discharged for neglect of duties. Perto, 210 Ill. Dec. at 940.

The Illinois Attorney General’s Office, in an informal opinion, wrote that an administrative hearing officer may not permit a lawyer who is not licensed in Illinois to appear and represent a client in an administrative hearing. See generally, the October 8, 2002 letter from Senior Assistant Illinois Attorney General Michael J. Luke to Nathan Maddox, Assistant General Counsel, Office of the Illinois Secretary of State.

The Property Tax Appeals Board upheld the Whiteside County Board of Review rule requiring that a complaint must be filed by either the property owner or her lawyer. Opinion of Property Tax Appeal Board, Docket Number 99-596-C-2, November 11, 2000.

The Illinois Pollution Control Board held that only a lawyer may represent a corporation in an adjusted standard proceeding before that board. See In the Matter of Petition of Recycle Technologies, Inc. for an adjusted standard under 35 Ill. Admin. Code 720.131(c), AS 97-9 (July 10, 1997).

In Stone Street Partners, LLC v. City of Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings, 2017 IL 11720, the Court addressed the validity of a 1999 administrative judgment for building code violations entered against a property owner, where the property owner had not been properly notified of the proceeding until ten years later. For unknown reasons, a non-attorney had appeared at the administrative hearing in 1999, purportedly on the property owner’s behalf, and agreed to the judgment. The city argued that code violation hearings do not require specialized legal skill and training and that the general rule that corporations must be represented by attorneys in legal proceedings is inapplicable to such administrative proceedings. The city further argued that even if the matter involved the practice of law and ran afoul of the prohibition on unauthorized practice, the court should invoke its inherent authority and hold that non-attorneys may represent corporations in this type of administrative proceeding. Ultimately, the Court rejected the city’s arguments and found that the non-attorney did not have authority to bind the corporation. The Court remanded the case to allow the property owner to pursue an action to quiet title.

D. Paralegal Activities.

The Attorney Act (705 ILCS 205/1 et seq.) prohibits non-attorney legal work on client matters by paralegals unless supervised by a licensed attorney. A non-attorney who prepares a postconviction petition on another person’s behalf and charged a fee for doing so, even though the preparer did not appear in court or provide legal advice, is nonetheless guilty of the unauthorized practice of law. People v. Hill, 2012 IL App (1st) 091-933-U. In this case, the preparer raised the pro se exception, but the court found this exception inapplicable as the preparer was neither a licensed attorney nor a party to the case. The court upheld the finding of indirect contempt of court under the Attorney Act and the imposition of a fine and required restitution.

A law clerk, who is not a licensed attorney, and who prepared an order in collaboration with opposing counsel spreading of record a jury finding after trial and continuing the case, is not guilty of the unauthorized practice of law. People v. Alexander, 53 Ill. App. 2d 299 (1964). The court cited as elements of what constitute the practice of law to include “preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, and the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts…”. The court held this preparation of an order, in collaboration with opposing counsel, to be a ministerial act for the benefit of the court and a mere recordation of what transpired, and not “management of the action” and thus did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law.

Disbarred attorney who owned paralegal firm which continued to provide paralegal services without attorney supervision was guilty of the unauthorized practice of law. U. S. v. Johnson, 327 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2003). The court found that the practical effect of the paralegal firm’s unsolicited marketing activities targeting criminal defendants was to interfere with the attorney-client relationship, which exceeded the scope of their permitted paralegal function and reached the level of practicing law. In so holding, the court found that, “It follows logically that a federal court’s power to regulate and discipline attorneys appearing before it extends to conduct by nonlawyers amounting to the practice of law without a license”, despite the fact that the state has its own attorney disciplinary powers.

E. Parents, Relatives and Powers of Attorney.

The pro se exception to non-attorney representation is often raised as a defense to a claim of the unauthorized practice of law, as is the holding of a power of attorney. Both exceptions have strict limitations.

In In re Estate of Mattson, 2019 IL App (1st) 180805, 131 N.E. 3d 578, a non-attorney pro se petitioned to open an estate for his deceased mother and for issuance of letters of administration. The trial court, after 3 continuances to allow time for obtaining an attorney, dismissed the petition with prejudice, finding that. “…although a pro se litigant is entitled to represent his own personal interests, a non-attorney cannot represent another’s legal interests…Moreover, this rule includes an attorney seeking to personally represent the legal interest of an estate.” The appellate court agreed and dismissed the appeal.

In People v. Wilson, 227 N.E. 3d 710 (Ill. App. 2023), the defendant’s wife, a non-attorney, holding a power of attorney, filed a post-conviction petition on her husband’s behalf. The court found the post-conviction petition to be a nullity, and the appeal was dismissed. Pursuant to the pro se exception, a layperson who does not have the requisite legal training or law license may appear in court only on his or her own behalf, but on behalf of no one else. The statutory short form power of attorney for property does not change this outcome, because it does not authorize an agent to act as an attorney-at-law for the principal or otherwise to engage in the practice of law without being a licensed attorney.

In Kimbrell v. State Bank of Speer, 2018 IL App (3d) 170498, 115 N.E.3d 1257, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of complainant’s second amended complaint, filed pro se by a non-attorney on behalf of herself and her family members, as the unauthorized practice of law. The complainant had earlier been sanctioned and ordered to make no further filings in the case without leave of court. The court cited the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Downtown Disposal Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL App 112040, 979 N.E. 2d 50, for the proposition that application of the “nullity rule” is not automatic and noted that among the factors to be considered are: whether the non-attorney’s conduct was done without knowledge or was minimal or resulted in prejudice to the opposing party. Having been previously warned to obtain counsel and failing to do so and filing additional pleadings pro se, the court held that the nullity rule was applicable.

In People v. Indoval, 2023 IL App (4th) 220774-U, the court found that the application of the nullity rule was not warranted in connection with a pro se filing of a post-conviction petition. Defendant, who did not speak English, enlisted the assistance of a prison paralegal in preparing his petition. Acknowledging that this act by the paralegal constituted the unauthorized practice of law, the court applied the Downtown Disposal factors and found that the paralegal was unaware that his involvement was improper, and held that the nullity rule should not apply here. Where non-attorney daughter acted as “mere scrivener” in transcribing mother’s wishes in the typing of trust amendment, there was no unauthorized practice of law in violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/2BB).

Roszkowiak v. Roszkowiak, 2024 IL App (2d) 230265. The court found that, “Whether the term scrivener, typist, or recorder is used, we determine, like the trial court, that a settlor may amend or revoke his or her own trust using the aid of an individual who acts entirely and only at the settlor’s direction.”

In contrast, an appeal was dismissed where late notice of appeal was attempted to be filed pro se by non-attorney holding durable power of attorney. Bertrand v. Gundogdu, 2023 IL App (1st) 220203-U. In Bertrand, the court found that the non-attorney was not a party to the litigation from which an appeal was sought and therefore lacked standing. Moreover, Illinois law provides that a durable power of attorney ends at the principal’s death.

In In re Estate of Lorraine Phillips, 2022 IL App (1st) 192409-U, the appellate court held that the nullity rule did not apply where one sibling attempted to file pro se request for letters of administration for deceased mother, and other sibling filed same request using counsel. The court proceeded with the case based on the request of the counsel-represented sibling. The circuit court was not required to enter an order dismissing the entire action simply because the non-represented sibling had filed his petition first; doing so would not protect the public or integrity of the court system.

F. Attorneys on Inactive Status and Law Students.

In an interlocutory appeal, the appellate court answered a certified question about application of the nullity rule as follows: Where a plaintiff proceeding pro se was formerly licensed to practice law, but is voluntarily on inactive status pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 756(a)(5) at the time of filing a complaint under the Wrongful Death Act, he or she is not authorized to practice law and the nullity rule applies even though plaintiff returned to active status prior to a hearing in a motion to dismiss the complaint as a nullity.

Applebaum v Rush University Medical Center, 376 Ill. App. 3d 993. Plaintiff was special administrator of the estate of decedent and was the only child and sole beneficiary of the estate, which had no creditors and was not opened to probate. He brought the suit in the name of the estate, and not individually for himself, and argued for an exception to application of the nullity rule due to his proper legal training and former licensure, and lack of any discipline while practicing. The court disagreed with allowing an exception, noting that as a former licensed attorney, plaintiff was charged with knowing the law, which prohibited the filing of a complaint while on inactive status, which he voluntarily took.

Defendants in consolidated appeal claimed denial of right to counsel where no consent of the accused was obtained or filed allowing participation in the defense by a non-attorney senior law student or law graduate acting pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 711 (711 student), People v Smith (In re Denzel W), 237 Ill. 2d 285, 930 N.E. 2d 974 (2010). The court noted that defendants were not solely represented by 711 students but were also represented by counsel who supervised the 711 students. And while the failure to file written consent under 711 is one factor to consider when evaluating whether counsel was ineffective, the court must assess that failure in light of counsel’s overall performance, and whether counsel’s performance prejudiced the accused, and the court rejected the defendants’ claims that they were denied counsel simply because they did not consent to a 711 student’s participation in their defense.

IV. Corporate, State, or Municipal Employee Acting on Behalf of Employer

As discussed above, the Supreme Court has held that the Attorney Act and the Corporate Practice of Law Act prohibit any corporate agent, other than a licensed Illinois lawyer, from filing an action on behalf of or representing a corporation. People v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931) (bank could not, through its legal department, manage estate matters, conduct foreclosure proceedings, draft wills, conduct real estate transactions, or prepare contracts or deeds). Exceptions to this holding have been carved out by the Illinois Appellate Court in the following instances: (1) when a state statute permits the exception or (2) the action taken by the nonlawyer corporate employee was on behalf of the corporation alone, and not another.

A. Application of Statutory Authority

In Meza v. Rodriguez & Children’s Home & Aid Society, 305 Ill. App. 3d 777, 713 N.E. 2d 764, 239 Ill. Dec. 233 (2d Dist. 1999), plaintiff-father challenged his surrender of parental rights based, in part, on an allegation that the surrender was void because it was the result of unauthorized practice of law. Plaintiff argued that the Adoption Act improperly permitted a child welfare agency representative, who is not a lawyer, to explain the content and legal consequences of executing a surrender document. Meza, 239 Ill. Dec. at 242.

The Appellate Court held that the nonlawyer employee of the child welfare agency did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law because § 10 of the Adoption Act authorizes agents of a licensed welfare agency to take surrenders for the purpose of adoption. The Appellate Court held that it did not “believe that the taking of a consent or surrender constitutes the practice of law.” The Court explained:

The agency representative is not required to draft the consent or surrender document because the forms of consent and surrender and the certificate of acknowledgement are provided by statute. Therefore, all the agency representative is required to do in order to complete the form is to place the appropriate names in the appropriate blanks. The only further statutory requirements of the agency representative are (1) to advise the parent that the execution of the document will irrevocably relinquish the parent’s right to the child; and (2) to attest that the parent has expressed his intent and desire to voluntarily relinquish his parental rights. We believe that such acts do not rise to the level of practicing law.

In Kittay v. Allstate Insurance Co., 78 Ill. App. 3d 335, 397 N.E. 2d 200, 33 Ill. Dec. 867 (1st Dist. 1979), plaintiffs-insureds alleged that their insurance companies were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when they used lawyer-employees to represent insureds in matters involving insurance coverage. The Appellate Court held that § 5 of the Corporate Practice of Law Act allows insurance companies to use employee lawyers in any litigation in which the company has an interest and insurance companies have an interest in the defense of its insureds.

B. Work performed for the sole benefit of the corporation

In King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 828 N.E. 2d 1155, 293 Ill. Dec. 657 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the preparation of mortgage documents by a mortgage company and the charging of a fee for the preparation of those documents was not the unauthorized practice of law. The court found that defendant was acting pro se when it prepared documents “solely for its own use” and that the defendant did not hold itself out as a legal representative or advisor and that defendant did not prevent plaintiff from securing counsel to represent plaintiff in the transaction. However, the Court did note that where a third party who is not an attorney and not a party to the transaction prepares the documents, that would fall outside the pro se exception and constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Id. at 23; see alsoFirst Federal Savings & Loan Association of Bureau County v. Sadnick, 162 Ill. 2d 581, 582-583, 515 N.E. 2d 1354, 114 Ill. Dec. 83 (3d Dist. 1987) (Quinlan & Tyson allows “persons to engage in activities that otherwise might constitute ’practicing law’ as long as the activities are incidental to the corporation’s main business.” Bank that prepares mortgage documents for its own purposes, does not provide legal advice to the mortgagors, does not hold itself out as a legal advisor or representative, does not prohibit mortgagors from seeking counsel, does not run afoul of the prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law).

In Johnson v. Pistakee Highlands Community Association, 72 Ill. App. 3d 402, 390 N.E. 2d 640, 28 Ill. Dec. 473 (2d Dist. 1979), the Appellate Court held that a nonlawyer secretary for not-for-profit corporation, comprised of owners of land in a subdivision, who prepared and filed with the recorder of deeds liens against lot owners in arrears on assessments did not commit the unauthorized practice of law because the liens were prepared for the association’s own purpose and filed for its own benefit.

In Downtown Disposal Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL112040, the Court held that even where a non-attorney corporate president engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by filing a complaint for administrative review on behalf of the corporation, the subsequent result of the proceeding is not necessarily a nullity. The Court found that sanctions for violating the rule against unauthorized practice should be viewed on a case by case basis and that before striking a matter, courts should consider whether the non-attorney's conduct was knowing, whether the corporation promptly obtained counsel once apprised of the issue, the extent of the non-attorney's involvement, and the prejudice that would be caused by imposition of such action. For a similar ruling, see In re IFC Credit Corp., 663 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2011), where the Seventh Circuit determined that a debtor corporation’s bankruptcy petition need not be dismissed as void after being signed by the non-attorney corporate president. The court held that the situation was promptly rectified and that there were no adverse consequences warranting dismissal. See also Illinois EPA v. Illinois Pollution Control Board & Prime Location Properties, 2012 IL App (5th) 100072-U, holding that the nullity rule did not apply to petition for review filed with the Pollution Control Board by a non-attorney on behalf of a corporation where agency's regulations did not define filing the petition as the practice of law.

C. Work performed for insureds

In Bowers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 403 Ill. App. 3d 173 (2010), the Appellate Court addressed a claim by a plaintiff insured that his insurance company had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by using corporate attorneys to represent its insureds in legal liability proceedings in court. court The Court determined that while the Corporation Practice of Law Prohibition Act, 705 ILCS 220/1 (2008), did not permit corporations to practice law, the company's use of staff attorneys to represent policyholders was permissible as long as the interests of the insurance company and insured were aligned.

V. Relief for the Unauthorized Practice of Law

Under the prior version of the Attorney Act, the only remedies available were contempt of court and restraint of the unauthorized practice of law. Rathke v. Lidisky, 59 Ill. App. 3d 560, 375 N.E. 2d 871, 16 Ill. Dec. 764 (5th Dist. 1978). An injured party, the State’s Attorney, the Attorney General, a private practicing attorney, a law firm or a bar association could bring an injunctive action to restrain another from the unauthorized practice of law or a rule to show cause why another should not be held in contempt for the unauthorized practice of law.

The First and the Fifth Districts have held that the prior version of the Attorney Act provided no private cause of action for damages for the unauthorized practice of law. If a plaintiff sought money damages, he or she had to bring a negligence action against the non-lawyer alleging that the legal work was negligently performed. Torres v. Fiol, 110 Ill. App. 3d 9, 441 N.E. 2d 1300, 65 Ill. Dec. 786 (1st Dist. 1982); Rathke v. Lidisky, 59 Ill. App. 3d 560, 375 N.E. 2d 871, 16 Ill. Dec. 764 (5th Dist. 1978). The Supreme Court agreed in King v. First Capital Corporation, 215 Ill. 2d 1, 828 N.E. 2d 1155, 293 Ill. Dec. 657 (2005).

Additionally, the Court has ruled that a non-lawyer can be held in direct criminal contempt of court for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and can be sentenced to jail and fined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, 173 N.E. 2d 417 (1961) (defendant was sentenced to up to one year in jail and fined $1,000).

A direct criminal contempt of court finding for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law may bring a jail sentence and significant fine. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, 173 N.E. 2d 417 (1961) (defendant was sentenced to up to one year in jail and fined $1,000).

Also, lawyers not licensed in Illinois may have no claim for fees for legal work provided in Illinois for an Illinois client if the lawyer is not admitted pro hac vice. Lozoff v. Shore Heights, Ltd., 66 Ill. 2d 398, 362 N.E. 2d 1047, 6 Ill. Dec. 225, 227 (1977).

VI. Conclusion

As time passes, the practice of law continues to evolve, as does the regulation of those that provide legal services. In this manual, we have endeavored to provide an overview of the authorities that both define the practice of law and impose sanctions on those that engage in the unauthorized practice of law. The authorities include case precedent from the Illinois Supreme Court and Appellate Courts, as well as statutes that apply to these areas. On occasion, the federal courts have also interpreted Illinois law or addressed situations that impact Illinois residents. For that reason, we have included some impactful federal caselaw in this text. As stated in the preface, this report is not intended to be a comprehensive resource for attorneys, the judiciary, or administrative agencies. Rather, we are hopeful that this manual will be used as a starting point for research and discussion about the lengthy history and application of guardrails meant to protect the public from harm.

As the manual was being written, technological advances were affecting major changes in the way that information is processed. Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is rapidly developing to the point of allowing non-lawyers the ability to prepare legal documents without the involvement of licensed and authorized legal counsel. The courts have not yet opined on the extent to which the formulation of AI commands to prepare legal documents, arguments, or decisions on behalf of others can or should be regulated. We expect that the guidance will at some point be covered.

In the meantime, in the absence of a comprehensive definition of the practice of law in the State of Illinois, the Illinois State Bar Association and its Task Force on the Unauthorized Practice of Law present this publication. We intend to help interested individuals understand the background and reasons for protective measures guarding against unscrupulous perpetrators who prey upon people that need legal advice or services. We also hope that it facilitates better enforcement of the existing mandates and that it helps to prevent issues for well-intentioned parties, who simply do not comprehend the parameters developed over time concerning lawful legal practice.


The Attorney Act provides for a number of exceptions to the unauthorized practice of law that allow nonlawyers to represent persons before administrative agencies. 705 ILCS 205/1. In People v. Goodman, the Supreme Court rejected defendant’s argument that the “legislative act relating to the Industrial Commission” allowed for nonlawyer representation. Goodman, 8 N.E. 2d at 945. The Supreme Court rejected this argument explaining that the legislature cannot grant to a layman the right to practice law. Id.; see also Perto v. Board of Review, 210 Ill. Dec. at 939.