Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the civil cases Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Hamer, Wilkins v. Williams, VC&M Ltd. v. Andrews and Crittenden v. The Cook County Commission on Human Rights and the criminal case In re B.C.P.

CIVIL

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Hamer

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC

A carrot dangled by an amnesty statute for delinquent taxpayers resulted in the Department of Revenue hitting a corporate taxpayer with a rather large stick:  a penalty of 200% interest.  Accordingly to a 4-2 decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, the plain language of the Tax Delinquency Amnesty Act, 35 ILCS 745/10 (West 2004), required this result.  The Amnesty Act established a program for taxpayers owing payment for any taxable period between June 30, 1983 and July 1, 2002, to avoid interest and penalties, as well as civil or criminal prosecution, by paying “all taxes due” during a six-week period in 2003.  Taxpayers who failed to square up during the amnesty period faced a penalty of 200% interest under another statute, the Uniform Penalty and Interest Act, 35 ILCS 735/3-2(f) (West 2004). 

The taxpayer here, MetLife, admittedly owed a 100% interest penalty following an IRS audit of MetLife’s 1997-1999 federal income tax returns.  MetLife contended that, because neither the company nor the Department knew whether MetLife owed additional state income taxes until long after expiration of the amnesty period, the Amnesty Act and the 200% interest provision did not apply.  MetLife paid the amounts assessed under protest and filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

The supreme court explained that its decision hinged on the meaning of “all taxes due,” a phrase undefined in the Amnesty Act.  Ultimately, the Court rejected MetLife’s argument that it could not have made an educated guess as to its increased Illinois tax liability during the amnesty window; the Court agreed with the dissenter in the appellate court and held that “all taxes due” means the amount owed based upon properly reportable income at the time the tax return was required to be filed.  When MetLife failed to pay those taxes during the amnesty period, it became liable for the 200% interest obligation. 

The Court also rejected MetLife’s claim of a substantive due process violation.  Employing the rational basis test, the Court considered whether the penalty was “wholly disproportionate to the offense and obviously unreasonable.”  The Court found that the penalty bore a reasonable relationship to the state’s legitimate interest in raising money and was not arbitrary and unreasonable. 

Noting that the intent of the Amnesty Act is to punish delinquent taxpayers, dissenting Justice Burke reasoned that MetLife should not have been subject to a double interest penalty – in excess of $2,000,000 – because the company was not delinquent and owed no income taxes during the 2003 amnesty period.  Justice Burke contended that “taxes due” under the Amnesty Act could not have encompassed a tax liability that state law did not require MetLife to pay during the amnesty period and which the Department could not have collected before the audit was concluded, long after the amnesty period had ended. 

Wilkins v. Williams

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan, Ottawa

A motorist  collided with an ambulance transporting a patient on a nonemergency basis from a hospital to a nursing home and sued the private ambulance service and the driver for the injuries the motorist sustained in the collision. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on the basis of the qualified immunity provisions of the Emergency Medical Services Systems Act, 210 ILCS 50/3.150(a).  The First District reversed, holding that the immunity provided in the EMS Act does not extend to negligence claims brought by a non-patient based on the ordinary operation of a motor vehicle.  Here, the supreme court, with Justice Thomas writing for the court, and Chief Justice Kilbride dissenting, reversed the appellate court.

The EMS Act affords immunity against ordinary negligence claims to private operators of ambulances in the course of providing both emergency and non-emergency medical services.  The Motor Vehicle Code contains provisions dealing with the operation of emergency vehicles.  This case involved the intricate arguments presented when two or more statutes apply in the immunity context. 

The supreme court first held that the appellate court erred in concluding that the EMS Act was silent concerning negligence toward a third party who was not being served as a patient.  The court held that the Act does not limit in any way the types of plaintiffs to which the immunity applies.  “The immunity … looks to the nature of the services rendered, and not to the recipient of those services.”  The court thought it to be “nonsensical” to allow a third party to recover for negligence, while limiting the ambulance patient’s recovery to willful and wanton misconduct.

The court then took up the question whether the Vehicle Code is to be interpreted in a manner to prevent the EMS Act from providing that qualified immunity to ambulance drivers.  The Vehicle Code deals with the operation of emergency vehicles.  The court found its decision in Harris v. Thompson, 2012 IL 112525, to be instructive, teaching that whether defendants owed a duty of care and whether defendants enjoyed immunity are separate issues.  The court concluded, as in Harris, that the Vehicle Code did not abrogate Section 3.150(a) of the EMS Act. 

The court rejected numerous smaller arguments made by plaintiff.  Defendant prevailed on all issues and the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed.

VC&M, LTD v. Andrews

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan, Ottawa

This Supreme Court Rule 316 certified question appeal presented the narrow but dispositive question of whether an e-filed motion to reconsider (of an order of dismissal) and an e-filed notice of appeal, neither of which was allowed to be e-filed under the then-prevailing Du Page County local rules, were effective to create jurisdiction for the appeal.  The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction; the supreme court reversed the appellate court, finding that jurisdiction existed despite the procedural irregularities in those filings.

Under the Du Page County local rules which applied at the time, a circuit court case was to be designated as an e-file (a) when a complaint was filed electronically, (b) a defendant filed an answer electronically, or (c) when the parties stipulated that a case could be included in the e-filing program.  This case was not designated as an e-file under any of those options – nor in any other way.  The local rules were significantly amended during the life of this appeal.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint.  Plaintiff e-filed its response to the motion to dismiss, without objection.  The motion was granted and the case was dismissed.  Plaintiff e-filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal, and then filed a paper copy of that motion, but not until 60 days after the order of dismissal.  At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, defendants asserted that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion to reconsider because the e-filing of that motion was improper.  The circuit court disagreed.

Plaintiff e-filed its notice of appeal within 30 days of the denial of the post-judgment motion.  Defendants countered with a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  The appellate court dismissed the appeal.  The appellate court stated that it could not find justification for plaintiff’s “blatant disregard of Supreme Court Rules and local rules governing e-filing.”  The court acknowledged that “the pilot e-filing system … might be the future of document management, but plaintiff must adhere to the rules in effect [at the time]….” 

Justice Theis wrote for the majority in this 4-3 split decision.  The court rejected many of the arguments made by plaintiff and in particular, “wholly rejected” plaintiff’s argument that the circuit court’s acceptance of the e-filing of the motion to reconsider excused the failure to follow the local rule.  The court noted the lack of any asserted prejudice, and concluded that the circuit court had discretion to hear the motion to reconsider.

The second certified question was whether the e-filing of the notice of appeal was sufficient.  That notice had the additional problem that even in properly designated e-filing cases, the local rule provided that all appellate and post-judgment enforcement proceedings and notices “shall be filed and served in the conventional manner and not by means of e-filing.”  The majority found some support for its position in another local rule which provided that during the pilot project the circuit clerk was to “create and maintain a paper copy of all e-filings in a parallel manual court file.”  The court then turned to the well-developed body of case law holding that where the deficiency in the notice of appeal is of form only, and not substance, the appellate court is not deprived of jurisdiction.

Although e-filing presented the factual setting of this case, the resolution of the case deals more with the manner in which rules will be applied, especially in transitional settings, rather than with shaping a paradigm specific to e-filing.

Crittenden v. The Cook County Commission on Human Rights

By Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams, Montgomery & John Ltd.

Punitive damages will not easily be read into a county ordinance.  The Supreme Court therefore upheld an appellate court judgment reversing an administrative agency award of punitive damages to an employee who filed a sexual harassment complaint under the Cook County Human Rights Ordinance.

Ms. Boyd filed a complaint with the Cook County Commission on Human Rights alleging sexual harassment by her employer.  The Commission awarded her wages, attorney fees, and punitive damages.  The employer, Crittenden, challenged the order, arguing among other things that the Commission lacked authority to award punitive damages.  The circuit court confirmed the Commission’s decision.  The appellate court affirmed the compensatory damages award but reversed the punitive damages award, finding that the Commission did not have authority to make that award.

The Supreme Court held that the Commission, as an administrative agency, is limited to the powers the legislature grants it.  The Ordinance at issue authorizes compensatory damages but does not expressly authorize punitive damages.  The Court further held that the Commission lacks common law powers and therefore is without authority to award common law punitive damages absent express authority.  The Court also rejected the Commission’s conclusion that it was implicitly authorized to award punitive damages since punitive damages are not favored under the law.

CRIMINAL

In re B.C.P.

By Jay Wiegman, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Although interlocutory appeals have been allowed from the granting of suppression motions in criminal cases, before today there was no specific provision for this in juvenile matters.  In In re B.C.P., 2013 IL 113908, the Illinois Supreme Court exercised its constitutional rulemaking authority to modify its procedural rules so as to allow the State to take an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress evidence in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.

In In re B.C.P., the State filed a delinquency petition against B.C.P. Then B.C.P. moved to suppress his confession on the grounds that he was not advised of his Miranda rights. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress. The State filed a certificate of impairment and a notice of appeal. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In re B.C.P., 2012 IL App (3d) 100921. The court reasoned that no supreme court rule specifically allowed the State to take an interlocutory appeal from the granting of a motion to suppress in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The State filed a petition for leave to appeal. The State argued that it should have the same right to appeal interlocutory suppression orders in juvenile delinquency cases as it has in criminal cases. On appeal, the State conceded that Supreme Court Rules do not expressly allow the State to take an appeal from an interlocutory order suppressing evidence in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.

Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas first noted that principles of statutory or rule construction was not at issue; rather, what the State sought was a modification of the Rules.  The majority noted that, in People v. DeJesus, 127 Ill. 2d 486 (1989), and People v. Martin, 67 Ill. 2d 462 (1977) (both of which cases concerned the termination of parental rights), the Supreme Court had allowed the State to take appeals in juvenile proceedings in situations that were not expressly covered by the rules, doing so because of a belief that certain trial court actions should not be immunized from appeal.

The primary determinant in this case, however, was that the Supreme Court agreed with the State's policy argument.  The Court noted that Illinois' view of juvenile proceedings has shifted, since the Rules were first drafted, to make juvenile proceedings appear more criminal in nature. Today's decision signals that a consequence of this shift in policy is the Court's recognition that the State has the same interest in appealing a suppression order in a juvenile case that it does in a criminal case. The Court therefore "modif[ied] Rule 660(a) to incorporate Rule 604(a)(1) in light of the shift in policy exhibited by the Juvenile Justice Reform Amendments of 1998."   2012 IL App (3d) 100921, ¶15.  The Court rejected defendant's argument that delays caused by interlocutory appeals could undermine the rehabilitation of minors. The Court noted that the Supreme Court of New Mexico reached the same conclusion when considering a similarly worded provision.

In deciding to modify the Rules in this manner, the Supreme Court rejected defendant’s suggestion that the Supreme Court should turn the question over to the rules committee, noting that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 3 reserves tot he Court the prerogative of departing from procedures applied to the adoption and amendment of Supreme Court Rules. The Court also rejected defendant's argument that delays caused by interlocutory appeals could undermine the rehabilitation of minors, and stated that the newly enacted procedures for expediting juvenile appeals should apply to interlocutory appeals, as well. The matter was remanded to the Appellate Court, which had previously determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the State's interlocutory appeal.

In dissent, Justice Theis noted that in its petition for leave to appeal, the State claimed that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) does not apply in a delinquent minor proceeding, but that the State did not request in its PLA that Supreme Court Rules should be changed to accommodate its interlocutory appeal. Justice Theis therefore considered it inappropriate to modify the Rules as the majority did in today's Opinion, in part because doing so gives tacit approval to the State’s failure to follow faithfully Rule 315 in identifying the issue raised in its appeal.  In re B.C.P., 2012 IL App (3d) 100921, ¶27 (Theis, J., dissenting).  Justice Theis was also concerned that the majority had sidestepped, without adequate justification, the more comprehensive rulemaking procedures adopted by the Supreme Court.  In re B.C.P., 2012 IL App (3d) 100921, ¶27 (Theis, J., dissenting).

As a substantive matter, the immediate impact of this decision seems obvious: the State may now file interlocutory appeals challenging the granting of a motion to suppress, as it does in criminal cases.  The long-term ramifications, however, are less clear.  As Justice Theis noted in dissent, the Court has not exercised its prerogative to modify its Rules without following its own rulemaking procedures, including committee review and public hearings, since 1989, and in that case, Harrisburg-Raleigh Airport Authority v. Department of Revenue, 126 Ill. 2d 326 (1989), the Court simply clarified a filing deadline.  In re B.C.P., 2012 IL App (3d) 100921, ¶34-35 (Theis, J., dissenting).  Whether this power to modify rules will continue to be used sparingly, or whether In re B.C.P.marks a trend remains to be seen.