Our panel of leading appellate attorneys reviews the four Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Thursday, March 24. 

People v. Deroo , 2022 IL 126120

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Ryan DeRoo was charged in Rock Island County with aggravated DUI. At DeRoo’s jury trial, the State introduced the results of a chemical blood test establishing DeRoo’s blood alcohol content. That evidence was admitted pursuant to 625 ILCS 5/11-501.4(a), which allows admission of chemical blood tests conducted in the course of emergency medical treatment “as a business record exception to the hearsay rule.”

Following his conviction, DeRoo appealed, arguing that Section 11-501.4(a) conflicts with Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6), which expressly excludes “medical records in criminal cases” from the business records exception to the hearsay rule and that Rule 803(6) should control. In a two-to-one decision, the appellate court found no conflict between the rule and the statute and affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, as well, albeit on different grounds.

The Supreme Court first concluded that Section 11-501.4(a) and Rule 803(6) are in direct conflict. The statute authorizes the admission of a type of medical record (chemical blood tests) under the business record exception to the hearsay rule, and the rule expressly excludes medical records from the business records hearsay exception in criminal cases. 

To remedy this conflict, the Supreme Court today amended Rule 803(6). While used sparingly, the Court has previously exercised its ability to depart from the normal rulemaking procedures set forth in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 3, by using a case before the court as a vehicle to adopt a rule change. The Court opted to do so today in order to resolve the conflict between the Rule and the statute.

In support of its decision, the Court noted the evolution of the law as regards medical records and the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Medical records were historically excluded from the business records exception on the basis that medical opinions and diagnoses require expert interpretation; thus it was deemed inappropriate to admit such records without expert witness testimony and an opportunity for cross-examination. Over time, however, the law has evolved.

The parallel Federal Rule of Evidence, also Rule 803(6), includes medical records within the business records exception for criminal cases, explicitly referring to both “opinions” and diagnoses” in describing the contents of records that may fall under the hearsay exception. And, medical records are admissible under the business records exception in civil cases under the Illinois rules. Thus, the Court found no basis to exclude medical records from the business records exception in criminal cases, noting, that while the burdens of proof differ in civil and criminal cases, “the trustworthiness of a recorded document does not change depending on whether the document is used in a civil matter or a criminal one.”  

The Court amended Rule 803(6), effective immediately, by striking the medical records exclusion for criminal cases. The Court specifically stated that the amendment is applicable to all pending cases, including the instant case. And, the Court concluded, “applying the amended rule to conduct in this case that occurred before the amendment took effect does not raise any ex post facto concerns.” Accordingly, DeRoo’s conviction was affirmed.
 

McHenry Township v. County of McHenry,, 2022 IL 127258

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC

This case, arising from the McHenry County clerk’s refusal to place a proposition to dissolve the McHenry Township on the November 2020 general election ballot, presents an unusual procedural situation. By the time of disposition in the Illinois Supreme Court, the dispute not only was moot, but also the parties, plaintiff McHenry County Township and defendants, McHenry County and its clerk, Joseph Tirio, were aligned against the appellate court’s judgment. Nonetheless, invoking the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and observing that although the township no longer opposed the county’s position, the parties had not resolved the litigation, the supreme court addressed the county’s arguments and decided the appeal.

The Illinois Constitution, the Township Code and the Election Code provide the legal backdrop. The Constitution permits the legislature to provide for counties to form and dissolve townships by referendum. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, sec. 5. Article 24 of the Township Code, a 2019 law enacted to further the public policy of reducing the number of local governmental units in Illinois, includes a section authorizing the board of trustees of any McHenry County township to propose the adoption of a resolution calling for submission of a proposition to dissolve the township in accordance with the general election law. 60 ILCS 1/24-15 (West 2020). The case also implicated Article 28 of the Election Code, which governs placement of public questions on the ballot. 10 ILCS 5/28 (West 2018).

Tirio refused the township’s request to place on the November 2020 ballot a proposition to dissolve the township based on the voter’s rejection of what Tirio considered to be the same proposition in a March 2020 primary election. He cited section 28-7 of the Election Code, which prohibits more than one referendum on “the same proposition” in any 23-month period. 

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment that the Election Code did not authorize Tirio to refuse to place the proposition on the ballot on the ground that it violated section 28-7 of the Election Code. He could do so only for the reasons listed in section 28-1, which specifies the procedures for submission of printing public questions on ballots, limits the number of public questions that may be included, and establishes that referenda may appear on the ballot only for certain elections.
 

Sigcho-Lopez v. Illinois State Board of Elections , 2022 IL 127253

By Joanne R. Driscoll, Forde & O’Meara LLP

This case provides instruction on the framework for bringing a complaint alleging a campaign finance violation under section 9-8.10 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/9-8.10 (West 2018)). Here, the expenditure was reported to the Illinois State Election Board (Board) by the 25th Ward Regular Democratic Organization (Committee). It covered legal expenses incurred by former 25th Ward alderman Daniel Solis while he held that office and was cooperating with a federal investigation of alleged political corruption by Illinois public officials. Solis’s successor brought the action.
 
The Board, adopting the recommendations of its general counsel and the findings of fact and recommendations of its hearing officer, dismissed the complaint. The appellate court, on administrative review, found thar the findings of the hearing officer were not clearly erroneous and affirmed.
 
The supreme court affirmed the dismissal but on different grounds. Justices Anne M. Burke, Theis and Neville took no part, thus requiring (and obtaining) a unanimous decision by Justice Overstreet, the author, and Justices Garman, Michael J. Burke, and Carter. Noting that the court was reviewing the Board’s decision, not that of the appellate court, Justice Overstreet began by applying basic principles of statutory construction, including to recognize the Legislature’s intent, which, here, was to preserve the integrity of the electoral process. 
 
After examining the Election Code’s definition of the term “expenditure” (Id. § 9-1.5(A)(1)), the court looked to section 9-8.10, which prohibits the use of a political committee’s funds for personal matters that are neither campaign related nor for governmental or political purposes related to a candidate’s or public official’s duties and responsibilities. The court found error with the Board’s application to section 9-8.10 of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius―the enumeration of an exception in a statute is considered to be an exclusion of all other exceptions―and its finding that the failure to exclude criminal defense fees meant that those expenditures could be covered. 
 
According to the court, that maxim was overcome by strong indication of legislative intent as well as the language of section 9-8.10, namely, subsections (a)(3) and (c). Section 9-8.10(a)(3) prohibits a political committee from making expenditures for repayment of any debt, other than loans from the committee, and the repayment of personal debt. Id. § 9-8.10(a)(3). Section 9-8.10(c) allows for the “expenditure of funds of a political committee controlled by an officeholder . . . to defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions.” Id. § 9-8.10(c).
 
As to section 9-8.10(c), the Board agreed with the Committee that it permitted the use of campaign funds to subsidize personal legal fees incurred because of the individual’s holding of a public office. The supreme court found that interpretation unreasonable because it would cover corruption. The court also disagreed with the plaintiff’s contention of a per se prohibition against the payment of legal fees as personal debt, noting that such payment may be appropriate against baseless allegations asserted against public officials because of their very capacity as public officials. They could properly be made “in connection with the nomination for election, election, or retention of any person to or in public office” (Id. § 9-1.5(A)(1)) or, although a personal debt, may “defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions” (Id. § 9-8.10(c)). A case-by-case analysis is required.
 
Rejecting both parties’ arguments that the Committee’s payments were made for defense fees incurred as a result of public corruption allegations―because Solis was not indicted―the Court nevertheless agreed with the Board’s conclusion that Solis’s legal fees amounted to a proper expenditure and were not prohibited as “satisfaction or repayment” of a personal debt (Id. § 9-8.10(a)(3)) because they were incurred “to defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions” (Id. § 9-8.10(c)). 

In re Application of County Collector, 2022 IL 126929

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan

This case deals with a single narrow detail of the information necessary to fulfill one requirement of a notice  of sale form advising the property owner that taxes had been sold at a tax sale. As result of the sale for the tax year 2014, the tax purchaser paid not only the 2014 taxes but also the second installment on the 2013 taxes, as was required to complete the sale. 

The form for the notice at issue required that the purchaser state “Sold for General Taxes of (year).” The assignee of the property owner filed a post judgment motion after the circuit court’s order to issue a tax judgment contending that the notice was improper because it did not list the taxes for both 2013 and 2014, but rather only 2014. The circuit court agreed and vacated the judgment. The appellate court, over a dissent, reversed, holding that although the purchaser was required to pay the unpaid 2013 second installment to complete the 2014 tax sale purchase, it did not purchase the 2013 taxes at the 2014 tax sale.

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, rejecting the contention of the assignee of the property owner that the notice of sale form is intended to provide information regarding the actual years of taxes paid at the tax sale and not simply the year of the delinquent taxes purchased at the sale. The Court found that the purpose served by the part of the notice form at issue is to provide the property owner with information “of the fact of the sale.” That purpose was served by listing the tax sale year of the delinquent taxes the purchaser acquired an interest in at the tax sale.

This opinion, by Justice Neville for the unanimous court, addresses the useful point of statutory interpretation that “headings” in legislation “are only helpful if they shed light on ambiguous words or phrases.” They cannot undo or limit that which the text makes plain.