Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Friday, January 24, 2025

Leading appellate attorneys review the Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Friday, January 24.

Walker v. Chasteen (the People of the State of Illinois, et al.), 2025 IL 130288

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Smyth LLC

In a class action making its second trip to the Illinois Supreme Court, the justices addressed whether individuals filing mortgage foreclosure complaints may recover in the circuit courts statutory “add-on” fees paid pursuant to a statute previously deemed unconstitutional on its face as violating the free access clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. Art I, section 12). The Supreme Court held that, under sovereign immunity principles, the Court of Claims, not the circuit court, had jurisdiction for return of the fees. For that reason, the court reversed an appellate decision holding otherwise and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment of dismissal.

Plaintiffs are Reuben Walker and others who challenged the statute, section 15.-1501 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 5/15-1504.1 (West 2012) and defendants are circuit clerks who imposed the fees. They successfully pursued, up to the Supreme Court, a permanent injunction against the defendants from enforcing section 15-1504.1 (along with two other statutes creating programs funded by the filing fees), and the court remanded the cause for further proceedings.

On remand, plaintiff pursued their the sole remaining claim, for the return of the unconstitutional fees ($50). The jurisdictional issues — circuit court or Court of Claims — hinged on an exception to the concept of sovereign immunity know as the “officer suit exception”. Arguing that the Sovereign Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 2020), applied at this juncture because the refund claim sought recovery of money from the State, defendants argued that plaintiffs could only proceed in the Court of Claims. The Sovereign Immunity Act protects the State from being named as defendant or a party in any court, other than as provided in the Court of Claims Act. The Supreme Court applied the principle that substance takes place over form, and held that the issues involved and the relief sought determined where the remanded issue could be adjudicated. 

The parties agreed that the “officer-suit exception,” also called “the prospective injunctive relief exception,” permittted the circuit court to hear the claims for injunctive relief in the first phase of the case seeking injunctive relief, because it fell within the essence of the officer-suit exception - forward looking relief. The defendants argued that, on remand, the constitutionality issue having been resolved, the officer-suit exception no longer applied, and what remained is a claim against the State to redress a past wrong.

Plaintiffs conceded that the State held all but a very small portion of the statutory filing fees the defendants collected and retained to cover administrative costs. Nonetheless, to maintain circuit court jurisdiction, plaintiffs relied on the complaint, in which they asserted constitutional matters and sought equitable relief, matters over which the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction. Plaintiffs also distinguished damages from restitution.

In analyzing the officer-suit exception, the Supreme Court agreed with defendants. The court found guidance in is prior decision in Parmar v. Madigan, 2018 IL 122265, where, like here, the plaintiffs did not alleged that defendants engaged in any conduct that was “outside of or contrary to their statutory authority”: instead, the defendant clerks acted pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. No prospective relief remained pending on remand, the overriding issue for purposes of applying the exception, and the Supreme Court again reversed the appellate court and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.

People v. Watkins-Romaine, 2025 IL 130618

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Prior to the effective date of the SAFE-T Act, which abolished cash bail in Illinois, Demarco Watkins-Romaine was arrested and had monetary bail set in the amount of $350,000. He remained in custody, unable to post that amount. After the SAFE-T Act took effect, Watkins-Romaine petitioned for release without bail. In response, the State filed a petition to detain.

At issue in the Illinois Supreme Court was whether the State may file a petition to detain in response to a defendant’s petition to remove a monetary bail condition. The circuit court had allowed the State’s petition to detain, while the appellate court had reversed, finding that a petition was not permitted under these circumstances and the State’s petition was therefore untimely. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the matter to the appellate court for consideration of Watkins-Romaine’s remaining contentions of error.

The Court first found that Watkins-Romaine failed to preserve the question for review by not objecting to the State’s petition to detain and not including the issue in his notice of appeal. (In a footnote, the Court noted that the preservation requirements in Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) are now even more stringent than they were at the time Watkins-Romaine filed his appeal such that an issue not included in a motion for relief will be deemed waived, not merely forfeited.) Because the issue was forfeited, it could only be addressed if the plain error test was satisfied. The first component of plain error review is to determine whether “clear or obvious” error occurred.

The majority held that there was no clear or obvious error here. Under the provisions of the SAFE-T Act, the State may file a petition to detain in a qualifying case either at the first appearance or within 21 days after a defendant’s arrest and release, pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c). Here, however, where Watkins-Romaine had cash bail set prior to the effective date of the SAFE-T Act, the State could not have filed a petition within the timeframe established in Section 110-6.1(c). But, Watkins-Romaine had the option to seek a hearing under 725 ILCS 5/110-5(e) once the SAFE-T Act went into effect. Section 110-5(e) is applicable to individuals like Watkins-Romaine, who were ordered released on cash bail but remained in custody, via 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b). Under Section 110-5(e), a defendant who remains detained due to the inability to satisfy a condition of release is entitled to have the conditions-of-release hearing re-opened to determine what available conditions will reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance and the safety of others.

Watkins-Romaine sought and received a hearing under Section 110-5(e). And, the Supreme Court concluded that it was proper for the State to participate in that hearing and to object to Watkins-Romaine’s release. More specifically, because Section 110-5(e) requires the court to “reopen” the conditions of release hearing, the court is entitled to consider at that reopened hearing which conditions, “if any,” are appropriate. Because a condition that the court had previously set – a substantial cash bail – was no longer available, the court could properly conclude that no other condition existed that could ensure the safety of the community. Further, the Court held that allowing the State to file a petition to detain at this stage, while not specifically provided for in the Code, was “the most practical approach, and the only one not leading to absurd and unexpected results.” Thus, where a defendant who previously had cash bail established prior to the effective date of the SAFE-T Act, seeks a continued detention hearing under Section 110-5(e), the State may petition to detain.

Justice Rochford filed a special concurrence. While she agreed with the ultimate decision to reverse the appellate court, she would have done so for different reasons. Justice Rochford observed that there is no statutory basis for allowing the State to file a petition to detain outside of the time limits set forth in 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c). And, there is no right to file a petition to detain in response to a defendant’s request for a hearing on continued detention under 725 ILCS 5/110-5(e), which is meant to address defendants who have been ordered released but remain in custody. Section 110-5(e) contains no provision for using such a hearing to reconsider the decision that defendant is eligible for release and no provision allowing the State to file a new petition to detain. Thus, Justice Rochford would have held that it was clear error to permit the State to pursue a petition to detain in response to Watkins-Romaine’s request for a continued detention hearing. But, because Watkins-Romaine had not challenged the State’s filing of the petition in the circuit court, thus failing to preserve it for review, the error could only be remedied if the plain error test was met. Here, Watkins-Romaine alleged only second-prong plain error, that is that the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the proceeding and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. Justice Rochford disagreed, concluding that the court’s consideration of the State’s untimely detention petition was not a structural error and thus did not rise to the level of second-prong plain error.

Petta v. Christie Business Holdings Co., 2025 IL 130337

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan

An unknown cybercriminal gained unauthorized access to one of Christie Clinic’s business email accounts.  The plaintiff Petta was a patient of Christie’s, which, in connection with Petta’s treatment, maintained her personal data of various types.  When Christie learned of the unauthorized access to Christie’s systems, Petta received a letter from Christie titled “Notice of Data Incident.”  Christie advised that its investigation could not determine to what extent the cybercriminal had actually reviewed information in the system.  Christie stated that the intrusion to “the impacted account may have contained” Petta’s information such as her social security number and medical insurance information, but that the intruder did not have access to her electronic medical record.

Petta filed a complaint for a putative class action contending that Christie had negligently failed to prevent its patients’ private personal data from being “exposed.”  The complaint sought to form a putative class consisting of “all persons whose Sensitive Information was exposed by the Christie Clinic Data Breach.”  Petta complained that the breach “exposed a variety of Sensitive Information” to the third party, and further that she had “experienced suspicious behavior in connection with her phone number and address,” in that her phone number and address were used in connection with a loan application at a bank in another state, under someone else’s name.

The Fifth District of the Appellate Court found that Petta lacked standing, the supreme court agreed, and the circuit court’s dismissal of the complaint was affirmed.

Justice Cunningham’s opinion for the unanimous court  began its analysis by describing standing as “one of the devices by which courts attempt to cull their dockets so as to preserve for consideration only those disputes which are truly adversarial and capable of resolution by judicial decision.”  Standing requires some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest.  That injury must be concrete, and a plaintiff which alleges only a “purely speculative” future injury or who is in no “immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury” lacks standing.  Here, Christie contended that Petta had not alleged an injury in fact, and the court agreed.  The Notice of Data Breach said only that certain of her information “may have been exposed,” and there was no allegation that the data had been actually acquired by the cybercriminal.  Even viewing the Notice of Data Breach in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Petta and the class members faced only an increased risk that their data had been obtained.  The court cited, in rapid fire order, five cases in support of the principle that an allegation of an increased risk of harm is insufficient to confer standing.

The court also treated Petta’s allegation concerning the unauthorized loan application. The court drew the distinction between Petta’s private personal data, the  gravamen of her complaint, and her publicly available phone number and address which were used by someone else.  Therefore, that allegation was not an instance of the acquisition of private information.

There is a bit of a research Easter egg embedded in the court’s approving recitation of the appellate court’s determination that the allegation regarding the loan application was also “purely speculative” because anyone could have committed the fraud using the same readily available public information.  In the cited paragraph of the Fifth District’s opinion, a footnote states:  “This court conducted a quick Google search and was able to locate Petta’s information … [W]e take judicial notice that Petta’s phone number and address are publicly available and accessible by anyone with Internet access … .”

The supreme court’s opinion also lays down a marker for a future petition for leave to appeal in some other case.  At the outset of the evaluation of the “loan application” allegation, which was unique to Petta, the court stated that this “raises the question of whether … the standing determination is made by focusing on those allegations that are applicable to the class as a whole, including the named plaintiff, or whether the standing determination is made by looking at those allegations that pertain too the named plaintiff.”  The court stated that it has not answered that question, and need not resolve it in this case.  However, the court offered citation to where SCOTUS has decided that issue.

Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC v. Illinois Gaming Board, 2025 IL 130036

By Amanda J. Hamilton, Konicek & Dillon, P.C.

The Illinois Supreme Court addressed issues of mootness, the public interest exception to mootness, and standing within the context of the complex licensing process involving both state and local governments and the Gaming Board.

In 2019, the General Assembly amended the Illinois Gaming Act to authorize the Illinois Gaming Board to issue six new casino licenses, including one to the City of Waukegan. The City issued a request for proposals, and one such proposal was submitted by Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC. Ultimately, the City passed resolutions certifying three applicants but not Potawatomi Casino. Potawatomi Casino filed suit against the City in Lake County, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, the Gaming Act, and the Open Meetings Act, seeking a declaration that the City Council votes on the proposals were void and seeking an injunctions requiring the City to certify Potawatomi Casino’s proposal. The City removed the case to federal court, where the district court found that Potawatomi Casino had failed to establish a constitutional violation and granted summary judgment in favor of the City. Potawatomi Casino appealed to the Seventh Circuit.  

Potawatomi Casino also filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief in Cook County (which was the subject of this particular decision), seeking to prohibit the Illinois Gaming Board from issuing a casino owners’ license to the City. Specifically, Potawatomi sought declarations finding that the City failed to satisfy the requirements for the Gaming Board to consider issuing a license and that the Gaming Board lacked authority to consider issuing a license to operate a Waukegan casino. It also sought an injunction preventing the Gaming Board from issuing a Waukegan casino license. The circuit court denied Potawatomi’s emergency motion for a temporary restraining order, and the First District appellate court affirmed. After the Gaming Board issued a finding of preliminary suitability in favor of one of the certified applicants, both the City and the Gaming Board moved to dismiss Potawatomi Casino’s complaint, and the circuit court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of standing.

The Appellate Court reversed, instead finding that Potawatomi Casino had a legally cognizable interest in its right to compete in a casino certification process that is fairly and lawfully conducted and that the alleged injury (i.e., the lost opportunity) was distinct and palpable and was reasonably traced to the City and the Gaming Board. While the appeal was pending, the Board issued a temporary operating permit and owner’s license to one of the other applicants, after which, both the Gaming Board and the City moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The appellate court refused, noting that the requested relief would require the retraction of the issued license and repeat of the application and certification process. Ultimately, the appellate Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court granted the City and Board’s petitions for leave to appeal. First, the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the June 2019 statutory amendment and the process by which the City certified applications to the Board and rejected Potawatomi Casino’s argument that the license issued to the successful applicant was void. The Court held that whether the City complied with the statutory requirements prior to certifying the applicants to the Board had no bearing on the Board’s jurisdiction to issue a license, and that each of the certifications, on their face, purported to comply with the statute.

Next, the Court addressed the issue of mootness, noting that another applicant had already received the owners’ license, that the Gaming Board did not have jurisdiction to revoke a license based on a municipality’s noncompliance with the Act, and that Potawatomi Casino was essentially requesting the Court to stop the licensing process before the Board (which was already complete) and have the City redo its certification process. Based on these facts, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred in finding that the appeal was not moot. However, the Court agreed with the City’s argument that the public interest exception for mootness was met because the lucrative nature of gaming licenses could lead to lawsuits by those who do not receive one, and in this instance, litigation had been hanging over the Board and City for several years, creating uncertainty regarding the validity of the license that was issued. Noting that this case was the third lawsuit involving this same dispute, the Court agreed to address the standing argument.

In concluding, the Illinois Supreme Court held that Potawatomi Casino lacked standing because it could not show a cognizable interest in the casino licensing process. The Court stated: “The city did not have to certify any applicant to the Board and could reject any applicant for any reason. While section 7(e-5) provides the matters the City must certify to the Board, the ultimate decision of whether to certify an applicant to the Board rested within the City’s discretion. Thus, we do not find the bidding cases cited established Potawatomi Casino possessed any vested right to a certain process.”

In re V.S., a Minor, 2025 IL 129755

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan

This opinion, by Justice Neville for a unanimous court,  provides a detailed narration of the facts of this guardianship proceeding.  The court resolved a split in authority among the districts of the appellate court on a question of when mootness obtains based upon the extent of the issues appealed.  This summary does not undertake to treat those facts nor the many rulings of the circuit and appellate courts, except to the extent that they directly relate to the resolution of that split of authority.

Seven days after the birth of V.S., the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, naming the unmarried parents as respondents.   The petition alleged that V.S. was neglected as a result of an injurious environment and abused as a result of substantial risk of physical injury. Following an adjudication hearing, the circuit court determined that V.S. was neglected because of an injurious environment and was dependent as a result of his mother’s disability under a section of the Juvenile Court Act. V.S. was adjudged to be a ward of the court, and DCFS was granted guardianship.

The father brought this appeal, arguing in part that the finding of neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court affirmed the adjudication order,  finding that the father’s challenges to the adjudication of neglect were moot  because he failed to also challenge the dependency finding. The appellate court also affirmed the disposition order, which had granted guardianship and custody to DCFS based on the finding that the father was unable to take care of V.S.

At an adjudicatory hearing, the court considers only “whether the minor is abused, neglected or dependent.” If the court finds that a minor is abused or neglected, it then conducts a dispositional hearing, in which it is determined whether the minor should be made a ward of the court. Here, the circuit court, without distinguishing between the parents made a finding of abuse and neglect under section 2-3 of the Act and a finding of dependency under section 2-4 of the Act.  By his appeal, the father only raised a challenge to the neglect finding, but not to the dependency finding.  A dispositional hearing is to be held if the court determines any one of three findings,  that “the minor is either abused or neglected or dependent.” That then implicates the appellate question posed in this case:  “Is a challenge to one finding sufficient when the court enters more than one finding, or will that render the appeal moot?”

The Supreme Court noted that the appellate court is divided on that question. The court resolved that split by holding that this appeal is moot  “because of (the father’s)  failure to challenge the dependency finding that would remain in effect even if this court were to have found error with respect to the neglect finding.”  The court expressly overruled those cases which had decided to the contrary.

The court also declined to apply the “collateral consequences” exception to mootness. Under that exception, a case is not moot if there remains a secondary or collateral injury despite the resolution of a party’s primary claim. But those collateral consequences “cannot be based on ‘vague, unsupported’ statements about the future.”  The court aired the arguments in detail, but found them to be insufficient to invoke the exception.

In a one sentence reminder of a principle of Supreme Court procedure,  the opinion concludes by stating that “any other questions not raised in the petition for leave to appeal as required by Rule 315 are forfeited.”

People v. White, 2025 IL 129767

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Sedrick White pled guilty to first degree murder in 1999. The plea contained no agreement as to the sentence, and the court ultimately sentenced White to 40 years in prison. He did not file a direct appeal, but more than 20 years later, filed a section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment. Included in that petition was White’s claim that his 40-year sentence constituted a de facto life term for an offense committed when he was 20 years old and that the sentence violated the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause. White cited scientific studies and articles on brain development of young adults and argued that the circuit court failed to consider his youth and rehabilitative potential at sentencing. The circuit court denied the petition, finding that the sentence was not a de facto life term because it was not more than 40 years and that White failed to demonstrate due diligence in presenting his claims to the court.

The appellate court affirmed. The court rejected the State’s argument that the petition was untimely, noting that the State had not objected or responded to the petition in the circuit court and thus had forfeited any claim as to timeliness. On the merits, the court concluded that White’s guilty plea waived any potential constitutional claim as to his sentence.

In the Supreme Court, White argued, and the State conceded, that a “blind” or open guilty plea – one where there is no agreement as to the sentence – does not waive a constitutional challenge to the sentence. The Supreme Court agreed. The general rule that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors, including constitutional ones, is grounded in contract principles precluding a defendant from unilaterally altering a fully negotiated plea agreement in which the sentence is inseparable from the conviction. In the case of an open plea, however, those principles do not apply because there is no sentence agreement to be breached by a defendant’s challenge to the sentence. The Court also pointed to the fact that Supreme Court Rule 604 requires only a motion to reconsider sentence, and not a motion to withdraw the plea, in order to challenge a non-negotiated sentence imposed following a guilty plea. Thus, White’s plea did not waive his sentencing challenge.

Because the Court accepted the State’s concession, White sought remand to the appellate court for consideration of the merits of his sentencing challenge. The State first responded that a 2-1401 petition was not the proper vehicle for White’s proportionate penalties challenge, but the Supreme Court refused to consider that procedural argument because the State had not raised it below and thus it was forfeited. But, the Court refused to remand to the appellate court and instead opted to review the substance of White’s petition in the interest of judicial economy.

On the merits, the Court found that White’s petition could not succeed. White conceded that his 40-year sentence was not mandatory and is not a de facto life sentence under People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327. He argued, though, that it was nevertheless disproportionate where the court failed to consider his age and rehabilitative potential. The Supreme Court disagreed. At 20 years old, White was not a juvenile when he committed the offense. Further, the factual basis at the plea showed that he intentionally shot an unarmed individual at close range, killing him, because the victim would not tell White where a criminal associate was located. And, the sentencing court had information about White, including his young age and lack of criminal history, when imposing sentence. Thus, White failed to state a meritorious claim, and the circuit court did not err in dismissing his petition.

Mercado v. S&C Electric Co., 2025 IL 129526

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Smyth LLC

Here the Illinois Supreme Court addressed a class action lawsuit in which plaintiffs alleged that their employer had shorted them overtime pay under section 12 of the Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/12 (West 2020). The issue before the court was whether the defendant employer, S&C Electric Company, incorrectly excluded certain bonus payments from the overtime calculation. Ruling for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court held that the plain statutory and regulatory language required the performance bonuses to be considered part of the “regular rate of pay” used to determine overtime compensation.

Two former S&C hourly-paid factory assembly workers, Carmen Mercado and Jorge Lopez, alleged in an amended complaint that they received bonuses not as gifts or any other category of payment excluded from overtime calculation. According to plaintiffs, the bonuses were paid as part of the company’s “regulator business practices” as compensation for their services performed at the company. On the plaintiffs’ pay stubs, S&C characterized the bonuses, ranging from $100 to $900, as payments for “success sharing,” “seniority award” and other categories, none of which referred to “gifts.” In both the trial court and the appellate court, S&C prevailed on a motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis that although S&C miscalculated the payments, the company made adjusted payments that fully satisfied the claimed damages. 

The plain language of section 12 of the Wage Law and a regulation promulgated under it guided the unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Cunningham. Section 4a(1) of the Wage Law requires an employer to pay at a minimum of 1.5 times “the regular rate at which [a worker] is employed.” Section 210.410 of the applicable administrative code regulation defines “regular rate” and its exclusions. 56 Ill. Adm. Code 210.410 (1995). “Regular rate” includes “all remuneration for employee meant paid to, or on behalf of the employee.” There are six exclusions, one of which was at issue here: “sums paid as gifts, such as those made at holidays or other amounts that are not measured by or dependent on hours worked.” 

The Supreme Court agreed with plaintiffs and amici, the Illinois Department of Labor and Illinois Attorney General, that the gift exclusion under the applicable regulation and Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) applied only to actual gifts and similar payments, like holiday bonuses or sums paid to a valued employee to be spent on a vacation. The court determined that S&C distorted the regulation in urging that gifts were not the only type of payment that fell within the exclusion at issue; it also includes other payments not based on hours. Noting other provisions of the regulatory scheme listing types of compensation not measured by hours but included in the regular rate of pay for certain employees, the court deemed plaintiffs’ interpretation of section 210.410(a) to align with the regulatory scheme as a whole, a conclusion also is supported by persuasive federal authority. 

The Supreme Court rejected S&C’s alternative argument that it had fully satisfied the alleged underpayment with adjustments for lost overtime wages, which, the employer argued, could be paid at any time before the employee filed a lawsuit. But in the court’s view, missing from the adjustment was a timely payment—the date on which the employees were due their wages. The adjustments did not moot the statutory claims for treble damages, attorney fees and costs. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed both the appellate and trial court’s judgments and remanded for further proceedings.

Martin v. Goodrich, 2025 IL 130509

By Amelia Buragas, Illinois State University

In Martin v. Goodrich, the Illinois Supreme Court was asked by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to provide guidance on three related questions of state law likely to have broad impact on cases brought by employees who discover years after the fact that they are suffering from a disease caused by their employment. The certified questions all pertained to section 1.1 of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act, 810 ILCS 310/1, which allows workers under certain circumstances to bypass the Act’s exclusivity provisions to pursue recovery through a civil action.

Rodney Martin worked for B.F. Goodrich Company for 46 years before he retired. Just a few years into his retirement, Rodney was diagnosed with a type of liver cancer believed to be caused by exposure to vinyl chloride, a chemical that Rodney was exposed to early in his career. He died less than a year after his diagnosis. Typically, recovery for Rodney’s illness and death would be limited to a cause of action filed pursuant to the Act. However, Rodney’s widow, Candice Martin, was time-barred from filing a lawsuit under the Act by a repose provision, so she instead used a recent amendment to the Act, section 1.1., which allows employees facing this type of predicament to pursue recovery through a civil action. Candice filed a civil lawsuit in federal court under the Wrongful Death Act and Survival Act against Goodrich and its successor-in-interest, PolyOne. The Seventh Circuit recognized the novelty of the questions raised and their potential widespread implications and certified three questions to the Illinois Supreme Court under SCR 20.

The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis by explaining that, until recently, the Act served as the sole avenue of recovery for Illinois workers who were injured or diagnosed with a disease in the course of their employment. The court also noted that in recent years, the Act’s repose provisions, combined with the latent tendency of some workplace illnesses has led to a “harsh result” for employees who were left without relief through no fault of their own because their disease did not manifest until many years after exposure. In 2019, the legislature sought to remedy this dilemma by adding section 1.1, which allows injured workers barred by the Act’s repose provisions to instead pursue a civil action.

This is a limited exception that only applies where the employee’s claim is barred by a repose provision contained in the Act. Thus, the first question certified by the Seventh Circuit asked whether section 1(f) of the Act is a repose provision as contemplated by section 1.1. The court discussed at length its prior opinion in Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2015 IL 118070 in which it concluded that a similar provision contained in section 6(c) of the Act was a repose provision and ultimately found the analysis regarding section 1(f) to be straightforward, concluding that because the language of section 1(f) terminates the employer’s liability after a period of time—regardless of whether the employee discovers the existence of a claim during that time— then “by its plain language, section 1(f) is a statute of repose.”

Having determined that section 1(f) is a statute of repose and covered under section 1.1 the court then turned to the second question, whether section 1.1 applies retroactively or prospectively. The court looked to section 4 of the Statute on Statutes for guidance and concluded that because section 1.1 changed the statutory framework in order to allow employees barred from recovery under the Act to seek compensation through civil actions, section 1.1 made substantive changes to the Act and could only be applied prospectively. This led to the final question considered by the court in its hat trick of statutory interpretation—whether the prospective application of section 1.1 violated the defendant's due process guarantees under the Illinois Constitution. Defendant argued that a prospective application served to bar plaintiff’s claim because defendant had a vested interest in pursuing dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint through the exclusivity provision of the Act that pre-dated section 1.1 and that its prospective application would be a violation of due process. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that a prospective application of the statute did not bar her lawsuit because it merely meant that section 1.1 applies to new actions filed after the enactment date and did not compromise any vested interest.

The court agreed with the plaintiff, explaining this while a defendant’s due process rights would be violated if section 1.1 served to resurrect an already-extinguished claim, that was not the case here. Rather, the exclusivity provision of the Act is an affirmative defense that does not accrue until the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues and the plaintiff’s cause of action does not accrue until they discover that they are injured. In this case, plaintiff’s cause of action accrued when her husband was diagnosed with cancer, and this occurred after section 1.1 went into effect. The court further explained that this outcome was not only the most rational conclusion, but that a contrary finding would “undermine the legislative intent in amending the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act to include section 1.1.”

As such, the opinion written by Justice Holder White for a unanimous court, can be summarized as follows: 1) section 1(f) is a “period of repose or repose provision” for the purposes of the exception provided in section 1.1 to the exclusivity rule, 2) the exception in section 1.1 applies prospectively under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes and, 3) the prospective application of section 1.1 does not violate an employer’s due process.

Ontinveroz v. Khokhar, 2025 IL 130316

By Amanda J. Hamilton, Konicek & Dillon, P.C.

Following the 2021 election for Glendale Heights village president, DuPage County Clerk Jean Kaczmarek certified the election results as 475 votes for Chodri Ma Khokhar and 473 votes for Mike Ontiveroz. Thirty days after the election was certified, Ontiveroz filed a “Verified Petition” to contest the election results but failed to attach any verifications or affidavits. In his Petition, Ontiveroz alleged that several ballots did not comply with the requirements of the Election Code. A few days later, Ontiveroz filed a Motion to Supplement the Petition, alleging that three people had verified the original petition but that the verification affidavits were somehow not filed with the Petition. The circuit court permitted that motion and permitted Ontiveroz to amend his original petition. Kaczmarek (named as a defendant due to her position as County Clerk) filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Ontiveroz’s failure to file a verified petition within the 30-day statutory timeframe resulted in the circuit court lacking jurisdiction. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the case.

The appellate court reversed, instead finding that the Election Code only required the filing of a petition within 30 days and the subsequent verification of the petition was sufficient. The appellate court, however, also raised, but did not decide, two other jurisdictional issues, including “special statutory jurisdiction” and the fact that “the language of the original petition was somewhat ambiguous as to whether petitioner had actually voted in the election at issue, another requirement of the statute.” Regardless, the appellate court remanded the matter for further proceedings.

The Illinois Supreme Court granted Kaczmarek’s petition for leave to appeal and addressed the subject matter jurisdiction issues raised, taking the opportunity to further explain and clarify special statutory jurisdiction, affirmatively state that the Illinois Constitution applies special statutory jurisdiction to all circuit court review of administrative action, and explain Belleville Toyota’s interpretation of subject-matter jurisdiction. Further, the Court opted to “interpret the constitutional limit on jurisdiction in light of its purpose and the definition of administrative action, determine whether county clerks administering elections perform administrative actions, and determine whether petitions in election contests challenging actions of a county clerk must meet the pleading standards for special statutory jurisdiction.”

Ultimately, the Court held that “a decision or implementation relating to the government’s executive function qualifies as an executive action,” and further that county clerks are performing an administrative action when they administer elections. Specifically, the Court stated:  “We hold that county clerks administering elections perform administrative actions, within the meaning of article VI, section 9, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9). Therefore, courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to review a petition challenging the county clerk’s administrative actions in election cases only if the petition complies with section 23-20 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/23-20 (West 2020)).”

As to those issues, the Court reminded the appellate court that it had an independent duty to address the issues of subject-matter jurisdiction it raised. The Court then held that Ontiveroz’s original petition failed to allege that he voted in the election and therefore failed to meet the statutory requirements. Further, the Court held that because the initial petition was not verified, it failed to meet the statutory requirements. These failures resulted in the circuit court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, and the petition should have been dismissed.

Editor's Note:  Additional summaries of opinions will be added to this post as they are received.

Posted on January 24, 2025 by Timothy A. Slating
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