Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Thursday, April 24, 2025

Leading appellate attorneys review the Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Thursday, April 24. 

Piasa Armory, LLC v. Kwame Raoul, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of the State of Illinois, 2025 IL 130539 

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan

The setting of this case could not be more efficiently described than Justice Rochford did at the outset of her opinion for the court.  “Section 2-101.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Pub. Act 103-5, Section 2 (eff. June 6, 2023) (adding 735 ILCS 5/2-101.5)) sets venue in Sangamon and Cook Counties for actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief from a constitutional challenge to a state statute, rule, or executive order.  The circuit court of Madison County ruled that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to individuals residing or injured outside of those two counties.”  On this direct appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 302(a), enabled by a finding under Rule 304(a), the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding that this venue statute was not unconstitutional on this as-applied challenge.

The underlying case is brought by the plaintiff firearms dealer in Madison County, asserting a facial challenge to the constitutionality of an addition to the Consumer Fraud Act commonly known as the Firearms Industry Responsibility Act. Plaintiff’s complaint also contained a count asserting the unconstitutionality of this venue provision.  Because the Attorney General moved to transfer venue from Madison County to Sangamon County pursuant to this provision, the provision was before the circuit court both as a matter of procedure and substantively in the complaint.

The court started its analysis by noting that “from the earliest history of this State, and under three different constitutions,” the legislature has always assumed and exercised the power of determining the venue of transitory actions. Further, venue requirements are procedural and define only where the case will be heard; they have no relation to jurisdiction.  While courts will generally not interfere with the actions of the legislature on venue, “a statute fixing venue may be so arbitrary or unreasonable that it deprives a defendant of due process.” The court noted that it has declared a venue statute unconstitutional only once, “in a 4 to 3 decision,” in Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm’n, 139 Ill. 2d 24 (1990). 

Here, the court, in keeping with the analysis in Williams, applied the balancing of factors prescribed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). For that test, the State asserted here that section 2-101.5 promotes the efficient and just adjudication of cases with constitutional importance by reducing the likelihood of conflicting opinions, while having the cases adjudicated by courts most experienced in public law issues.  The court found that to be a legitimate interest of the State, “especially in light of recent statewide litigation asserting duplicative constitutional claims.”  Upon that balancing process, the court concluded  that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied because requiring plaintiff to litigate in Sangamon County “does not deprive it of the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 

As asides, the court noted that even in this case, the circuit court conducted the hearing on the motion to transfer venue and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment by Zoom, and that plaintiff’s attorney “has already traveled to Sangamon County for oral argument before this court.”  Those remarks had additional resonance in this case because the circuit court, while stating in its ruling that forum non conveniens principles did not apply, nonetheless discussed the claimed inconveniences with reference to some of those principles.  That, in part, gave rise to the filing of three substantial amicus briefs by a) Illinois Defense Counsel and the DRI Center for Law and Public Policy, b)  the Illinois Manufacturers Association, joined by many business and insurer interests, and c) the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, all of which were devoted to forum non conveniens, and the contention by ITLA that  the court “should take this opportunity to limit forum non conveniens to interstate application.”  The Supreme Court demurred, saying  “That subject is not at issue in this appeal, so we do not address it.” 

Justice Holder White specially concurred.  She stated that the majority properly analyzed and found that the venue statute was not unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff.  However she felt “compelled” to address the dissent of Justice Overstreet, to the extent that he found the act to be unconstitutional because of the three-readings rule, and in doing so “extols” her dissent in Caulkins v. Pritzker, 2023 IL 129453, ¶ 84 et seq., in which Justice Overstreet had joined.  Justice Holder White stated that unlike in Caulkins, the three-readings rule issue was not properly before the court here.

Justice Overstreet’s dissent is longer than the majority opinion.  He wrote at length that the statute should be found to be unconstitutional on the merits of the challenges presented, including denial of meaningful access to the courts, and therefore struck down in its entirety.  He also set out the alternative basis for affirming the circuit court  on the “additional” ground in support of affirmance  that the enrolled-bill doctrine should no longer bind circuit courts to ignore constitutional violations of the three-readings rule.  Here, this venue statute started life as an amendment to the Landlord and Tenant Act, involving reusable tenant screening reports. That passed the House, but it was all stricken in the Senate, being replaced with the venue provision at issue here.  Noting that he “wholeheartedly agreed[d]” with the dissent in Caulkins, he incorporated many pages of it into his dissent here.

People v. Guy, 2025 IL 129967

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

In 2002, Travaris Guy was charged with first degree murder of David Woods and attempt first degree murder of Sheena Woods. The charges arose out of a shooting incident where Guy, who was the passenger in a vehicle, fired the shots that killed David and injured Sheena, who were in another vehicle. At the time of the shooting, Guy’s family and the Woods family were in a “serious feud,” and there was conflicting evidence as to which family was the instigator in that feud. At trial, Guy asserted that he acted in self-defense. Ultimately, he was convicted of second degree murder as to David, on the basis of unreasonable-belief-in-self-defense, as well as attempt first degree murder as to Sheena.

Here, because Guy was found guilty of second degree murder as to David, the jury necessarily found that he acted with the belief that his actions were justified by the need to defend himself, albeit unreasonably. And, because Guy believed in the need for self-defense at the time of the shooting, he could not be convicted of attempt first degree murder as to Sheena because he did not intend to kill “without lawful justification.” Accordingly, the court reversed Guy’s attempt conviction, entered conviction on the lesser included offense of aggravated battery with a firearm, and remanded the matter for resentencing on that lesser offense.

On a procedural note, the supreme court also pointed out that the State’s petition for leave to appeal argued exclusively that the court should grant leave to appeal “on the important issue of the mental state requirement for attempt first degree murder.” In briefing, though, the State raised a number of alternative arguments, including whether Guy had established cause to file his successive post-conviction petition, whether any relief on the substantive issue was barred by the doctrine of invited error, whether the verdicts of second degree murder and attempt first degree murder were actually legally consistent because they were based on separate acts, and whether the appropriate remedy for any error was a new trial rather than entry of a lesser conviction.

Under Rule 315, a petitioner’s PLA must include a statement of the points relied upon in asking the court to review the lower court’s judgment as well as a short argument explaining why review is warranted. As to the additional issues raised here, the State’s petition met neither of those requirements and thus those points were forfeited. Accordingly, the supreme court declined to consider the issues of whether Guy established cause and whether the underlying verdicts were actually legally consistent. As to cause, the court held that it was a procedural argument completely unrelated to the substantive question presented in the PLA and thus was not properly before the court. And, the State’s argument that the verdicts were actually consistent because they were based on separate acts was directly contradicted by the position the State had taken in the appellate court, where the State conceded that Guy’s intent had not changed throughout the entirety of the shooting incident.

Noting that it may consider an issue not raised in a PLA where the issue is “inextricably intertwined” with other matters properly before the court, however, the court agreed to review the State’s invited-error argument. But, the court went on to reject invited error as a basis to deny relief here where Guy demonstrated that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, on appeal, and in earlier post-conviction proceedings, thus overcoming any claim of invited error.

The court also agreed to consider the question of the appropriate remedy “in the interests of justice.” Under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(3), a reviewing court has the authority to reduce the degree of the offense of which the appellant was convicted, and the court found it necessary to exercise that authority here.

A dissenting justice would have reached the question of cause, rejecting the State’s framing of the issue in the PLA and instead concluding that the correct issue was whether the trial court erred in dismissing Guy’s successive post-conviction petition. On that question, the dissent would have ruled in the State’s favor.

People v. Harris, 2025 IL 130351

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Several years after being convicted of multiple offenses at multiple trials, Ralph Harris filed a post-conviction petition alleging that newly discovered evidence of a pattern and practice of coercion by Area 2 police detectives corroborated his previously-rejected claims that his confessions were coerced and therefore involuntary. Accordingly, Harris argued, introduction of those confessions at trial violated his fifth amendment and due process rights. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing, at which it found that Harris had established a pattern and practice of physical abuse at Area 2. But, the court ultimately denied Harris’s petition.

Harris appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new hearing for the purpose of determining if the outcome of the suppression hearing would have been different in light of the new pattern and practice evidence. People v. Harris, 2021 IL App (1st) 182172 (Harris I). On remand, the circuit court denied relief on the coerced-confession claim but vacated Harris’s convictions and ordered new trials, concluding that it was possible that the new pattern and practice evidence could have led to a different result because the jury may have given different weight to Harris’s statements had it heard that evidence. The State appealed, and Harris sought to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that it was an unauthorized interlocutory appeal. The appellate court dismissed, concluding that it was actually the prior appeal, and not the proceedings on remand, that had vacated Harris’s convictions and granted new trials, at least implicitly.

The supreme court disagreed, with one justice dissenting. The order in Harris I was a remand for additional proceedings on Harris’s coerced-confession claim, nothing more. It did not vacate Harris’s convictions, nor did it direct the circuit court to order a new trial. The proceedings on remand were simply a continuation of the earlier post-conviction proceedings, and the circuit court’s new trial order following those continued proceedings was a final, appealable post-conviction judgment. Thus, the matter was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of the merits of the State’s appeal.

The dissenting justice would have held that Harris I constituted an order granting post-conviction relief and the remand proceedings were the beginning of new pretrial proceedings, specifically a pre-trial motion to suppress. Accordingly, the dissent would have affirmed the appellate court’s dismissal order.

People v. Yankaway, 2025 IL 130207

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

In March 2020, the Illinois Supreme Court entered an emergency order related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Among other things, that order tolled speedy-trial terms in criminal cases. A subsequent order, entered on June 30, 2021, and effective October 1, 2021, restored the time restrictions of the speedy trial statute.

On April 7, 2020, Jaterrius Yankaway was arrested and charged in connection with the shooting of his cousin, Robert Hunter, which had occurred on July 26, 2019. On April 30, 2020, Yankaway was charged separately with an unrelated weapons offense. Yankaway was tried beginning on September 19, 2022, and was convicted of attempt murder. On appeal, he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to file a speedy trial demand under the intrastate detainers statute, 730 ILCS 5/3-8-10. Yankaway asserted that the statute applied because he was also in custody on the separate weapons charge while awaiting trial in this case. He also asserted that counsel should have objected to a February 28, 2022, continuance, which placed his trial date outside of the statutory speedy-trial term, and that, regardless, that continuance should not have been attributed to him because he later personally disavowed counsel’s decision.

The appellate court held that while counsel performed deficiently by not filing  a demand under the intrastate detainers statute, Yankaway could not show prejudice because his claim was speculative as to whether, had he filed a speedy-trial demand, his trial would have been held in a timely manner. 

The supreme court first clarified that Yankaway actually was not subject to the intrastate detainers statute because he was not committed to the Departmnet of Corrections when the State proceeded on one of his charges, as required by section 3-8-10. Instead, the speedy-trial provision of 725 ILCS 5/103-5(e) applied. Under section 103-5(e), when a defendant faces multiple charges in the same county, trial on a pending charge must take place within 160 days of the judgment on the prior charge. No demand is required to trigger that 160-day period. Here, Yankaway was in the Peoria County Jail on multiple charges, and was sentenced on the first of those on September 28, 2020, at which time the 160-day clock for the instant case automatically began. Because the interstate detainers statute did not apply, counsel could not be ineffective for failing to file a demand.

The supreme court agreed, however, that counsel performed deficiently by not objecting to a crucial continuance which moved Yankaway’s trial date outside of the speedy trial term. The record showed that Yankaway informed counsel of his request for a speedy trial prior to counsel agreeing to the February 28, 2022 continuance, and counsel failed to object. On that date, the court granted a continuance, which it attributed to both parties, until July 11, 2022 – a date beyond the 160-day speedy-trial term. “[D]efense counsel was duty bound to protect that right [to a speedy trial] and his failure to do so established that his performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”

As for prejudice, however, neither party could do more than speculate. Yankaway argued that if counsel had objected, the charges would have been dismissed in September, at the conclusion of the 160 days. But that argument ignored the possibility that the State might have changed its pretrial strategy had counsel objected, and that the circuit court, which was aware of the speedy trial implications of each continuance, might have changed its approach, as well. Because Yankaway had the burden to show a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome, and because speculation could not overcome that burden, he could not establish prejudice.

The court rejected Yankaway’s assertion that based on this record, the delay was nevertheless improperly attributed to him because he personally objected. When counsel agrees to a continuance, that delay is attributable to the defendant. Yankaway noted that unlike 725 ILCS 103(a), section 103-5(e) does not expressly require a defense objection to preserve the right. But the court held that in this case, counsel affirmatively waived any speedy trial claims by agreeing to the continuance and new date.

The court also upheld Yankaway’s 44-year sentence for attempt murder. That offense was a Class X felony with a range of six-to-30 years, and the jury found that Yankaway possessed a gun during the commission of the crime, requiring a 15-year sentence enhancement. At sentencing, however, the court stated that the minimum sentence was 26 years rather than 21, apparently under the misconception that the 20-year add-on for personal discharge of a firearm had been found to apply.

Yankaway argued the sentencing court committed plain error by sentencing him under an inaccurate sentencing range. The appellate court held that he could not show the mistaken range influenced the sentence, and the supreme court agreed. At sentencing, the trial judge noted his belief that Yankaway was “overwhelmingly guilty,” that his crime was “stunning” because he shot at his cousin and friends, that based on his record, he strikes fear not only in the community, but in his own family, and that he was “the reason prisons are built.” In light of these statements, Yankaway could not establish “he would have received a lower sentence but for the court’s misunderstanding; therefore he cannot satisfy his burden of showing a clear and obvious error.”